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

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Issued in Spring, Summer, Fall, and Winter, POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY (ISSN 0032-3195) is published by the Academy of Political Science, 475 Riverside Drive, Suite 1274, New York, NY 10115-1274. Subscriptions are obtained through membership in the Academy.

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PUBLISHED INDICES: A title page and an index of articles and book reviews appears in the Winter issue of *PSQ*. *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature* lists articles from 1886 to 1953 and *The Science Index* has articles dating from 1953 to the present. Articles are also listed in *ABC Pol Sci*, *The International Bibliography of Political Science*, and the *Public Affairs Information Services Bulletin*. Articles are abstracted in *United States Political Science Documents*, *The International Political Science Abstracts*, *Historical Abstracts*, *Urban Affairs Abstracts*, and *America: History and Life*. Book reviews are listed in *The Book Review Digest to Social Science Periodicals*, *Book Review Index*, and *Book Review Digest*.

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Postmaster—send address changes to Political Science Quarterly, 475 Riverside Drive, Suite 1274, New York, NY 10115-1274.

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Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 7-36315.

Printed by Capital City Press, Montpelier, Vermont.

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POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

Volume 111 • Number 1 • Spring 1996

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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

ROBERT J. ART analyzes the six-year political struggle that took place within Western Europe to define its post-cold war security arrangements. He shows why NATO and the American military presence remain essential ingredients of Western Europe's stability.

EFRAIM INBAR examines the ways in which changing international and regional environments as well as internal developments within Israel have influenced Israel's recent strategic thinking.

GRAHAM P. RAMSDEN looks at the mass media's balance of issue and candidate coverage during American election campaigns. He argues that when coverage is inappropriately balanced, voters find it difficult to get the information they need to make decisions in the way democratic theory would require.

TAYLOR E. DARK discusses the relationship between labor unions and the congressional Democratic party during the 1980s. He concludes that because of close cooperation between a more unified and well coordinated labor movement and a more homogenous and disciplined Democratic party, unions played a greater role in congressional politics than is commonly realized.

JOHN ORME investigates the unfolding of rapprochement between Austria and Germany, West Germany and the Soviet Union, and Egypt and Israel. He concludes that threat or use of force can, contrary to the widespread opinion, provide the crucial impetus for reconciliation between international rivals.

DONALD R. CULVERSON examines the rise of American anti-apartheid activism as a result both of opportunities created by shifting power configurations in southern Africa and of declining public confidence in U.S. government and corporate responses to political crises in South Africa. He explores how activists capitalized on structural changes in American society to develop new resources, constituencies, and action repertoires for challenging U.S. connections to the apartheid system.

In a critical review essay of Robert S. McNamara's *In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam*, ROGER HILSMAN argues that despite the book's purported attempt to set the record straight, it in fact contains many misstatements of fact and false allegations about the role of other officials in decisions made during the Vietnam War.

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DEMETRIOS CARALEY

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Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO

ROBERT J. ART

The rich, industrialized, democratic, northern states, we are told, have entered a new era in their relations with one another. These states—meaning the United States, Canada, Western Europe, the Scandinavian countries, and Japan—now constitute a "pluralistic security community," wherein the rule of law, not the use of force, settles disputes and conflicts that arise among its members.[1] War among these states is now unthinkable; and as a consequence, so it is argued, security concerns and military considerations hold little sway as these states deal with one another. Instead, international institutions, high economic interdependence, and the pacifying effects of democracy are the central determinants of state relations within this emergent security community.

As exhibit number one, advocates of this view offer the Maastricht Treaty of 1991, which put Europe on the course of true political union. Two central pillars of European Political Union (EPU) are: European Monetary Union (EMU), which means a common currency and a single central bank for all member states; and a common foreign and security policy (CFSP), with the expectation that ultimately Europe will create its own defense capability. Whether these advocates hold to the supranational or the intergovernmental model of European integration, they cite both EMU and CFSP as evidence that traditional Realist analysis, which

[1] The phrase "pluralistic security community" comes from Karl W. Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1969), 5–8. For examplars about the changed nature of state relations in Western Europe and about the pacific effects of democracy, Richard H. Ullman, *Securing Europe* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), chap. 2; Jacques Delors, "European Integration and Security," *Survival* 33 (March/April 1991): 99–109; and Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), chaps. 1, 2, 4.

ROBERT J. ART is Herter Professor of International Relations at Brandeis University and research associate, The Olin Institute, Harvard University. This article draws from his forthcoming book, *Selective Engagement: An American Grand Strategy.*

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stresses the importance of security concerns and considerations of relative power, no longer captures the political reality in Western Europe today.

I challenge this view. It is both wrong and dangerous to believe that security and power no longer motivate the Western European states in their relations with one another. The view is wrong-headed because it is factually incorrect, as I shall show. It is dangerous because policy based on this mistaken view carries the risk of disastrous outcomes. Realist analysis, because it highlights the role of security and relative power, remains valid in understanding what is happening in Western Europe today. The desire for security vis-à-vis one another has played a role in the Western European states' second great push for closer union in the 1990s, just as it did during their first great push of the late 1940s and early 1950s. In neither phase of Europe's integration can economic considerations alone explain elite motivations. In the first phase, the desire to banish war from Europe and to tame Germany drove European elites equally as much as did their desire to generate wealth. In the second phase, the desire to constrain a newly unified Germany and "to Europeanize Germany rather than Germanize Europe" similarly drove European elites equally as much as did their desire to make Europe a more cohesive and powerful economic and political actor vis-à-vis the United States and Japan.[2]

No less a figure than Helmut Kohl, the chancellor of Germany and the prime driver behind European Union, has argued that security factors and relative power still count in the new Europe. In October 1995, when addressing his fellow Christian Democrats, Kohl argued that monetary union was not simply an issue of wealth, but also one of "war and peace in the 21st century" and

> To anyone who says this is inadmissable histrionics, I ask this question: Who among us five years ago would have believed that the Balkans would have fallen so rapidly into fratricidal war, to ethnic hounding, to rape, murder and death?[3]

In a front-page article for *Die Zeit*'s weekly, he went on to stress that concerns about relative power still remain important in Europe and that they must be constructively addressed. Kohl argued that should Europe fail to achieve monetary union, then it would regress to a mere common market, which would be politically split between those states within the mark zone and an anti-German alliance of those that were not. What would then ensue, in his words, is the following: "Germany's dominance would necessarily provoke fear and envy among all our neighbors and move them toward common action against Germany." Finally, in early 1996, he argued: "If there is no momentum for continued integration this will not only lead to a standstill, but to regression. Nationalism has brought great

[2] For a Realist analysis applied to European Monetary Union, see Joseph M. Grieco, "State Interests and Institutional Rule Trajectories: A Neorealist Interpretation of the Maastricht Treaty and European Economic and Monetary Union," *Security Studies* 5 (Spring 1996): 176–22.

[3] Helmut Kohl, quoted in Alan Cowell, "Kohl Casts Europe's Economic Union as War and Peace Issue," *New York Times*, 17 October 1995. Kohl was addressing a party congress in Karlsruhe.

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suffering to our continent. Just think of the first 50 years of this century."[4] No better statements can be found about the weight that security and relative power factors still play in intra-West European statecraft, here even in the realm of economic and monetary affairs.

In this article, I show that Kohl has a better grasp of what is going on in Europe today than do those analysts who denigrate traditional state concerns for security and relative power. I concentrate on Western Europe's political struggle to define its future security arrangements from the middle of 1989 to the end of 1995. This struggle is commonly referred to as either "the Eurodefense debate" or the debate over "Europe's Security Architecture." The struggle began when it first became clear to Europeans and Americans that Germany might be reunified and the cold war ended and concluded with the United States and NATO reasserting their continued relevance to European security with NATO's assumption of its peace enforcement role in Bosnia. During these six years, the United States and the Western Europeans struggled with one another both to define the future security arrangements for Europe and to keep the United States militarily engaged there. My central argument is that Western Europe's drive to create a European Defense Identity (EDI), which would encompass both CFSP and the common defense, was motivated by three elite worries: fears about the power of a newly reunited Germany; concern that the United States might leave Europe now that the cold war had ended; and as a consequence of the first two, the nightmare that Europe might revert to its destructive nationalistic past unless corrective steps were taken. "Renationalization fears" is the generic term used by the European political-military elite to encompass these three interrelated worries.

Although I stress the role that security and relative power considerations played within Western Europe as it debated its security future during this period, I do not claim that these two fully explain the drive for either EPU or EDI. They are only part of the story, even though I believe they are the most important part. European elites were also motivated by three other desires: first, to make the common market more efficient and productive by creating a single currency and central bank; second, to make European firms more competitive in the global economy by enabling them to take advantage of greater economies of scale within the newly revamped single market; and third, to enhance Europe's international political clout by fostering a more united foreign and security policy. I do not deny the importance of these three motives, but I do claim that they, too, are only part of the story. Neither EPU nor EDI makes sense unless we understand that security concerns and relative power considerations continue to play an important role in the calculations of the Western European states via-à-vis one another.

[4] Cited in John Tagliabue, "Europe's Union of Currencies in Anxiety Stage," *New York Times*, 2 November 1995; and Alan Cowell, "Bonn Admits Currency Plan for Europe Has Problems," *New York Times*, 7 February 1996.

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The struggle within Western Europe to construct its security future is, therefore, a hard case for Realism. Apart from the case of the United States and Canada, Western Europe is the other place where a pluralistic security community has taken the firmest root. I demonstrate that even though there is a commitment to the rule of law and the pacific resolution of disputes among the states of Western Europe, none of their elites take either for granted. To the contrary, they have been motivated in part by their fears about what might happen to this security community if they did take matters for granted. By revealing the role these fears played, I demonstrate that Realism passes this hard test and in the process show that those who dismiss them are engaged in woolly-headed flights of dangerous irrelevance.

To make my argument, I proceed in the following fashion. First, I define more precisely what renationalization fears mean and then provide an overview of the political struggle that subsequently took place to construct Western Europe's future security arrangements. Second, I show how the major state actors (the United States, Britain, France, and Germany) used international institutions as tools in their battles with one another to construct these arrangements. Third, I lay out the compromises through which this political struggle reached resolution and illustrate the role played by the Yugoslav crisis in resolving it. Fourth and last, I draw some policy implications for American foreign policy, arguing that the American military presence remains of central importance for stability in Western Europe.

One final point. This analysis focuses on security matters within Western Europe. I do not treat the big subject of NATO's enlargement or the even bigger one of pan-European security (how an enlarged NATO should relate to Russia, Ukraine, and all those other states not likely to be taken into NATO). For Europe's political future, these are critical issues, and I do not denigrate their importance. My task, however, is a different one. Equally important to Europe's future, indeed central to it, are peaceful relations among the Western European states. Those relations, in the view of the Western Europeans, are not something that can be taken for granted, nor something that closer economic integration by itself will solve. Indeed, matters are the reverse: closer economic relations will not work unless security concerns are properly dealt with first. Therefore, if Europe as a whole is ever to achieve a large measure of peace, Western Europe must play a central role, but it will be unable to do so unless its own nightmares are held in check.

Renationalization of Defense

Renationalization Fears

The renationalization fears experienced by Western Europe's political-military elites centered on this worry: they might return to what French analyst Francois Heisbourg called "la geopolitique de grand'papa" (old-style geopolitics) if the

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United States left.[5] These elites feared that their security and defense affairs would retrogress from multilateralism to nationalism—from the multilateral, transparent, and cooperative approach that had been achieved within NATO under forty years of American leadership to a nationalistic, competitive, autonomous, noncooperative approach. Renationalization thus meant the return to the nationalistic pursuit of security and defense policies.[6]

In itself, this would not be a danger; it would only waste money. What the Western Europeans feared, however, was the spread of nationalistic backsliding from these matters to others, to foreign policy and ultimately to the entire range of issues on which they cooperated. They feared, in short, the spill over effects that nationalism in one issue area would have on other issue areas. If that were to happen, then the Western European states could well return to the destructive power politics that they had just spent the last forty-five years trying to banish from their part of the continent. Thus, so these elites reasoned, the renationalization of security and defense matters could seriously threaten, if not fatally harm, the economic union Western Europe had already achieved, as well as make impossible the greater political union they were seeking. In sum, renationalization threatened a potentially fatal blow to Western European integration.[7]

[5] See Francois Heisbourg, "The European-U.S. Alliance: Valedictory Reflections on Continental Drift in the Post-Cold War Era," *International Affairs* 60 (April 1992): 669.

[6] For evidence about the more nationalistic approach to defense matters in the early 1990s, see Jan Willem Honig, "The 'Renationalization' of Western European Defense," *Security Studies* 2 (Autumn 1992): 122–139.

[7] The analysis of political-military elite attitudes in this and succeeding sections is based in part on over one hundred interviews I conducted in Western Europe and Washington, DC periodically from 1990 to 1994. I also found especially useful the following published sources: Catherine Guicherd, *A European Defense Identity: Challenge and Opportunity for NATO* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 12 June 1991); Louise Richardson, "British State Strategies after the Cold War" and Stanley Hoffmann, "French Dilemmas and Strategies in the New Europe" both in Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, and Stanley Hoffmann, *After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989–1991* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 148–169 and 127–148, respectively; Elizabeth Pond, *Beyond the Wall: Germany's Road to Unification* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1993); Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, *Germany United and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995); Paul R. S. Gebhard, *The United States and European Security*, Adelphi Paper #286 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1994); Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, *At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993); Diego Ruiz Palmer, *French Strategic Options in the 1990s*, Adelphi Paper #260 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, July 1991); Anand Menon, Anthony Forster, and William Wallace, "A Common European Defense?" *Survival* 34 (Autumn 1992): 98–119; Daniel Vernet, "The Dilemma of French Foreign Policy," *International Affairs* 68 (April 1992): 655–664; Richard Corbett, "The Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 30 (September 1992): 271–298; David S. Yost, "Mitterrand and Defense and Security Policy," *French Politics and Society* 9 (Summer/Fall 1991): 141–158; David S. Yost, "France and West European Defense Identity," *Survival* 33 (July/August 1991): 327–352; Steven Philip Kramer, "The French Question," *The Washington Quarterly* 14 (Autumn 1991): 83–96; Ronald Tiersky, "Mitterrand, France, and Europe," *French Politics and Society* 9 (Winter 1991): 9–25; Ronald Tiersky, "France in the New Europe," *Foreign Affairs* 71 (Spring 1992): 131–147; Alexander Moens, "American Diplomacy and German Unification,"

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As a consequence, no matter how much they disagreed with one another, no European government envisioned a Europe without an American military presence. They may have differed about the political-military role the United States would play and how it would play it, but none, not even France, wanted the United States to leave. Germany's neighbors wanted the United States in because they worried about a united Germany if it were out. Germany wanted the United States in because it worried about its neighbors' worries if the Americans were out. Of course, all worried about the Soviet Union's power before it broke up and the chaos within its former borders after it did. But fear of nationalistic backsliding within Western Europe if the United States left was as potent a fear as that of Soviet-Russian power and chaos. The unanimous wish that the United States stay is the most potent evidence available that Western Europe's governments still do not trust themselves to avoid the worst excesses of their past.

Yet, this fear that their security and defense affairs might once again become renationalized presents a puzzle. After all, the states of Western Europe are all democracies, they have high levels of economic interdependence with one another, and two of them are armed with nuclear weapons. Democracies are not supposed to fight with one another; high interdependence among states is supposed to lead to their peaceful relations; and France and Britain have the ultimate security guarantee against German resurgence. If peace were ever overdetermined in a region, it should be in Western Europe. With war among the states unthinkable, then, what legitimacy did the renationalization fears of the Western European elites have?

The answer lies in the phenomenon of a "security competition," which elites feared would ensue if the Americans removed their security blanket from Europe.[8] Security competition is a concept used by international relations theorists that encompasses the deleterious effects that defense renationalization can have on a group of states that had hitherto cooperated with one another militarily.

A security competition among states commences when they come to view their security as highly competitive and divisible, not quasi-harmonious and semi-indivisible. When a state perceives its security in indivisible terms, it believes two things: first, it thinks it cannot be indifferent to events that directly affect its neighbors but that do not directly or immediately affect it; and second, it thinks its security cannot be achieved through its own efforts but must be attained

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Survival 33 (November/December 1991): 531–546; Catherine McArdle Kelleher, *The Future of European Security: An Interim Assessment* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995); Mathias Jopp, *The Strategic Implications of European Integration*, Adelphi Paper #290 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1994); and Laurence Martin and John Roper, eds., *Towards a Common Defense Policy* (Paris: The Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, 1995).

[8] Stephen Van Evera was the first, as far as I know, to use the phrase "security competition," although he did not define it. I am indebted to him for suggesting the phrase to me and for urging me to flesh it out. See Stephen Van Evera, "Why Europe Matters, Why the Third World Doesn't: American Grand Strategy After the Cold War," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 13 (June 1990): 11.

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by pooling its resources with others. To believe that security is indivisible, therefore, is to act, not unilaterally, but cooperatively and multilaterally, to attain it. If nations in a grouping come to regard their security as divisible and then implement policies that lead to competitive approaches, a security competition has broken out. Security competitions thus involve a two-step process: first, the development of a widespread view that security is divisible; second, the pursuit of competitive military policies to achieve it. Only when the divisibility-of-peace view moves to the stage of competitive approaches has security become renationalized.

States within a region could view their respective security as separable and distinct from one another without engaging in a competition to attain it. This is possible, but not likely. Adverse external events will intrude on this static and benign state of affairs and will require the states to take action to counter them. The states in question will ultimately have to decide whether to concert their actions or instead to act unilaterally and competitively to counter them. Whether they concert depends on both how severe the threats are and how each is affected by them. The more severe the threats and the more they affect all nearly equally, the more likely is concerted action. But if the threats affect them differentially, even slightly so, then the states in question are less likely to cooperate, especially since they had already come to see their security as detachable from their neighbors. Equality in the effects that threats have on a given set of states, however, is rare. It is therefore more likely that competitive approaches will be pursued, once a belief in detachable security has developed, than a cooperative approach will be reforged. The step from divisibility to competition is thus a short one.

Finally, it is not necessary that all states cease cooperation for a full-blown security competition to ensue. It is sufficient that only one of the large powers defects. Unless somehow checked, the result is predictable: divisibility and then competition will spread like wildfire to the other states. If one influential power acts in ways that ignore the security interests of its neighbors or that adversely affect them, they must take counteractions that will be seen in turn by the state that first acted unilaterally as competitive.

As I conceive it, a security competition differs from a security dilemma. The difference is that the former is more comprehensive than the latter. A security competition can be manifested as a security dilemma, but it need not be. A security dilemma has traditionally referred to the action-reaction spiral (an arms race) that occurs when nations find themselves locked into increasing their armaments via-à-vis one another. The security dilemma arises because it is relative, not absolute, power that counts in international relations. For most situations, if one state has added to its offensive military power, then other states have thereby experienced a decrease in their defensive capabilities. They must then act to counter the increase, or else accept a worsened position. But if they do counter it, the other state may increase its armaments in turn and undercut the increases of the responding states. This would require additional actions by the latter, provoke counters by the former, and so on. A dilemma is the necessity of choosing between two equally unpleasant alternatives. For states locked into

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a security dilemma, the alternatives are: either do not match and be worse off; or match and be no better off and perhaps worse off if the adversary then ups the ante.

A security competition, by contrast, may or may not involve such arms spirals. The military competition between states A and B, for example, could be confined to A's failure to cooperate on security matters with B, when B wants such cooperation, or A's signing a military alliance with another state that excludes B to B's detriment. Neither of these two examples involves a full-blown arms race, though neither excludes one from developing. Thus, a security dilemma is only one of the forms, though probably the most severe short of war, that a security competition can take.

Why, then, worry about a security competition within Western Europe if it cannot lead to war? What deleterious effects could it possibly have? Should this happen, Western Europe's multilateral institutions and its hard won economic interdependence would be severely tested. Cooperation on political matters does become more difficult when states are pursuing competitive military policies – the more competitive the military policies, the more difficult the political relations. Similarly, economic intercourse among states does flourish most when national concerns about military security vis-à-vis trading partners are low.[9] Since 1945, competitive military policies were severely dampened within Western Europe because of the reassuring effects of the U.S. military presence. With no chance for an outbreak of wars or security competitions, the Western European nations could intertwine their economies and not worry about the military effects of interdependence. They understood the historical sequence of events that had gotten them to where they were. As Josef Joffe aptly put it:

> Conventional [alliance] theory holds that states coalesce in order to assure their security. In the case of NATO, however, they coalesced because their security was assured – by a powerful outsider that delivered both external protection and internal order to Western Europe. Order was the precondition of alliance and integration.[10]

Having understood how they got to where they were with American help, the Western Europeans feared what they might return to if the United States left.

[9] Joanne Gowa argues that a state cannot be indifferent to the effects that trade has on the military power of the state(s) with which it is trading. The gains from trade are increased efficiency and increased wealth. Both can be turned to military advantage. Thus, Gowa argues that free trade is more likely within than across alliances and more likely in bipolar than in multipolar systems. See Joanne Gowa, *Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), especially chaps. 3 and 4, for the argument and the evidence. The beneficial effects that trade has on a state's military power is, of course, not a new insight. Albert Hirschman made the above point long ago when he argued that "foreign trade enhances the potential military force of a country," which he called the "supply effect" of foreign trade. See Albert O. Hirschman, *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 14. See also: R. G. Hawtrey, *Economic Aspects of Sovereignty*, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, Green, 1952); and Jacob Viner, "Power versus Plenty as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," in Jacob Viner, *The Long View and the Short* (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1958), 277–306.

[10] Josef Joffe, "Europe's American Pacifier," *Foreign Policy* 54 (Spring 1984): 74.

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It did not have to be war that would fundamentally alter their political-economic relations for the worse; an intense security competition would suffice. Or so they feared.

The War over Institutions

The best piece of evidence that should cause us to take the potential for Western European security competitions seriously is, therefore, the fact that Western Europe's political elites take it seriously. Evidence for their concern is to be found in their motivations and maneuverings to devise a new security order for Western Europe as they entered the post-cold war era. The ensuring political struggle entailed intense political warfare over a seemingly simple issue: which entity—NATO, the Western European Union (WEU), or the Euro-corps (a Franco-German corps intended by the French to be the nucleus of an all-European army)—could best keep the peace in Western Europe. Often, the political maneuverings appeared to involve subsidiary issues that appeared arcane, if not downright insignificant; and too often the attendant debates took on the semblance of those apocryphal disputes among medieval theologians over how many angels could fit on the head of a pin. But below the arcaneness and nitpicking lay a fierce clash over two different visions of Western Europe's post-cold war security. On the one hand were to be found France and its allies (Belgium, Spain, and Italy) who favored a Western Europe more tightly bound together on defense and security matters; and on the other hand were the United Kingdom and its allies (Denmark, the Netherlands, and Portugal) who opposed such a tight security structure for fear that it would empty NATO of its meaning and thereby cause the United States to depart. The Germans were caught in the middle of this struggle, while the United States opposed any designs that would gut NATO. Ultimately, however, even though the French and the British differed in their prescriptions, both were motivated, as were the Germans and all other Western Europeans, by the fear of a return to Western Europe's destructive past unless strong corrective steps were taken.

The political struggle to define the new Western European security order thus took the form of a war over institutions. In this war, Western Europe's three security institutions—NATO, the WEU, and the Euro-corps—were not unimportant, but they were more tools to be wielded and arenas in which to jockey than they were tight constraints on state action.[11] Governments manipulated institutions in order to advance their goals. They did not hesitate to push those designs best calculated to serve their respective interests, nor to drop their proposals when they no longer served them. In the last analysis, in this institutional war a government's loyalty was to state interest, not to an international institution.

[11] The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) played almost no role in the debate over Western Europe's security. For a view that maintains that institutions bound states more tightly than the one I present, see Robert O. Koehane and Stanley Hoffmann, *After the Cold War*, 381–404.

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The struggle was most intense in 1991 and 1992. During that period Western Europe's uncertainty over America's intention to stay was highest and its concerns over the consequences of German unification were at their peak. Subsequently, the fear of renationalized defense diminished, although it never completely disappeared, after the Europeans came to believe that the United States would remain a European military power and after they saw that Germany would long be occupied digesting East Germany.

National positions in this war over institutions can be summarized as follows. The United States wanted NATO to remain Europe's central security forum, but it did not oppose the development of the CSCE and the WEU as long as those two did not challenge NATO's central role. France favored the development of a strong European Defense Identity, but a residual role for NATO. Britain preferred a strong NATO and a more modest EDI. For their part, the Germans by necessity straddled the fence, trying to please all their allies. Much of the fluidity of the European security struggle before and after unification stemmed from the conscious German decision not to come down unequivocally for any particular institutional design. Forced to choose between the French and the British designs, the Germans chose both. Germany was receptive to all proposals because it did not want to offend any of its allies. Its reasons were clear: before merger of the two Germanies, act so as not to derail rapid unification; after unification, act so as to reduce apprehension about it. As a consequence of their respective preferences, the United States pushed NATO; France, the European Political Union, with a security dimension in the form of either the WEU or the Euro-corps, whichever tactically best advanced EDI; Britain, NATO and a WEU outside of EPU and subservient to NATO; and Germany, all four institutions.

Thus, although the Western European great powers shared a common security fear, the institutional designs that they devised to counter it differed. These designs stemmed from their differing views about both European political unification and the American role in Europe. France wanted to diminish America's political profile and reassert its own on the continent, and believed that a united Germany could be held in check within a strengthened European Union. France, therefore, pursued a strategy of continental entanglement of Germany. Britain was wary of a politically united Western Europe and thought that only American power could balance that of a united Germany. It therefore pursued a strategy of transatlantic entanglement. Germany wanted to assert its new found power but also to avoid alarming its neighbors about it. It needed more European political unification to satisfy France and its allies, on the one hand, and a strong NATO under American leadership to reassure Britain and its allies, on the other. Germany therefore pursued a dual strategy of continental and transatlantic entanglement.

Nationalistic Jockeying

The United States and NATO

In 1989, the first to define what the new security order for Europe should look like was the United States. It was able to move quickly to exploit the revolutionary

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events of that year, because, contrary to the view at the time that it lacked vision, the Bush administration had in fact developed quite early in its term a strategic conception of what it wanted to accomplish in Europe.[12] This was because President Bush, Secretary of State James Baker, and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft had come into office with the sense that there were opportunities for decisive change in Europe, and they were intent on "overthrowing the old political-military balance" there.[13] The administration knew what it did not want: a Soviet-American modus vivendi that would reign peacefully over a divided Europe. Instead, it intended to bring the cold war to an end with a Western victory. In a speech delivered at Mainz, Germany, on 31 May 1989, five months before the Berlin Wall fell, President Bush described in simple terms what he meant by victory: "to help Europe become whole and free."[14] The West Germans clearly understood that this phrase meant the ultimate reunification of Germany, but the administration downplayed its meaning at home, because events abroad had not yet moved to the point where action could be taken.

After the Berlin Wall's fall in early November, however, events permitted action. In swift succession, the Bush administration publicly embraced German reunification, actively worked for it, managed its international aspects, laid out its vision for Europe's new security order, sought to keep a reunited Germany in NATO, and acted to transform NATO so as to preserve it. In early December, after German Chancellor Kohl laid out his terms for the eventual reunification of the two Germanies, which he did at the end of November without consulting his allies, President Bush nevertheless supported him and worked to bring the British and French around to his view. In mid-December, in a speech in Berlin, Secretary Baker set out America's views on Europe's new security architecture, calling on NATO to become more political in its functions, supporting the deepening of European integration, and pushing for the further advancement of the CSCE process.[15] Between mid-January and early February 1990, after Kohl had committed a united Germany to full NATO membership, the United States backed Kohl in his drive for rapid German unification. Shortly thereafter, the principal

[12] My source for the early thinking of the Bush administration is Philip Zelikow, who dealt with European affairs on the National Security Council from January 1989 until March 1991. Interview with Philip Zelikow, 31 December 1991, Cambridge, MA. For full accounts of the policy planning that took place from January through May 1989, see Bechloss and Talbott, *Highest Levels*, chaps. 2–4; and Zelikow and Rice, *Germany United*, chaps. 1 and 2; and Moens, "American Diplomacy and German Unification."

[13] Zelikow interview.

[14] "Proposals for a Free and Peaceful Europe" (address by President George Bush at Rheingoldhalle, Mainz, Federal Republic of Germany, 31 May 1989), United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Current Policy No. 1179. A month earlier, in an interview in April with the *Washington Times*, Bush explicitly backed German unification (Pond, *Beyond the Wall*, 163).

[15] See Secretary of State James Baker, "A New Europe, A New Atlanticism: Architecture for a New Era," (speech before the Berlin Press Club, 11 December 1989), United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Current Policy No. 1233.

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senior officials of the Bush administration met for the next few months to lay the plans for transforming NATO in order to preserve it.

In American thinking, NATO's preservation and Germany's unification were inextricably bound together. On the one hand, without NATO there would be little to prevent Germany from going neutral and unilaterally pursuing its own designs in Central Europe. The prospect of a Germany reunited but unbound would scare not only the Soviet Union and all of Germany's other western and eastern neighbors, but also it would most likely derail rapid reunification. On the other hand, there could be no NATO unless a united Germany were in it. If Germany ceased to be a member of NATO, the rationale for American troops in Europe, most of which were in Germany, would disappear. The American presence would then look like an army of occupation, not a reassuring presence; and any western alliance that might survive would have a blatant anti-German cast to it. Thus, once the United States decided to work with West Germany for swift German unification, the preservation of NATO and the placement of a reunited Germany in it became in essence two sides of the same coin.[16]

To put a reunited Germany in NATO in turn required that the alliance be revamped in two ways: become less military and more political in nature, and appear nonthreatening to the Soviet Union. Transforming NATO in this fashion would accomplish two objectives. By making NATO Soviet-friendly, Mikhail Gorbachev could more easily sell German membership to his hardliners. By making NATO more political, the United States could give it a new lease on life and thereby reduce the reluctance of Germany's western allies to go forward with its unification. In order to revamp NATO, the United States devised, and then dominated, the July 1990 NATO summit held in London at the heads of state level. The London meeting was one of NATO's most important summits ever, because it was there that the fundamental steps to transform NATO from a cold war to a post-cold war alliance were taken.

At the London meeting, NATO launched four major political initiatives, all of which flowed from Secretary Baker's speech in Berlin in December: NATO declared its intention to "enhance the political component" of the alliance; it proposed a joint declaration to the Warsaw Pact in which the two would "solemnly state that we are no longer adversaries"; it invited the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies "to establish regular diplomatic liaison with NATO" in Brussels; and it proposed that the CSCE summit in November 1990 "decide how the CSCE can be institutionalized to provide a forum for wider political dialogue in a more united Europe.[17] The first three decisions were intended to make NATO look more relevant to the emerging European scene; the second and third, to appear

[16] For previously published and fuller accounts of American thinking, see Moens, "American Diplomacy"; Pond, *Beyond the Wall*, chaps 12–14; Beschloss and Talbott, *Highest Levels*, 163–195; and Zelikow and Rice, *Germany United*, chaps. 4 and 6.

[17] The phrases in quotes are taken from *The London Declaration of a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance*, 6 July 1990, NATO Press Office, Brussels (mimeo).

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nonhostile to the East; the fourth, to strengthen the continent's only pan-European forum so that the Soviet Union would not feel excluded from Europe. Together with the decision to institute a fundamental review of NATO's military strategy, the Bush administration succeeded in launching NATO's transformation so as to maintain it as the "new" Europe's central security institution.

France and EDI

Unlike the Americans, the British and the French were not only unenthusiastic but downright worried about German unification. In reaction to Kohl's proposal to create a confederation between the two halves of Germany, François Mitterrand, in the best tradition of nineteenth-century balance of power diplomacy, flew to Kiev, met with Gorbachev on 6 December and explored ways to slow down, if not totally prevent, such a confederation. At the 5 December Brussels meeting between Bush and the European Community (EC) heads of state, Margaret Thatcher took the position that German reunification should not occur for ten to fifteen years.[18] By publicly backing unification the day before, however, Bush had undercut British-French opposition. He then proceeded to persuade Mitterrand and Thatcher that they had no choice but to reaffirm once again their long-standing commitment to Germany's reunification. Consequently, at the meeting of the European Council on 8 December in Strasbourg, the European heads of state supported the United States position. By the first week of December, Germany's allies had forged a common position and had accepted German reunification, but only under four conditions: free elections had to be held in both the Germanies; a reunited Germany had to respect international borders; a united Germany would be in both the EC and NATO; and reunification would be peaceful and gradual.[19]

Britain's and France's public acceptance of gradual reunification under American strong-arming was one thing; genuine acceptance of it was another. In her memoirs, Thatcher made clear how she and Mitterrand viewed the prospect of eventual German reunification when she recounted two private meetings they held, one at Strasbourg in early December 1989 and a second at Paris in late January 1990. Her words are worth quoting at some length because of the fears they reveal about Germany:

> [At Strasbourg] . . . President Mitterrand and I—at his suggestion—had two private meetings to discuss the German problem and our reaction to it. He was still more concerned than I was. . . . He observed that in history the Germans were a people in constant movement and flux. At this point I produced from my handbag a map showing the various configurations of Germany in the past, which were not altogether reassuring about the future. We talked through what precisely we might do. . . .

[18] Moens, "American Diplomacy," 531; Pond, *Beyond the Wall*, 158–160.

[19] These were the four conditions under which Bush supported unification. See Moens, "American Diplomacy," 533.

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> [Mitterrand] said that at moments of great danger in the past France had always established special relations with Britain and he felt that such a time had come again. We must draw together and stay in touch. It seemed to me that although we had not discovered the means, at least we both had the will to check the German juggernaut. That was a start.
>
> [At Paris] The President [Mitterrand] was clearly irked by German attitudes and behavior. He accepted that the Germans had the right to self-determination but they did not have the right to upset the political realities of Europe; nor could he accept that German reunification should take priority over everything else. . . . President Mitterrand went on to say that he shared my worries about the Germans' so-called "mission" in central Europe. The Czechs, Poles and Hungarians would not want to be under Germany's exclusive influence, but they would need German aid and investment. I said that we must not just accept that the Germans had a particular hold over these countries, but rather do everything possible to expand our own links there. At the end of the meeting *we agreed that our Foreign and Defense ministers should get together to talk over the issue of reunification and also examine the scope for closer Franco-British defence co-operation.*[20]

These meetings between Mitterrand and Thatcher came to naught. Although both opposed reunification, they could not agree on how to thwart it. Mitterrand eventually concluded that there was no legitimate way to stop it, nor even to slow it down. After that, the two split over how best to deal with a reunited Germany. Thatcher succinctly summarizes Mitterrand's strategy and, unwittingly, her own: Mitterrand chose the path "of moving ahead faster towards a federal Europe in order to tie down the German giant" rather than returning to the path "associated with General de Gaulle—the defense of French sovereignty and the striking up of alliances to secure French interests."[21] If we substitute Thatcher for Charles DeGaulle and British for French in the last phrase, we have Britain's strategy also. Thus, the French sought to bind a reunited Germany more tightly by strengthening the EC's bonds on it; the British, to balance against a reunited Germany by preserving the NATO alliance and hence the American military presence in Europe.

French moves to strengthen the EC came in two stages. The first stage was short-lived, lasting from the fall of the Berlin Wall in early November 1989 until the elections in East Germany in mid-March 1990. During this period, the French government, as was the case for all other governments (including Germany's), saw German reunification as inevitable but distant. Even though the event was thought distant, however, Mitterrand seized the political opportunity it provided in order to advance the cause of European Monetary Union. Since January of 1988, when Finance Minister Edouard Balladur had proposed to his EC counterparts that they begin discussions on a common European currency and central bank, the issue of monetary union had risen to active consideration within the

[20] Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years* (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), 796–98. (Emphasis added.)

[21] Ibid., 798.

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community. France had come out in favor of monetary union because it wanted to end the power that the Bundesbank exercised over France's economy.[22] Through the sheer size of the German economy, the stability of the mark, and the mechanism of the European Monetary System, the Bundesbank was able to set the interest rates of those countries that had pegged their currencies to the mark, even though it took into account only the mark's value when making its decisions. EMU would end this state of affairs: a European-wide bank, controlled by all EC members, would take the place of the German controlled Bundesbank, and a single European currency would take the place of the mark. EMU was thus a strategem to end Germany's exclusive power to set Europe's interests rates. As former French president Valery Giscard d'Estaing put it several years after the fact: "We need an organized Europe to escape German domination."[23]

For precisely the reason that France favored EMU—to cut down the Bundesbank—Kohl was reluctant to embrace it. By the end of November, however, Kohl found his ability to delay on EMU at an end: he needed to secure Mitterrand's blessing for Germany's eventual reunification. By early December, a Franco-German deal was in the air. At the early December Strasbourg meeting of the European Council, the deal was consummated. Mitterrand extracted from a reluctant Kohl Germany's unequivocal commitment to proceed with EMU, and an equally reluctant Mitterrand joined his fellow heads of state in endorsing eventual reunification. Kohl's acceptance of EMU was thus France's price for its public endorsement of Germany's eventual reunification. With monetary union, France was seeking to dilute Germany's power by strengthening the multilateral bonds on its financial might.[24]

The second stage in French policy commenced on 18 March 1990, when the majority of East German voters made unequivocally clear in their elections on that day that they desired to unify with West Germany as fast as possible. With rapid reunification now imminent, Mitterrand calculated that monetary union was no longer sufficient to tie down the German giant. Something more was required. Exactly one month later it materialized. On 19 April, Kohl and Mitterrand issued a joint message to Charles Haughey, the Irish prime minister and president of the European Community, asking him to launch a second intergovern-

[22] For the analysis of French motives regarding EMU, I have relied heavily on Joseph M. Grieco, "State Interests and Institutional Rule Trajectories." See also Wayne Sandholtz, "Monetary Politics and Maastricht" *International Organization* 47 (Winter 1993): 1–41; Patrick McCarthy, "France Looks at Germany, or How to Become German (and European) while Remaining French" in Patrick McCarthy, ed., *France-Germany, 1983–1993* (New York: St. Martin's, 1993), 57–63; and Derek W. Urwin, *The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration Since 1945* (London: Longman, 1991), 243–44.

[23] Quoted in David Marsh, "Final March of the Old Guard," *Financial Times*, 25 April 1994, 17.

[24] Joseph Grieco terms this integrationist policy the "voice opportunities" strategy. It is the policy that a weaker power follows toward a stronger one when it is unable itself to balance against the stronger power. In this sense, integration is strategy of balancing through institutional binding. See Grieco, "State Interests and Institutional Rule Trajectories," 202–205.

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mental conference (IGU) on political union, which would meet in tandem with the IGU created earlier on monetary union.

In their message, Kohl and Mitterrand argued that political union would serve several purposes: it would reinforce the democratic legitimacy of the European Community; it would make Europe's institutions more effective; and it would ensure that Europe's economic, monetary, and political actions would be coherent. But most significantly, political union envisioned a Western Europe able to formulate and implement a common foreign and defense policy.[25] Through political union, France thus hoped to achieve in foreign and security affairs what it had set in motion for monetary and financial affairs: a strengthening of the multilateral bonds on Germany's power so as to reduce its ability to act independently. In agreeing to push for political union at this juncture, French policy was true to form. *Le Monde*'s Daniel Vernet aptly described French motives:

> The situation [after the East German elections] was radically new, but the attempt to build a firebreak against the inevitable was very much in the tradition of French policy since the 1950s. To each increase or affirmation of German sovereignty, France has responded by pushing for a further integration of Western Europe. . . . [The goal is] to ensure that the Germans would never again yield to the temptations of *Machtpolitik* [power politics].[26]

Although French policy was true to form, it is important not to underestimate the revolutionary nature of Mitterrand's action. True, it is the case that Kohl, not Mitterrand, was the one who first proposed political union at this particular time. It is also true that Kohl wanted monetary union, but only in a more politically integrated Western Europe. But security and power motives were also important for Kohl: he wanted to assure his European partners that he was committed to "Europeanizing Germany," not "Germanizing Europe."[27] Although it was Kohl who took the initiative, Mitterrand nevertheless quickly embraced it. It is this swift embrace that is testimony to French concern about German reunification.

To appreciate what Mitterrand did, some perspective is necessary. Ever since the early 1980s, Mitterrand had been pressing for the further political integration of Europe, calling for action on political union at the Fontainebleau summit of

[25] See George Graham, David Marsh, and Phillip Stephens, "Bonn and Paris Move to Speak European Unity," *Financial Times*, 20 April 1990, 1.

[26] Daniel Vernet, "France in a New Europe—Vive le Difference?" *The National Interest* 29 (Fall 1992): 32. A high official of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs spoke in strikingly similar terms when describing France's ardor for political integration: "The only choice we have is to speed up the European integration process very rapidly. There is no other solution. It is not that we are more European than others; we are very nationalistic and understand the British position." Interview at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris, 14 January 1992. What makes these sentiments all the more interesting is that they come from an avowed Gaullist.

[27] See David Marsh, "Bonn Initiative behind Ambitious Target," *Financial Times*, 20 April 1990, 4; and Harald Muller, "German Foreign Policy After Unification" in Paul B. Stares, ed., *The New Germany and the New Europe* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1992), 159. I discuss Kohl's motives more fully shortly.

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1984 and again in his election manifesto of 1988.[28] But Mitterrand's support for political union had always been predicated on a divided Germany, on a union led politically by France not Germany, and on a model of union based on intergovernmentalism, not supranationalism.[29] Indeed, France had always been a staunch—some would even say virulent—defender of its national independence in foreign and defense affairs throughout the postwar period and had moved grudgingly and only infinitesimally toward greater integration in these two realms with the sole purpose of binding Germany more tightly to the West. The conflict between the maintenance of its independence and the promotion of European integration had always been the most pronounced in the foreign and defense realms. As a consequence, for France, integration in economic affairs had gone way beyond what had taken place in foreign and defense affairs. As Anne-Marie Le Gloannec perceptively put it, France had undertaken "as much integration as possible and as little as necessary."[30]

With a reunited Germany, however, France could no longer assume that it would be politically ascendant in a more tightly integrated Europe. Indeed, the probability was high that the reverse would be the case: a diminution of French sovereignty and a reduction in its political influence. Political union in foreign and defense affairs was not likely to produce the same results for France as would greater integration in monetary affairs, even if it were done on the basis of the intergovernmental model. In the latter realm, France had favored integration because it was dealing from a position of weakness. More integration in monetary affairs, so the French believed, would strengthen France's hand on the German mark. In the former realm, however, France had been dealing from a position of strength. More integration in foreign and defense matters could well strengthen the German hand on France's much valued autonomy in foreign and defense affairs. Integration would thus likely have different results for France, depending upon whether it was relatively weak or strong in a given realm. If integration in defense affairs went even half as far as it had in economic matters, France's

[28] For a good review of Mitterrand's policy toward Europe, see Elizabeth Haywood, "The European Policy of Francois Mitterrand," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 31 (June 1993): 279; and McCarthy, "France Looks at Germany."

[29] The institutions of the European Community (and now Union) are of two types. The two prime intergovernmental institutions are the Council of Ministers and the European Council. The former is where national governments meet to make joint decisions on the basis of pooled sovereignty. The type of minister present varies according to the particular issue being considered. The European Council consists of the heads of states of all the governments. The Council has retained ultimate control over the nature and pace of political integration. In both these institutions, decisions are made by national governments sitting together. The European Court of Justice, the European Parliament, and the Commission are more supranational or federal in nature. The first interprets EU law on a community-wide basis; the second is the EU-wide legislature; and the third is the Union's executive arm. The point about the Union is that it contains both intergovernmental and federal strands. Foreign, security, and defense policies, however, are still very much intergovernmental.

[30] Anne-Marie Le Gloannec, "The Implications of German Unification for Western Europe" in Stares, ed., *The New Germany and the New Europe*, 266.

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much vaunted autonomy would be severely eroded. This probably explains in part why the Kohl-Mitterrand proposal for a European Defense Identity was left vague until fall 1991, when Kohl and Mitterand called for turning the Franco-German brigade into the Franco-German corps (or the Eurocorps), which would become the nucleus of a European army. In the last analysis, however, Mitterrand's agreement in the spring of 1990 to push for political union was a potentially radical change for France. One acute observer summarized well France's push for a European Defense Identity:

> The most important factor in explaining recent French positions on European defense had doubtless been the unification of Germany. In the past, France had always sought—and to a certain extent managed—to impose supranational constraints on Germany that would somehow not apply to France. . . . The French now seem to have concluded that they cannot expect Germany to accept the constraints of European integration, such as the devolution of control over the Deutsche mark to a European central bank, if France is unwilling to do the same in the military field.[31]

In assessing the significance of the Kohl-Mitterrand initiative, it is also important to recall all the past efforts toward political union that had failed. In 1976, there was the Tindeman's Report, which argued among other things for a common foreign policy and defense system; in 1979, the "Three Wise Men's" Report, which argued for reducing the power of the Council of Ministers and enhancing that of the Commission; in 1981, the Genscher-Colombo Plan, which called for more common policies, especially in foreign affairs; in 1985, the Doodge Committee on Institutional Reform, which called for turning the EC into a true political entity; and, finally, the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986, which called for a review of foreign policy procedures in 1992 so as to move toward joint formulation and implementation, and which urged closer collaboration on security and defense policy. In spite of these numerous calls for moving toward greater political union, nothing of substance had happened. All these initiatives had gone nowhere. Unlike the movement toward a true common market embodied in the SEA, which was fueled in part by fears of Europe losing out to American and Japanese competition, there was no similar motivating event or powerful force driving the European states towards political union.[32] In the early spring of 1990, however, the political landscape changed. The prospect of rapid German reunification gave political union a powerful boost.

[31] Philip H. Gordon, *A Certain Idea of France: French Security Policy and the Gaullist Legacy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 175. For further analysis of Franco-German security and defense cooperation, see Philip Gordon, "The Franco-German Security Partnership," in McCarthy, ed., *France-Germany, 1983–1993*; and David G. Haglund, *Alliance Within the Alliance? Franco-German Military Cooperation and the European Pillar of Defense* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991), esp. chaps. 3 and 7.

[32] The only exception was the brief revival of the Western European Union in 1987, which was due primarily to French efforts. The French, and to a lesser extent the Germans, were disturbed about the unilateralist actions of the Reagan administration, especially the proposals at the Reykjavik summit. It was the fear of a superpower condominium and U.S. abandonment that briefly revived the WEU.

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In the early 1990s, France was acting as it had forty years earlier, and the catalyst was identical: fear of German power.[33] In the early 1950s, France had helped to create a multilateral institutional web, first in the form of the European Coal and Steel Community and then in the European Economic Community, in order to tie down the part of Germany that the western allies had created from the ashes of the Third Reich. In the early 1990s, through pursuit of monetary and political union, France acted to spin an even stronger web around a Germany that was about to become significantly more powerful. The early to mid-1950s and the early to mid-1990s are the two periods when Western Europe took the largest leaps forward in integration. It is not an accident that both leaps coincided with peak French anxiety about German power. The conclusion seems inescapable: fear of Germany pushed France into monetary and political union.

Britain and the WEU

While the French sought to entangle Germany, the British chose to balance against it.[34] Balancing Germany meant keeping the United States militarily engaged in Europe, because with America there, a reunited Germany would loom less large. To keep the United States engaged, British policy was dogged and single-minded: do whatever was necessary to preserve NATO. Hence, before the July 1990 London summit, the British cooperated closely with the United States to revamp NATO. After the summit, they worked to deflect the Franco-German effort to develop a European Defense Identity. Revamping NATO, as we saw, meant making it "Soviet friendly" so that Gorbachev could sell his hardliners on a unified Germany's remaining in NATO. Deflecting the Franco-German thrust meant making any would-be European defense entity "NATO friendly" so that it would not undercut NATO. British officials feared that unless EDI was kept under strict control, it would compete with, not compliment NATO. The worry was that if the entity became too big, robust, and capable, it would marginalize the United States and gut NATO. Because the United States would tolerate neither outcome, so the British reasoned, it would depart Europe rather than accept either. Hence Britain's goal was to keep NATO as Europe's prime defense institution, and its means was to make certain that any would-be EDI remained subservient to it.

[33] For the early 1990s, see Hoffmann, "French Dilemmas and Strategies," *After the Cold War*; Tiersky, "France in the New Europe"; Kramer, "The French Question"; Tiersky, "Mitterrand, France and Europe"; and Haywood, "The European Policy of Mitterrand." For the early 1950s, see John Gillingham, *Coal, Steel, and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945–1955: The Germans and French from Ruhr Conflict to Economic Community* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1991), esp. chaps. 5, 6, and conclusion; and Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950–1957* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1958), chaps 1–3 and 7.

[34] This account of Britain's strategy is based on interviews with British officials in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and in the Ministry of Defense (MOD) held in June and November of 1991 and January of 1992. See also Louise Richardson in Keohane, Nye, and Hoffmann, *After the Cold War*.

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There were two ways that a robust EDI could undercut NATO. First, in a fully functioning defense entity, the Europeans would reach agreement among themselves before interacting with the United States. After all, the Europeans could not have a viable defense institution if they had to check continually with the United States on every matter of consequence prior to reaching agreement among themselves. But achieving prior agreement would mean presenting the United States with what would in effect be European fait accomplis. The United States would not have been party to Europe's deliberations and would be faced with either accepting or rejecting whatever was the outcome. The consequence would be that NATO would be emptied of significant political meaning, because it would no longer be the main forum where the prime deliberations about European security took place. The political weight would have shifted away from NATO to the EDI.

Second, a robust EDI could not help but drain significant resources from NATO. The essence of the NATO alliance is not the national forces assigned to it; a state can assign its military forces to any institution it wishes. Rather, NATO's core is its integrated military planning and command structure, its political coordinating mechanisms, and the cooperative habits that years of socialization, training, and working together have produced. These have yielded an institution that has operated effectively on the basis of unanimity, not majority voting, a notable accomplishment for a military alliance of sixteen members.[35] If the Europeans were to construct their own defense, then they would need to do what NATO had done: create their own integrated planning capabilities and political coordinating mechanisms. But if they had these, what would become of NATO's? What would be the point of having two large planning staffs and two coordinating mechanisms—one set in NATO and another in EDI—that did essentially the same things? What sense would it make for the Europeans to plan and coordinate in their own forum, only to turn around and redo the entire exercise again within NATO? Not only would this make no sense, but the Europeans did not (and still do not) have the wherewithal to afford redundant, large-scale planning staffs.[36] For these reasons, the British wanted to make especially certain that any would-be EDI did not have its own distinct military command structure and combat units, but instead would rely on NATO's. In sum, Britain wanted any EDI to be kept quite small so as not to challenge NATO's primacy.

British officials calculated that the best way to achieve this end and thereby derail the Kohl-Mitterrand initiative was to preempt it with their own proposal. Therefore, while the United States was distracted with the crisis in the Persian

[35] For two good descriptions of the integrated military institutions of NATO, see E. Vandevanter, Jr., *Studies on NATO: An Analysis of Integration*, *Memorandum RM-5506-PR* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1966); and Douglas L. Bland, *The Military Committee of the North Atlantic Alliance: A Study of Structure and Strategy* (New York: Praeger, 1991), chap. 7.

[36] For a brief analysis of how a European entity and NATO could compliment rather than duplicate one another, see Heisbourg, "The European-US Alliance," 674–675.

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Gulf, the British defense and foreign affairs bureaucracy worked from midsummer until the early fall of 1990 on a plan to revive the Western European Union and fashion it into Europe's Defense Identity. The proposal was embraced by Thatcher and Foreign Secretary John Hurd and unveiled in the late fall by Hurd. It was deliberately flexible, with a studied degree of ambiguity about where the WEU would operate and about what exactly it would do, calling for the WEU to substitute for NATO mainly outside of Europe, but not entirely so.[37]

The WEU strategem was not without risk. In attempting to make it the repository of the EDI, British officials knew they were setting in motion a process that would inevitably develop its own dynamic and that could go off in directions they did not favor. They calculated that they had no choice but to incur it, because a greater one was looming: the gathering momentum for political union that would overwhelm them unless it was countered. As one high level Defense Ministry official put it:

> We had seen several revitalizations of the WEU. We were cautious about going down that route again. But we felt that unless we would contemplate some mechanism for a greater European security role, we would find it taken over by European political union enthusiasts. The WEU was the obvious institution to go for, but not with enthusiasm.[38]

Thus, the WEU was to be Britain's counter to the Franco-German proposal.

The Western European Union had come into existence in 1948 as the military body within the framework of the Brussels Treaty of 1948, which was directed against Germany. It was originally called the Western Union Defense Organization (WUDO). In 1954, with the entry of Germany into NATO, the WUDO became the Western European Union, and Germany and Italy were admitted as members. Once Germany became a member of NATO, the anti-German cast of the Brussels Treaty lost its rationale, and the WEU became a largely residual organization without much point. Its sole function was to keep watch on Germany's armed forces, something that was effectively done by NATO.[39] From 1954 until 1985, the WEU remained "an intergovernmental organization with no operational functions."[40] It began to assume more political importance during the early 1980s, when the momentum for political union began to gather steam, and reached its high point in 1990, when the WEU coordinated the military presence of several

[37] Interview with British MOD assistant secretary, 27 November 1991; and Guicherd, *A European Defense Identity*, 46–47.

[38] Interview with a deputy undersecretary of defense, Ministry of Defense, London, 7 January 1992.

[39] Ullman, *Securing Europe*, 48–53. Three useful surveys of the WEU are *WEU Primer*, mimeo (undated), U.S. Mission to NATO: Ian D. Dawson, "Adaptation in an International Organization: The Case of the Western European Union," Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, June 1991, mimeo; and Willem F. van Eekelen, "Future European Defense Cooperation: The Role of WEU," European Strategy Group, ESG Occasional Paper, September 1989, mimeo.

[40] The phrase is Willem van Eekelen's. See van Eekelen, "Future European Defense Cooperation," 7.

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of its members in the Gulf embargo against Iraq.[41] At that point, the British could credibly pick up the WEU as the nucleus around which to build the EDI, because it was actively engaged in doing something of consequence. Therefore, the continental proponents of political union could not view Britain's selection of it as simply another cynical British ploy.

But apart from the fact that it was showing life, the British turned to the WEU because of three specific attributes that made it an especially suitable device to derail Franco-German plans. First, it was free standing. This meant it was not part of the EC and, therefore, could not be automatically controlled nor easily absorbed by it. Second, it had an organic relation to NATO by treaty. This meant that there was a tradition and practice to build on. Third, and most important, this relation was one of subservience to NATO. This meant that there were formidable legal and institutional barriers to making the WEU into something that could rival NATO. Article IV of the 1954 Protocol amending the Treaty of Brussels of 1948 clearly delimited the WEU:

> In the execution of the Treaty, the High Contracting Parties and any Organs established by them under the Treaty shall work in close cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. *Recognizing the undesirability of duplicating the military staffs of NATO, the Council [of the WEU] and its Agency will rely on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters.*[42]

Britain could not have asked for a more tailor-made provision to keep a European defense entity secondary to NATO.

Thus, Britain's choice of the WEU was not whimsical. It had chosen an institution that had been treaty-limited in how important it could become vis-à-vis NATO. In British eyes, the WEU's main virtue was that it could not amount to too much. It therefore appeared to be the perfect institutional solution to Britain's goal: to provide a European union with a defense identity that would not threaten NATO's existence. Britain's WEU ploy is a good example of a state's use of an international institution to suit its own interests.

Germany, EDI, and NATO

Chancellor Kohl, Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, and other high German officials also worried about the renationalization of Europe's defense.[43]

[41] See Willem van Eekelen, "The WEU and the Gulf Crisis," *Survival* 32 (November/December 1990): 519–532.

[42] The Brussels Treaty can be found in John A. Reed, Jr., *Germany and NATO* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1987), 204. (Emphasis added.)

[43] My analysis of German motives is based on interviews held in Brussels in January 1992 with members of the German delegation and in Bonn in January 1992 with officials in the Chancellory, the Foreign Office, and the Ministry of Defense. In addition, I also relied on the perceptions of American, British, and French officials whom I interviewed for their interpretations of German actions. Where possible, I have supplemented interview data with published sources.

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Among the Western European political-military elites, German leaders were perhaps the most sensitive to taking actions that could initiate a security competition within Western Europe. They had three specific concerns that ran parallel to, but also differed from, those of their neighbors.

First, they were worried that the other states of Europe worried about them. One official in the Foreign Ministry put matters this way:

> As Europeans are trying to knock their heads together [create a political union], we were discovering that the old beasts are not dead. The French, for example, have their own fears of German hegemony and predominance, while a number of people in German society are now thinking they are a big power and should behave like one.[44]

German officials did not like, but understood, the concerns that their neighbors had about a united Germany; and they knew that these concerns had to be assuaged.

Second, they worried about the effects that their neighbors' worries could have on German domestic politics and foreign policy. A Germany that had to give constant reassurances to its neighbors could produce a backlash in German politics and ultimately bring about a self-fulfilling prophecy—a more, not a less, nationalistic state. Kohl voiced this concern publicly several years later in a long article in the op-ed page of the *Financial Times*, an article notable for its wide-ranging concerns about nationalism in Europe:

> Despite all these reasons for optimism, I doubt whether the evil spirits of the past, which have brought us Europeans so much suffering this century, have really been banished for good.
>
> No one should be under the illusion that the spectre of European nationalism has been finally laid to rest, or that this ugly apparition is confined only to the Balkans. . . . Even Western Europe is not immune to such [nationalist] temptations. I feel myself carried back to an ill-fated past when I hear some people stirring up public sentiment with the argument that Germany has become too large and too powerful, and therefore needs to be "contained" by means of coalitions. It is a cruel irony that this kind of talk plays into the hands of precisely those forces, not least in Germany, which propagate old-style nationalism.[45]

Others, such as analyst Wolfgang Schlor, saw destructive effects on German politics that could be produced simply by a Germany that failed to cooperate fully with its neighbors: ". . . even if a German withdrawal into unilateralism poses no threat to its neighbors, foreign criticism of German policies might well spawn defensive attitudes in Germany, fueling a sense of isolationism."[46] Schlor

[44] Interview with an official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bonn, 17 January 1992. An adviser to the minister of Defense in France echoed French fears of Germany: "We need now to control rather than cooperate with German power. It is bad but a reality." Interview at the Ministry of Defense, Paris, 13 January 1992.

[45] Helmut Kohl, "An Anchor in an Unstable Europe," *Financial Times*, 4 January 1993, 46.

[46] Wolfgang F. Schlor, *German Security Policy*, Adelphi Paper #277 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1993), 5.

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was speaking of a Germany that was being criticized by its neighbors for turning inward and refusing to participate wholeheartedly in a European security regime. But isolationism was only one form unilateralism could take. There could be no guarantees that it might not turn outward and take an aggressive (though not warlike) form. Thus Germany could lose both ways: a Germany perceived as too powerful, or a powerful Germany that refused to use its power for the common good. Either could produce destructive domestic results.

Third, high-level German officials worried about the future course of German politics, apart from any effects that the constant need to reassure its neighbors might produce. Even though Germany was an established democracy, there was still enough uncertainty about the course their country might take and enough remembrance of the past that they favored binding the freedom of action of their successors in foreign and defense affairs. This is, after all, the central meaning of the phrase oft-repeated by Kohl of "Europeanizing Germany, not Germanizing Europe." This third worry was significant. If other nations did not completely trust Germany, neither did Germans completely trust themselves.[47] Among the far left, this distrust took the form of opposition to German reunification.[48] For the ruling German coalition that represented the vast middle of the political spectrum, it took the form of binding future political leaders. The constraints on future German statesmen were imposed as much for Germans as for their neighbors.

The way to dampen all three worries was through integration, not independence. Kohl clearly understood that the best way to make unification palatable to his Western allies was to pursue a strategy of voluntary "self-entanglement"—to take the initiative for strengthening the integrating bonds that held Germany in check.[49] A German ambassador described well Kohl's motives in proposing political union in terms that nearly exactly mirrored Mitterrand's motives in agreeing to cosponsor it:

> In the new environment the German (and French) government(s) in April 1990 made a push for deeper integration when the prospects for German unification became real. We were preparing for the 1992 internal market. Suddenly we had the catalyst of German unification, and then the EC 92 program looked far too modest. We needed more. It was very natural to work for a common foreign and security policy. We needed a partial merging of sovereignty to make the situation more stable and

[47] A long-time official in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with strong Gaullist leanings, described the French view of Kohl's concern: "The European choice is the realpolitik choice. The alternative is Germany in the center, with a fragmented Europe, with France and the United Kingdom going their own ways. If we want to preserve stability in Europe, there is no choice but the Europeanization of the German issue. Kohl sees the unification of Europe as good for Germany and is afraid of the other possibility, though he never speaks of it." Interview held in Paris at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 14 January 1992.

[48] Pond, *Beyond the Wall*, 201–209.

[49] The phrase is Harald Muller's. See Muller, "German Foreign Policy After Unification" in Stares, ed., *The New Germany*, 158.

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to reassure everyone. We needed further integration as a consequence of German unification.[50]

Therefore, with the French trying to "Gulliverize" Germany, with the British balancing against it, with the other states of Europe warily watching it, and with its citizens having their own concerns about their future, Kohl strongly supported the creation of a meaningful European Defense Identity and the preservation of a strong NATO. The close Franco-German relationship was, after all, the core of a peaceful and prosperous Western Europe. But the NATO alliance was the bedrock of Germany's security and the ultimate key to the rest of Europe's reluctant acceptance of its reunification. Kohl wanted to lock Germany into both institutions while he still retained power.

In the pursuit of reassurance through integration, Kohl had no choice, therefore, but to attempt to square the circle: to reconcile the building of an EDI with the preservation of a strong NATO. This was not an easy task. It required the striking of compromises between the French and British positions that satisfied neither and that left unease in both capitals. German actions in two cases—the WEU and the Franco-German corps—will illustrate the point. Under Kohl's leadership, Germany supported the French in their bid to make the WEU into the defense arm of the European union, but Germany also backed the British at Maastricht in their insistence that the WEU be compatible with NATO and specifically that it not duplicate NATO's command structure. Kohl maintained that European union was not thinkable without some type of defense identity. "Establishing a European union without the element of security," as an official in the German Chancellory put it, "is like establishing a free trade zone without trade."[51] But Kohl also maintained that such an identity was important to NATO, because one of the best ways to keep the United States militarily engaged in Europe was if Europe did more for its own security. A European Defense Identity was thus a form of burden-sharing. Through Europe's construction of its own defense identity, Kohl was thus able to maintain that NATO would be strengthened.

On 14 October 1991, Germany also cosponsored with France the creation of the Franco-German corps, which was intended to serve as the nucleus of the Eurocorps (a European army).[52] The corps initiative was launched from the

[50] Interview with Ambassador Hans von Ploetz, the German ambassador to NATO, Brussels, 10 January 1992. Germany has traditionally sent the best in its diplomatic corps to NATO headquarters because of the importance it has attached to NATO. As a consequence, they are unusually well informed about political thinking at the highest levels of their government.

[51] Interview with an official on the foreign policy and security staff in the Chancellory, Bonn, 16 January 1992.

[52] The proposal was succinct: "The German-French military cooperation will be strengthened beyond the currently existing brigade. These enhanced German-French units could therefore become the core of a European Corps, in which the armed forces of other WEU member states could be absorbed. This new structure could in turn become the model for closer military cooperation between all WEU member states." Text in Department of State cable from the U.S. Military Mission to NATO to U.S. Secretary of State, 18 October 1991.

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highest political levels in both countries – from the Chancellory in Germany and the Elysee in France. The Chancellory briefed the Americans on the proposal, but did not consult its own Foreign or Defense Ministries before announcing it. Much the same happened in Paris. The purpose of the corps was to make concrete the April 1990 Kohl-Mitterrand call for a common European Defense Identity and to give a political impetus to it. The initiative was hastily formulated, however, without the staff work necessary to make it a well thought through proposal.[53] Moreover, the conflicting French and German positions about the relation between an EDI and NATO had not been reconciled. A British official from the Foreign Office recounted the briefing that he and his European partners received on the proposal the day after it was launched:

> The Germans told us not to take this seriously; we are bringing the French closer into NATO, they said. The French told us something different. In the permanent representatives meeting of the EC in Paris, we asked whether these forces would be assigned to NATO and whether they would be for use outside the NATO area. The German representative promptly said "yes" and "no." His French colleague said "no" and "yes." This was a day after they had launched this proposal! It was born in an atmosphere of confusion.[54]

Although Kohl had agreed to launch the corps with France, he insisted that it had to be compatible with NATO and argued that the corps would bring France back into close military cooperation with NATO by giving it "a European door to enter the Alliance."[55] Germany also insisted that its own troops in this corps would be "double-hatted" – under NATO and Eurocorps command – and therefore that the Eurocorps "cannot be asserted to be an alleged plan for a European army outside of NATO."[56] Moreover, Kohl supported the British and the Americans in their desire to have the Eurocorps designated as one of three multinational units available to the WEU, the other two being the British-Dutch amphibious force and the multinational central division of NATO.[57] This last strategem had the effect of watering down the significance of the Eurocorps. Because it was

[53] Interview with a German military official at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 9 January 1992; with a French adviser to the minister of Defense, Paris, 13 January 1992; with a high level official in the U.S. embassy in Paris, 13 January 1992; and with two officials in the Ministry of Defense, London, 6 and 7 January 1992. See also Schlor, *German Security Policy*, 8 and 18; and Muller, "German Foreign Policy," 155.

[54] Interview with an official of the British Foreign Office, 6 January 1992. Confirmed with a British deputy under secretary of Defense, 7 January 1992.

[55] The phrase is that of an official in the State Department interviewed on 17 June 1992.

[56] The phrase in quotes is from the Press Statement on the Eurocorps, to be found in the Department of State cable of 18 October 1991. The press statement on the double-hatting of German troops read: "For the German troop component, this would not involve a change in their previous commitment (assignment) to the Atlantic Alliance. Rather this would entail that this troop component would take over an additional task in the framework of German-French cooperation."

[57] Phone interview with an official in the British Embassy, Washington, DC, 9 November 1992; interview with an official of the State Department, Washington, DC, 13 January 1993; interview with an official in the British Foreign Office, 13 December 1993; and Schlor, *German Security Policy*, 38.

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only one of three multinational units that could be made available to the WEU or to NATO, it looked less like the nucleus of a European army and more as if it were subservient to the WEU, not coequal with it. It thereby weakened the French claim that the Eurocorps would evolve into a European army. By arguing that the main intent of the Franco-German corps was to bring France back into NATO, Kohl was thus able to maintain that the Franco-German corps strengthened the alliance.

In this last analysis, even though Germany did not want to be caught between the French and the Anglo-Americans, it was. Each side sought to have Germany in its camp. "Germany's arms were twisted to choose between France and the United States, but we never did choose. We resisted the choice."[58] Instead, Germany tried to satisfy both. It acted this way because it wanted double insurance—EDI and NATO—against a return of European power politics. It therefore sought to construct an EDI in a way that would not threaten NATO's primacy. This attempt to please each side in the Euro-defense debate explains what some saw as ambivalence, and others saw as duplicity, in Germany's position from 1989 through 1994. In the main, however, German officials were neither ambivalent nor duplicitous. They sincerely believed that a European Defense Identity would not detract from NATO, but instead strengthen it. To the extent that this end was achieved, Germany deserves a large part of the credit.

Compromises and Resolution

The clash among the great powers over how best to avoid a security competition within Western Europe lasted from November 1989 through January 1994. There were two phases: the first, from December 1989 until the end of 1991; the second, from early 1992 until January 1994. The Maastricht treaty conference of December 1991 marked the end of the first phase; the NATO heads-of-state summit at Brussels in January 1994, the end of the second. During the first phase, the four great powers defined their positions and settled upon their strategies. By the end of the first phase, however, neither the precise nature of the EDI, nor its exact relation to NATO were resolved. By the end of the second phase, these two issues had been largely settled. The relation between the WEU and NATO on the one hand, and between the Eurocorps and NATO on the other, had been worked out. NATO had made peace with the Western European Union, the WEU had made peace with NATO, and France had made peace with both. In the process, Europe's renationalization fears receded below the surface of visible political concern.[59]

[58] Author interview with Ambassador von Ploetz.

[59] During these four years, while NATO and the EDI were working out their relationship, NATO was also in the process of transforming itself so as to be relevant to the new security environment within Europe, especially with respect to Central Europe.

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The Maastricht Compromise

Throughout most of the first phase, the European defense entity did not take final shape, in part because Western Europe was in the midst of working out the modalities of political union. A security and defense identity was only one aspect of political union, and, as is the case with such complex negotiations, final decisions were left until the end when trade-offs among all the aspects are made. But more important was the unwillingness of the Germans to choose between the French and the British visions of a European Defense Identity. As a consequence, the two fought to a draw over the issue and produced a compromise at Maastricht that enshrined rather than broke the stalemate. Before and at Maastricht, the French maintained that the WEU was to become the defense component of the European Union and succeeded in inserting language to that effect in the treaty. The British, however, maintained that the WEU was more the European pillar of NATO, therefore an entity independent of the European Union, and inserted language in the treaty that stipulated that any European defense entity had to be compatible with NATO.[60] In further defense of their interpretation, the French pointed to the agreement reached at Maastricht that any member of the European Union could join the WEU, thereby making the latter look as if it were the defense arm of the former. In further defense of their interpretation, the British could point to language that all EC members of NATO had agreed to one month earlier at the NATO heads-of-state summit at Rome: "The [NATO] Alliance is the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defense commitments of allies under the Washington Treaty.[61]

By the end of the first phase, then, there was no agreement about whether the WEU would duplicate the staff and command structure of NATO, whether the WEU would be superior or equal to the Eurocorps, or whether NATO could draw upon the Eurocorps. Most of the political energy and rhetoric had been spent on whether the WEU was to be the defense component of the European Union or the European pillar of NATO. The issue was not settled, and precious little else was either.

[60] Article J.4 of the *Treaty on European Union* (the Maastricht Treaty) contains the two passages, the first of which justifies the French view; the second, the British view. The first passage: "The [European] Union requests the Western European Union, which is an integral part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defense implications." The second passage: "The policy of the [European] Union . . . shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain Member States, and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defense policy established within that framework."

[61] *Rome Declaration of Peace and Cooperation, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on 7th–8th November, 1991. NATO Review* 39 (December 1991): 19–20. NATO's North Atlantic Council communiques can be found in *NATO Review*, usually during the month the meeting took place, or in the next issue.

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The Franco-American Compromise

During the second phase of the debate, even though there were many detours and hard fought battles along the way, the two major issues around which political lines had hardened—the role of the Eurocorps and the relation between the WEU and NATO—were resolved. Their resolution in turn enabled all the subsidiary issues to be settled.

The role of the Eurocorps was resolved more along the lines of British and German rather than French preferences. After the British succeeded at Maastricht in stopping the French from having the European Union completely take over the WEU and fashion it into its defense arm, the French lost interest in it and turned instead to the Franco-German corps as the vehicle to create the EDI.[62] No other European member of NATO agreed to contribute to the corps, however, until they had a clear idea of how exactly it would relate to the Alliance. Even the Belgians, who were closest to the French outlook, refused to contribute to the corps until this issue was resolved. None wanted to risk undermining NATO and pushing the Americans out. Under great pressure from the British, the Germans, and the Americans, the French therefore became a party to the compromise that was reached in December 1992 between the Eurocorps and NATO. Although the text of the agreement is classified, the agreement consisted of three parts: the Eurocorps would be assigned to NATO command if the Alliance came under attack; the Eurocorps would also be under NATO command during crises and NATO-run peacekeeping operations; and in peacetime, when the Eurocorps was not under NATO command, NATO's command had the right to review its operations so as to determine its compatibility with NATO's planning, training, and doctrine.[63] In effect, the Eurocorps would be a free-standing military force in peacetime, but in any war or warlike situation when NATO was engaged, NATO would control it. This made the Eurocorps much like the other national forces of NATO: they are under national command in peacetime, with NATO having influence on their training and doctrine, but come under NATO command in crises or war.

The compromise reached between NATO and the Western European Union also consisted of three parts. First, the United States and NATO accepted the development of a European Defense Identity. In fact, as early as July 1990, at NATO's heads-of-state London summit, the Alliance had taken the position that a European Defense Identity would contribute to Alliance solidarity. This position was restated three times in 1991: in June at NATO's Copenhagen summit, in November at NATO's Rome heads-of-state summit, and in December at the EC's

[62] Yost, "France and West European Defense Identity," 344–347.

[63] Interview with an official of the British Foreign Office, London, 13 December 1993; and interviews with an official of the U.S. State Department, 13 January 1993 and 17 March 1993. The agreement is mentioned, but not described, in "Communique Issued by the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council," Brussels, 17 December 1992," to be found in *NATO Review* 40 (December 1992): 29–30.

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Maastricht conference. In January 1994, at the Brussels NATO summit, the gathered heads of state went one step further and declared:

> We [the Alliance] support strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance through the Western European Union, which is being developed as the defense component of the European Union. The Alliance's organization and resources will be adjusted so as to facilitate this.[64]

In effect, this understanding meant that the WEU would become the European Defense Identity and would therefore become a part of the European Union. In this sense, the French had won. In another sense, however, they had lost. For what had been at issue underneath the French-British debate was not so much where the WEU was located—as a component of the European Union or independent of it—but how much it would replicate and thereby undercut NATO. The French wanted the WEU to become part of the European Union, because they thought this increased the chances to make it large and powerful enough to relegate NATO to a residual role. The British wanted the WEU to be kept out of the European Union so that it could be kept small and subsidiary to NATO. Not location but duplication was the issue in dispute.

By the end of 1993, the issue had been settled: the WEU would be part of the European Union, but it would not undercut NATO. The British, the Dutch, the Danes, the Germans, and the United States had accepted EU ownership of the WEU, because the other two elements of the compromise insured that the WEU would not threaten NATO. The second element, reached at the Copenhagen summit and blessed by the heads of state at the Rome summit, affirmed NATO's primacy with these words: NATO was "the essential forum for consultation and venue for agreement" on security and defense matters in Europe.[65] This language reflected the fact that the European Union had accepted the primacy of NATO. At the time, all members of the WEU were also members of NATO, though not the other way around. Therefore, the Western Europeans could not accept NATO's primacy within the NATO forum and then deny it within the WEU or EU fora. The third element of the compromise gave concrete meaning to the Copenhagen language: the WEU would not duplicate NATO's military command and staff structure, because its own structure would remain small in relation to NATO's. In concrete terms, this meant that the size of the WEU military planning cell would grow to no more than three persons per country. There was also the strong possibility that relations between the WEU cell and NATO would be close, with the WEU staff being co-located at NATO's military command center at SHAPE

[64] *Partnership for Peace: Declaration of the Heads of State and Government, January 10, 1994, NATO Review* 42 (February 1994): 31.

[65] The phrase appears in paragraph 7 *Final Communique of the Minsterial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Copenhagen, June 7, 1991, NATO Review* 39 (June 1991): 31; and paragraph 6 of the Rome Declaration.

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and with the personnel being double hatted (that is, the same people serving on both staffs).[66]

The modus vivendi that the WEU and NATO had reached by the end of 1993 is best described as "separable but not separate capabilities."[67] What this means is that there would be two chains of political decision making (a NATO chain and a European chain), but only one set of military assets that each would utilize, not two political chains and two sets of military assets.[68] In short, the WEU would rely largely on NATO for military staff work, command structure, logistics, intelligence, and lift. The January 1994 Partnership for Peace made this agreement formal: NATO stands ". . . ready to make collective assets of the Alliance available, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations undertaken by the European Allies in pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security Policy."[69] NATO (and the United States) had accepted the European Union's drive to create a common security and defense policy, but only as long as it did not destroy the heart of NATO—its integrated approach to military planning and combat.

In actual fact, NATO has few truly collective assets. Most of them consist of national forces that have been assigned to it. What collective assets exist consist either of commonly funded headquarters and communications, or commonly funded forces such as AWACS and minesweepers. But when more broadly interpreted, as was the intent, the Brussels agreement meant that in those situations where the Europeans decided to use their combat forces, but the United States chose not to send its combat forces, the military assets of NATO, including its command structure, would be made available. The rationale for lending NATO assets to the WEU was obvious: if the WEU was to be expected not to develop its own assets, then it had to use NATO's. In principle, the asset-lending agreement also opened the way for the United States to make available to the Europeans its logistics, communications, and lift capabilities, without having to commit American combat forces to WEU operations. Finally, the institutional manifestation of this two-chains-one-set-of-assets agreement is NATO's decision to form Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs). These are to be forces organized for what are termed "non-Article 5 missions"—those not related to the defense of a NATO member against attack. In practice, such missions would most likely be peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations outside of Western Europe. CJTFs are to be flexible, mobile, rapidly deployable, and able to make use of non-NATO forces that can be attached to them.[70] With the formation of CJTFs, NATO was

[66] Interview with an official of the British Foreign Office, London, 13 December 1993.

[67] The phrase is from *Partnership for Peace: Declaration of the Heads of State and Government*, paragraph 6.

[68] Interviews with an official in the British Foreign Office, London, 13 January 1994; and with a deputy undersecretary, Ministry of Defense, London, 14 January 1994.

[69] *Partnership for Peace Declaration*, paragraph 6.

[70] Gebhard, *United States and European Security*, 75–76; interview with John Chipmann, director, International Institute of Strategic Studies, London, 14 January 1993; interview with an official in the British Embassy, Washington, DC, 31 March 1994; Steven Greenhouse, "NATO Clears Plan for Task

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redesigning itself for selective intervention missions, which could be conducted by NATO as a whole or by the WEU separately, with or without the participation of non-NATO nations. NATO was moving from a purely collective defense alliance to an organization that could serve as the military core around which to organize intervention actions on the European continent. This was roughly the approach used for the peace enforcement role that NATO undertook in Bosnia in December 1995.

Thus, by early 1994, the political conflict over how best to prevent the renationalization of defense within Western Europe had diminished considerably, even if it had not disappeared entirely. During the course of the Eurodefense debate, three key compromises and two fundamental political understandings had been reached. The three compromises were: NATO would command the Eurocorps during crises, wartime, and peacekeeping missions; the WEU would become the defense component of the European Union; and the WEU would make use of, not replicate, NATO's military structure. For the North Atlantic security community, these three agreements contained two fundamental political understandings. First, for its part, Western Europe had accepted NATO's primacy in Europe's security and defense affairs as the price to be paid to keep the United States militarily engaged on the continent. Second, for its part, the United States had accepted what will come to be a European caucus (or pillar) within NATO. In effect, the European Union will develop a defense identity, but it will sit institutionally within NATO, caucus within the Alliance, and make use of the Alliance's assets.

By no means, however, did all these agreements put to final rest the underlying French desire to make the EU's defense identity more robust and independent of NATO, nor cause it to desist in its attempts to enlist the Germans in this endeavor.[71] France bought into the agreement partly because it had no choice: its European partners would not go along with its proposals to cut NATO down in importance. Subsequently, in early 1994, France decided to participate more fully in the Alliance's military deliberations in order to affect its decisions and influence its evolution. It decided to send its defense minister and chief of staff to NATO's military fora, but only to attend those meetings that involved the potential use of French forces.[72]

Forces," *New York Times*, 6 January 1994; David White, "Europe Undergoes Change in Defence Identity," *Financial Times*, 12 January 1994, 2; Michale Putzel, "US Seems Unsure of Its NATO Clout," *Boston Globe*, 12 January 1994; David White, "UK Calls EU Defense Talks," *Financial Times*, 24 January 1994, 2; and Kelleher, *Future of European Security*, 67–73.

[71] For example, the French and Germans announced their intention to develop a new military transport and satellite observation system. If procured, both would enhance the WEU's ability to rely less on the United States for airlift and intelligence. See David Buchan, "Kohl and Mitterrand Make Pact Over EU Presidency," *Financial Times*, 1 June 1994, 1.

[72] David Buchan, "Paris to Strengthen Its Role within NATO," *Financial Times*, 6 January 1994, 2; David Buchan, "France Goes on the Defence Offensive," *Financial Times*, 24 January 1994, 2.

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Seemingly an incremental move, this decision was in fact a dramatic change in French policy. In 1966, France had withdrawn from the Alliance's integrated military command, even though it had not left the Alliance itself. Under President Giscard d'Estaing, it had begun to cooperate more closely with NATO's military command, although it did so informally and unobtrusively. The 1994 decision, even though qualified, meant that France in effect had reentered the Alliance's military structures. Although its representatives would participate only in those meetings that involved operations to which French forces might contribute, such operations were most likely to be undertaken by the newly-formed combined task forces. The task forces would be constructed out of elements taken from NATO's regular standing commands. France had agreed to contribute to the task forces, even though its forces were not integrated into the standing commands. With this sleight of hand, France could have its cake and eat it too. It could claim that it maintained the tradition of Gaullist independence of the Alliance, because it did not take part in NATO's regular standing commands. But it could also claim that it was cooperating more closely with NATO to deal with the post-cold war challenges, because it had agreed to participate in precisely those operations most likely to be undertaken by NATO in the future. Despite its pretentions to the contrary, France had put at least one foot back into NATO's integrated command.

The Clincher: Yugoslavia

The above three compromises and two political understandings were the product of four years of hard bargaining within NATO, within the EU, and between the two of them. The negotiations that produced these arrangements did not take place in a sterile political vacuum, but were heavily influenced by the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the inability of the West to deal with it. Jan Bielecki, former prime minister of Poland, aptly described the impact of Yugoslavia on Western security deliberations: "The transatlantic partnership almost disappeared in the political language of a significant number of Western European politicians until they realized how unsuccessful was their policy toward Yugoslavia."[73] Yugoslavia's bloody disintegration demonstrated that eternal peace had not arrived in Europe, that the Europeans could not agree on a common policy, that they did not have the collective will to intervene forcefully to stop the bloodshed, and that the peacekeeping intervention they did engage in strained their military resources. As a consequence, Balkan events ultimately pushed the French even closer to NATO, the British closer to the French, the Germans to work harder for CFSP, and the Americans to become heavily reengaged in Europe. Yugoslavia's impact on the Western security debate is clear: although it was a source of great

[73] Interview with Jan Krzksztof Bielecki, prime minister of Poland from January–December 1991, Warsaw, 8 July 1992.

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tension among the NATO allies, it paradoxically solidified the compromises and understandings reached by early 1994.[74]

Perhaps the most profound impact was felt in France. At the outset of the Eurodefense debate, France had wanted the United States to retain its military presence in Europe, but it did not want America's concomitant leadership of Europe's security affairs that had traditionally gone along with it. In French eyes, the end of the cold war now made it possible to relegate the United States to the "insurer of last resort" against a resurgent Russia, while France would politically organize and lead a unified European Union. Early in the Eurodefense debate, therefore, France had made two calculations: first a European Defense Identity could be constructed to deal with Europe's security problems; second, NATO could then be relegated to a residual role. Events did not prove out either calculation. In particular, the Yugoslav conflict profoundly affected France's views about what the European Union could do in foreign policy and defense matters. Under the impact of Yugoslavia, France moved from relegating NATO to a residual role to becoming a participant in revamping it so that it could meet the new security challenges in Central Europe. France is thus a useful barometer of Western European thinking about NATO's utility. The one country that had tended most to downplay NATO's utility had rediscovered its importance.[75] On the eve of NATO's 60,000 troop deployment to Bosnia, France therefore moved one additional but conclusive step toward full participation in NATO: it announced that its defense minister would attend all future meetings of NATO's military committee, not just those that might involve the use of French troops, as it had decided in January 1994. This additional step signified France's acceptance that NATO was "where the action was" and hence that France had better fully engage in its deliberations so as to influence them more to its liking.[76] France's movement in four short years from NATO's denigrator to its supporter provides a good measure of the profound impact that Yugoslavia had on European political elites.

[74] For analyses of the impact that the Yugoslav crisis had on NATO and Western Europe, see Roger Cohen, "Over There: Why the Yanks Are Going Yet Again," *New York Times*, 26 November 1995; Lionel Barber, "European Union States Forced to Confront the Limits of Action," *Financial Times*, 22 November 1995, 2; Pavel Baev et al., *The Implications of the Yugoslav Crisis for Western Europe's Foreign Relations*, Chaillot Papers #17 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, October 1994); Kelleher, *Future of European Security*, chap. 5; and Ted Galen Carpenter, *Beyond NATO: Staying Out of Europe's Wars* (Washington, DC: The Cato Institute, 1994), chap. 5.

[75] Interview with an official of the State Department, Washington, DC, 17 March 1993; interview with an official at the British Embassy, Washington, DC, 17 March 1993; interview with a member of British Foreign Minister John Hurd's personal staff, held in Cambridge, MA, 12 December 1995; Alan Riding, "Its Competitors Distracted, France Gets to Be Power," *New York Times*, 27 June 1993; Lionel Barber, "Concern at Weak EU Foreign Policy," *Financial Times*, 19 January 1994, 2; Gebhard, *United States and European Security*, 21–23.

[76] See Roger Cohen, "France to Rejoin Military Command of NATO Alliance, *New York Times*, 6 December 1995; and Bruce Clark, "France Aims to Apply Oil to NATO's Squeaky Wheels," *Financial Times*, 6 December 1995, 2.

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The effect of Yugoslavia on Britain was equally profound.[77] The British still continued to insist that WEU remain a distinct entity, separate from the EU, but they moved closer to the French position that Europe needed its own defense capability to cope with those continental conflicts from which the United States chose to remain aloof. Early on in the Eurodefense debate, the French had argued that the United States might leave the Europeans in the lurch in those conflicts in which American interests were minimal. For nearly three years, Yugoslavia demonstrated the full force of that argument. As a consequence, Britain moved from a standoffish to a more constructive position regarding the development of a European defense capability.

The changes in the German and the American positions were also important. Unlike the French and the British, the Germans and the Americans had viewed the Yugoslav conflict in moral terms: an outright case of Serbian aggression against Bosnians. The British and the French saw things differently: there was enough blame for all the warring parties to share. Their approach was to contain the conflict and limit the suffering. The irony was that the two states that took the moral high ground committed no ground troops, while the two that had taken the more cynical approach did. Ultimately, both the Germans and the Americans became engaged: the Germans revised their laws so that they could take part in NATO-sanctioned interventions outside NATO territory; and the Americans committed 20,000 troops to the Bosnian peace enforcement effort. The Americans realized that their initial 1991 calculation—that Yugoslavia was a European problem to be handled by the Europeans—was wrong. The Germans concluded that they had to redouble their efforts to increase an effective CFSP and began to view military and nonmilitary steps toward political union increasingly in that light. As one elder German statesman put it: "We should go to monetary union *if* it helps us go towards CFSP."[78]

Thus, the searing Yugoslav experience made NATO's defenders and detractors alike realize that they still needed the Alliance and the United States for something other than a residual protector against a resurgent Russia or a balancer against a powerful Germany. NATO was now being groomed for the role of selective intervener too.

Conclusion

What policy implications for American foreign policy can we draw from the foregoing analysis? In my view, they are clear: reject isolationism and stick with

[77] Sources for the British position are interview with a member of British Foreign Minister John Hurd's personal staff, 12 December 1995; David White, "Britain Isolated over EU Defense Merger," *Financial Times*, 15 November 1995, 2; and Ronald Tiersky, *The Mitterand Legacy and the Future of French Security*, The McNair Paper 43 (Washington, DC: National Defense University, August 1995), 44–48.

[78] Quoted in Ian Davidson, "Kohl Calls the Tune," *Financial Times*, 24 May 1995, 12; The source is not identified. See also Michael Lindemann, "Germans Outline Plans to Draw EU Nations Closer on Defence," *Financial Times*, 8 June 1995, 2.

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engagement. The former calls for the United States to scuttle its NATO alliance and bring the troops home.[79] The latter argues for the importance of a continuing American military presence in Europe.

The engagement strategy toward Europe takes the position that the United States serves its European interests best by continuing to provide a security blanket to Western Europe.[80] As such, it serves as the "balancer of last resort." In this role, the United States becomes the ultimate guarantor that the weak will not be bullied by the strong and that the strong do not need to be overly concerned with balancing militarily against one another. By performing this role, the United States provides a sense of reassurance to the Europeans that they would not otherwise have and thereby helps make security relations, and also political and economic relations, within Western Europe more stable than they would otherwise be. Through its peacetime military presence, the United States performs a quasi-governmental function: it provides a reassuring degree of security that would otherwise be absent.

The United States can play this balancing role because it is *in*, but not *of*, Europe. As a consequence, if it acts appropriately, the United States can appear more disinterested (although never completely so) about Western European security matters than can any Western European state. If forced to choose, the Western Europeans will entrust this balancer-of-last-resort to the United States because they will not entrust it to one of their own, nor do they trust themselves to provide it collectively. These attitudes are widespread across Europe. The small powers of Western Europe clearly prefer that the United States, not one or several of their big continental neighbors, play this guarantor role. The greater powers of Western Europe will definitely not defer to one another for this balancing role. And although there are a few exceptions, the Central Europeans in general trust the United States more than they trust any of the continent's great powers to protect them. As one experienced, high-level European diplomat put the matter: "Among Europeans, it is not acceptable that the lead nation be European. A European power broker is a hegemonic power. We can agree on U.S. leadership, but not on one of our own."[81] None of these nations, west or east, large or small, advocates a total abdication of European security matters to American leadership, but none wants to do without an American presence. All want the United States militarily engaged in Europe precisely because of its balancing and quasi honest-broker roles.

The argument for continued military engagement in western Eurasia rests heavily on the desirability of buying insurance. Contemplating the removal of American forces from Western Europe can be compared to deciding whether to maintain a fire insurance policy on one's own home. Having carried coverage for the last forty-odd years, does one now summarily cancel the policy simply

[79] See, for example, Carpenter, *Beyond NATO*, chap. 7.

[80] I develop this argument more fully in my forthcoming *Selective Engagement*, chap. 6.

[81] Interview with a Western European ambassador to NATO, Brussels, 10 January 1992.

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because no fire has occurred? Does the prolonged absence of a fire mean that the coverage is no longer required?[82]

The engagement position answers both questions with a "no." It sees the U.S. military presence in Western Europe as good insurance because of the two types of coverage it provides: one to prevent damage from occurring; the second to limit it should it occur. With regard to damage prevention, the U.S. military presence is akin to hiring a night watchman to monitor a building continuously so as to make certain that nothing is done, by accident or design, to start a fire.[83] With regard to damage limitation, the U.S. military presence is akin to installing a sprinkler system inside a building that can quickly put out a fire once it has started. The first type of coverage—prevention—is the best value for a given expenditure, because measures to prevent a fire are cheaper than those required to rebuild after one. But unlike fire insurance, the U.S. military presence can also buy some coverage for limiting damage. Not every fire can be prevented, but many can be contained if the proper steps have been taken to put them quickly out. Buying insurance, therefore, is a precautionary and prudent strategy, because it puts in place measures that adequately safeguard one's valuable investments.

In western Eurasia today, the most valuable investment that the United States has to protect is the political-economic cohesion of Western Europe. The two greatest military threats to it are the nuclearization of Germany and the outbreak of a security competition within Western Europe. The investment to be protected and the two military threats to it define the three objectives of America's grand strategy toward Western Europe now that the cold war is over. They are: to preserve Western Europe's political-economic cohesion and to encourage its efforts towards greater integration, as long as these efforts produce an outward-looking, liberal trading community, not an inward-looking, protectionist one; to keep Germany from acquiring nuclear weapons; and to prevent the outbreak of a security competition within Western Europe. The first objective is the overarching stake, while the second and the third can be viewed as the means to help attain it. By no means do these three exhaust the number of interests that the United States has in Western Europe today, but they are the ones for which the military instrument is most applicable.[84]

Although the second and third objectives can be viewed as means to help attain the first, nevertheless, all three are so inextricably bound up with one another that they should be viewed as of equal importance. They are tightly interlinked, because the degree to which each is realized affects the attainment of the other two. If economic integration is preserved and advanced, prosperity

[82] The fire insurance analogy is not quite exact, because American homeowners who have mortgages have no choice but to carry fire insurance, because their lenders require it.

[83] The phrase "night watchman" is in John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," *International Security* 15 (Summer 1990): 47.

[84] The argument developed here parallels the one made by Van Evera, "Why Europe Matters," 8–12.

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will be better assured and enhanced, and a security competition is less likely to reappear. Prosperous states are not hungry, anti-status quo states. Similarly, if Germany eschews nuclear weapons, the incentives of the other Western (and Central and Eastern) European nations to take military steps to counter it, singly or in concert, will remain low. A nuclear free Germany is still seen by all its neighbors as a Germany safer than a nuclear armed one. Moreover, if a generalized Western European security competition can be avoided, then Germany is less likely to want nuclear weapons. Friendly neighbors are not worrisome neighbors.

Finally, if defense and security worries are mitigated, then Western Europe's current cohesion will be better protected, and additional integrationist progress may be made easier. A benign security environment is crucial to economic, if not also to political, integration. The political-economic relations of states cannot be quarantined from what goes on in their security relations (and vice-versa). Severe disturbances in the latter will inevitably spill over into the former and fatally infect them. Political-economic integration will not indefinitely survive competing, nationalistic, beggar-thy-neighbor approaches to security. Or, as one high level and experienced Western European diplomat put the case:

> The United States presence in Europe is crucial. The role of the United States goes beyond balancing the Soviet Union. The United States keeps our national rivalries down. We are now faced with the emergence of a friendly local superpower—Germany. Our chances of succeeding are greater if the United States stays. If it goes, however, the effects will be felt way beyond the security field—in GATT, agriculture, and so forth. If NATO breaks up, our economic structures are threatened also.[85]

Seen in this perspective, America's military presence helps maintain the benign security environment within Western Europe. America's balancing role is a principal instrument that helps keep both external threats and internal fears from corroding Western Europe's cohesion. Through its military presence, the United States helps buffer, dampen, and thereby keep within defined bounds the inevitable tensions that will continue to arise among the Western Europeans. If it can help reduce or even completely eradicate the fear that security competitions may arise once again within Western Europe, the United States can, so to speak, take this matter out of discussion and remove it from Western Europe's already crowded agenda. By doing so, it will enable the Western Europeans to preserve and perhaps advance their political-economic integration. The United States cannot force further integration, but it can help produce conditions that can facilitate it, if the West Europeans are so inclined. Even more important, its military presence there can provide an added barrier against a headlong backslide into an unbridled nationalism that potentially could threaten even the Common Market. A Western Europe that fails to achieve the goals of economic and political union called for in the Maastricht Treaty may not be a severe loss to the United

[85] Interview with a Western European ambassador to NATO, Brussels, 10 January 1992.

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States. But a Western Europe that has failed to achieve these union goals and that then backslides into a destructive state of competing nationalism would be. The American presence can both assist the movement towards greater union and also prevent corrosive nationalistic backsliding.

By its absence or presence, therefore, the United States will influence what Western Europe looks like at the end of the Maastricht process, and therefore what the rest of Europe will look like. In the engagement view, the United States must be present, not absent.*

* This article draws from my forthcoming book, *Selective Engagement: An American Grand Strategy*, which is supported by the Twentieth Century Fund. I am indebted to the Fund and also to the United States Institute of Peace, which enabled me to conduct extensive interviews in Washington and Western Europe in 1991 and 1992. I thank David Art, Michael Brown, Andrew Moravcsik, and John Sawyer for their perceptive comments.

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

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Contours of Israel's New Strategic Thinking

EFRAIM INBAR

As Kenneth Waltz put it, states operate in a "self-help" system in which threats to national security are omnipresent. Small states, in particular, have difficulties meeting challenges from powerful aggressors, since such states are by definition limited in their ability to build sizable and well-equipped military machines.[1] Generally, small states have little leeway; their military and diplomatic margins are thin.

A few small states reconcile themselves to "defensive nihilism," the abandonment of hope to establish an effective defense.[2] A few others, such as Switzerland and Sweden, adopt postures of self-reliance, attempting to meet security challenges without outside help. This is also known as internal balancing; it describes the way a state aggregates power. Other small states augment their military capability by allying themselves with other countries. The mobilization of other countries' resources in confronting external threats is termed external balancing.[3] Alliances, however, can constrain a state's freedom of action. In many cases, a small state's room to maneuver is also constricted by the prevailing structure of the international system and its regional subsystem. Most small states attempt to devise strategic doctrines based on a mix of external and internal balancing in order to maximize military power and the freedom to use it.

Israel is an example of such a small state. This article analyzes the ways in which the international and regional environments, and internal developments

[1] For studies of small states, see inter alia David Vital, *The Inequality of States* (Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1967); Michael Handel, *Weak States in the International System* (London: Frank Cass, 1981); Efraim Karsh, *Neutrality and Small States* (London: Routledge, 1988).

[2] For such a doctrine that had adherents in Norway, Sweden, and particularly in Denmark before World War 1, see Handel, *Weak States in the International System*, 77.

[3] For internal versus external balancing, see Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1983), 168; for a review of the literature on alliances, see Glenn H. Snyder, "Alliances, Balance and Stability," *International Organization* 45 (Winter 1991): 121–42.

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within Israel, have influenced Israel's recent strategic thinking. Yossi Sarid, a left-wing Meretz party cabinet member (an ex-Laborite) in the present Labor-led government, described Yitzhak Rabin's government as the most "Sharetist" in Israel's history.[4] In Israeli political parlance this means that it had a most dovish orientation. Indeed, we see a redefined and reduced threat perception, change of emphasis in the concept of national power, a greater reluctance to use force, and an erosion in the centrality of the concept of self-reliance.

Israel's Traditional National Security Concept[5]

Since Israel's establishment, its leaders felt that their country faced an existential threat from the Arab states' desire to eradicate the Jewish state. They similarly understood that military power was critical to the country's ability to survive, and as a result Israel invested heavily in developing a strong military machine. Realizing that it was a small state surrounded by numerous Arab countries, the help of extraregional powers has also been sought to offset asymmetries in resources with the Arab world.

David Ben-Gurion, Israel's first prime minister, knew that building a militarily strong country was extremely important to survive in the Middle East: "Israel stood up by its own strength and will stand firm only if it trusts first and foremost in itself as a power of growing greatness."[6] Furthermore, he felt that allies cannot be totally relied upon, which led to a great emphasis on self-reliance. This concept meant two things: the freedom to act when challenged and the military ability to do so effectively. Though cognizant of the limitations inherent in a small state predicament, Israel hoped to achieve a capacity to respond unilaterally to any emerging security challenges and to establish a deterrent power. Israel's goal was "independence" in what Shimon Peres called in 1975, "uniquely decisive situations."[7]

[4] Yossi Sarid speaking at a colloquium on Sharet at the Hebrew University, 21 November 1994. For the Sharet-Ben-Gurion dispute over foreign and national security policies, see Michael Brecher, *The Foreign Policy System of Israel* (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), 251–290; Gabriel Sheffer, *Resolution vs. Management of the Middle East Conflict*, Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems, no. 32 (Jerusalem: Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, Hebrew University, 1980).

[5] For works on Israel's security thinking, see Michael I. Handel, *Israel's Political-Military Doctrine* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Occasional Papers, July 1973); Israel Tal, "Israel's Doctrine of National Security: Background and Dynamics," *Jerusalem Quarterly* 4 (Summer 1977); Yoav Ben-Horin and Barry Posen, *Israel's Strategic Doctrine*, Paper No. 4-2845-NA (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1981); Efraim Inbar, "Israeli Strategic Thinking After 1973," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 6 (March 1983): 36–59; Dan Horowitz, "The Constant and the Changing in Israeli Strategic Thinking" in Joseph Alpher, ed., *War by Choice* [Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1985), 58–77; and Ariel Levite, *Offense and Defense in Israeli Military Doctrine*, JCSS Study no. 12 (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1989).

[6] David Ben Gurion, "Israel Among Nations," *Government Yearbook 5713* [Hebrew] (Jerusalem: State of Israel, 1952/53), quoted in Brecher, *The Foreign Policy System of Israel*, 265.

[7] In a speech to party activists in Jerusalem, *Haaretz*, 29 April 1975.

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In the past, Israel's political elite displayed skepticism about the benign nature of international relations. Many of its political leaders believed that the Jews faced a world of hostile and/or untrustworthy Gentiles. The Jewish historic experience of previous centuries and the Holocaust perpetrated in this century reinforced a realpolitik outlook and amplified the sense of insecurity and isolation of many Israelis.[8] Conflict with the Arab world only strengthened Israel's perception of insecurity.

Precisely because of this sense of insecurity and isolation, Israel was always preoccupied with securing a patron among the major international powers.[9] Alliances with great powers were perceived by the Israeli leadership as an important element in securing political and economic support, and, above all, in securing access to modern weaponry. It was felt that alignment with a major power would improve Israel's capacity for action through external balancing and would also provide some measure of extended deterrence, a commitment to defend another party. The help of a world power—the United States—was sought since the 1950s to neutralize perceived threats from the Soviet Union and to increase Israel's potential for action against regional Soviet allies.

In its early years, Israel adopted a policy of nonalignment; it avoided taking sides in the global conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union.[10] Later in the 1950s, Israel gradually came to the conclusion that an alliance with the Western powers would be useful in contending with the hostile Arab world. But Israel was denied access to the treaties established by the West in the Middle East, and NATO also declined to accept it.[11] Israel's enthusiasm for a formal alliance evaporated as it realized that an alliance could curb its freedom of action. It settled for access to weaponry from European powers, France in particular. Yet before 1967, as later on, Israel was willing to trade some of its freedom of action for nurturing good relations with potential weapon suppliers in order to enhance its military capacity.

After 1967, proposals for an American-Israeli Defense Treaty were usually conditioned on full Israeli withdrawal from the territories captured in the Six Day war, a condition not well received in Israel.[12] After 1973, at a time when

[8] For the Israeli leadership's perceptions of the international environment, see Brecher, *The Foreign Policy System of Israel*, 251–369. For a discussion of the impact of Jewishness on Israel's foreign policy, see ibid., 229–43; Aharon S. Klieman, *Israel and the World After 40 Years* (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1990), 52–57; Efraim Inbar, "Jews, Jewishness and Israel's Foreign Policy," *Jewish Political Studies Review* 2 (Fall 1990): 165–83.

[9] Klieman, *Israel and the World After 40 Years*, 91–93.

[10] See Michael Brecher, *Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy* (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), 111–71; Uri Bialer, *Between East and West* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

[11] For the early search for allies, see Avner Yaniv, *Deterrence Without the Bomb: The Politics of Israeli Strategy* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987), 48–55.

[12] Senator William Fulbright and Undersecretary of State George Ball were among the proponents. For a critical analysis of an American-Israeli defense treaty reflecting official thinking, see Yair Evron, "Some Political and Strategic Implications of an American-Israeli Defense Treaty" in Haim Shaked

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its security challenges sharply escalated, Israel found itself greatly isolated in world politics. Then Israeli leaders invested even greater effort in maintaining good relations with the United States.[13] In the early 1980s, the two countries came very close to formalizing a strategic partnership in response to fears of Soviet expansionism and influence. But as broad and deep as strategic cooperation became in the late 1980s and early 1990s, both sides refrained from aspiring to a formal alliance. At the same time, Israel always emphasized that it did not expect others to fight its battles or to participate directly in its defense. This was helpful in asking for Western help with no diplomatic strings attached. In orienting Israel in this manner, its leaders aspired to increase their freedom of action.

Israeli strategists knew that the Israel Defense Force (IDF) must plan for quick wars because of asymmetries between Israel and Arab states. This could be achieved with offensive operations. Offensive tactics helped avoid a situation that might compel Israel to deal with two or more fronts simultaneously. Offensive, surprise operations also enhanced Israel's freedom of action by allowing Israel to choose a convenient diplomatic moment, while minimizing the chances for effective outside intervention on the part of Arab expeditionary forces or the superpowers. Furthermore, when on attack, the IDF could better utilize its qualitative edge in manpower and in tactics against the Arab armies. Offensive operations were also believed to be less costly in terms of casualties.

Israeli strategic thinking also required building a military force that would enable it to stand alone versus regional threats. After the 1973 war, Israel greatly expanded the IDF and increased its stocks of military equipment to minimize the need for extraregional support and to exclude outside intervention.[14]

Israel also developed a sizeable military industry. The main motivation behind the large defense industry was the fear that weapons needed for Israel's security could become unavailable, for political reasons, on the world market. Israel sought and established an ability to produce a main battle platform for each branch of the IDF—air, ground, and naval. Israel began production of the Kfir jet-fighter following the French embargo in 1967. The British refusal to sell Chieftain tanks led Israel to build the Merkava tank. Similarly, the difficulties in purchasing fast patrol boats in the 1960s resulted in indigenous production of Saar class missile boats.

Following the 1973 war, however, the dream of weapon self-sufficiency faded away as IDF's needs increased drastically, and Israel's military, economic, and diplomatic dependence upon the United States grew. Nevertheless, the military industries expanded and developed maintenance and repair services to reduce the dependence upon foreign arms suppliers. Israel's industries also produced

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and Itamar Rabinovich, eds., *The Middle East and the United States* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1980), 371–94.

[13] Efraim Inbar, *Outcast States in the World Community*, Monograph Series in International Affairs (Denver: University of Denver Press, 1985).

[14] Inbar, "Israeli Strategic Thinking After 1973," 41–45.

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many military products and adapted imported weapons to the specific needs of the IDF, which thereby acquired a technological edge over its regional opponents.

The development of an infrastructure to produce modern weaponry included the Israeli nuclear option. The Israeli nuclear program, started in the late 1950s, was also motivated by existential fears and by the assessment that in case of military defeat in a conventional war, little help was to be expected from friendly governments. The nuclear option was perceived as an insurance policy in case Israel lost its conventional defense capacity or if Arab countries acquired nuclear weapons. Israel, therefore, refused to join the Nonproliferation Treaty of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), but maintained since 1965 that it will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the region, a somewhat ambiguous statement. Israel's policy of opaqueness in nuclear matters was also useful in facilitating access to conventional hardware.[15] Israel's nuclear program, more than other efforts in the security sphere, embodies Israel's preference to maximize power and freedom of action.

A New Israeli Strategic Outlook

Recent developments in Israel's environment: global realignment, the Middle East peace process, as well as changes within Israel have led to the emergence of a new strategic thinking. The departure from past thinking started in the 1980s. Its present prevalence is linked to Labor's return to power and to the dominance of its dovish wing's thinking.[16] Four key features characterize this transformation: new perceptions among Israeli leadership regarding the international and regional systems; a reevaluation of the nature of national power; a greater aversion on the part of the Israeli leadership to use force; and a deprioritizing of the concept of self-reliance.

New Perceptions of the External Environment

The collapse of the Soviet empire is seen by the Israeli leadership as creating a new international atmosphere and is often credited for opening the door to Mideast peacemaking. Israel's adversaries lost their Soviet umbrella, a politico-military relationship that was an important factor in the Arab ability to confront Israel.

Even the late Prime Minister and Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin, known for his realpolitik approach to regional and world politics, came to believe that a "new world" was emerging. Rabin, as well as his deputy in the Defense Ministry, Mordechai Gur, identified another important international event as having posi-

[15] For Israel's nuclear program and policy, see Leonard S. Spector, *The Undeclared Bomb* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1988); Louis Bene Beres, eds., *Security or Armageddon: Israel's Nuclear Strategy* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1986). The most comprehensive discussion is Yair Evron, *Israel's Nuclear Dilemma* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994).

[16] For the evolvement of Labor's thinking on security matters, see Efraim Inbar, *War and Peace in Israeli Politics, Labor Party Positions on National Security* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991).

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tive security results for Israel – the defeat of Iraq by an American-led international coalition.[17]

These developments seem to have led to the Arab-Israeli negotiations after the 1991 Madrid Conference, the September 1993 Israel-PLO accord, and the October 1994 Peace Treaty with Jordan. The 1979 Peace Treaty with Egypt added to these events indicated to many Israeli leaders that an historic process of Arab acceptance of Israel was under way. This process has significantly reduced the military threat emanating from Egypt, the largest Arab state, and has further diminished the likelihood of a hostile coalition coalescing on Israel's eastern border. Indeed, Rabin concluded his overall assessment of the regional environment in 1992 with: "we live today in a period in which the threat to the very existence of Israel has been reduced."[18]

The most optimistic within the Israeli political leadership was Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, who became prime minister after Rabin's assassination. He believes that the Middle East is very close to peace and prosperity and heralded the birth of a new Middle East. "Instead of visions of blood and tears, there will rise visions of happiness and beauty, life and peace," he recently wrote.[19]

Nowadays, fewer Israeli leaders share the basic sense of insecurity felt by most Israeli leaders of the past, which was partly rooted in a Jewish perspective of world affairs. The cultural baggage of most Israeli-born politicians, unless exposed to traditional education, is usually poorer in Jewish content than their predecessors who were born abroad. They are, therefore, less likely to be influenced by the Jewish psycho-cultural dimension. Actually, this Jewish prism has been increasingly attacked by some, primarily on the left, as a negative Jewish and Diaspora heritage and a hang-up that Israelis must shed. For example, Ezer Weizman, Israel's president, regards Israeli fears as a "ghetto mentality," which hinders the peace process.[20] In his opinion, Israel has never been as secure as it is in the 1990s.[21]

Rabin also noted that attitudes toward the Jewish state have changed and abandoned the traditional fear and suspicion of the gentile world. "Israel is no longer 'a people that dwells alone' . . . and has to join the global journey toward peace, reconciliation and international cooperation."[22] Rabin even lectured before the IDF highest echelons about his conviction that Israel must adapt to changing realities: "The world is *no longer* against us. . . . States which never stretched their hand out to us, states which condemned us, which fought us, which assisted our

[17] Addresses by Yitzhak Rabin and Mordechai Gur in Yehudah Mirsky and Ellen Rice, eds., *Towards a New Era in U.S.-Israel Relations* (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute, September 1992), 1-2, 29-30.

[18] Ibid:, 2

[19] Shimon Peres with Arye Naor, *The New Middle East* (New York: Henry Holt, 1993), 46.

[20] "Interview with Ezer Weizman," *Spectrum* 6 (June 1988): 10. This is the Labor party's monthly journal published in English.

[21] *Haaretz*, 3 January 1994.

[22] Rabin's address when presenting his new government, *Knesset Minutes*, 13 July 1992.

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bitterest enemies . . . regard us today as a worthy and respectable address. . . . This is a new reality. . . . Peace requires a world of new concepts. . . ."[23]

Threat perception is particularly low in dovish circles, which are more prominent in the Labor-led government in power since 1992. For example, Minister Yossi Beilin even believes that Israel can now afford to concentrate on domestic problems, because the Arab-Israeli conflict is reaching an end.[24]

The global and regional developments were seen as providing for a window of opportunity to create a much safer environment for Israel. This new, American-imported term in Israeli political language implied that there was a certain urgency in taking advantage of the propitious conditions, otherwise the window might close. Indeed, the attainment of comprehensive peace—an end to the Arab-Israeli armed conflict—was regarded by the Labor government to be within reach, and it was therefore worthwhile to take risks. Rabin asked the Golan settlers from the Knesset rostrum: "Shouldn't we try to make an effort to reach peace? Reject out of hand the possibility of *putting an end to all wars*?"[25] This rhetorical question, more than any other quotation, depicts the change in Rabin's perceptions of the external environment.

Yet, despite Rabin's overall assessment that the probability of war is low for the near future and that the existential threat has been reduced, he believed that Israel continues to face serious military challenges. The nature of the threats and the sources changed, however. According to Rabin, the peace process only influenced the probability of the use of force, not the Arab capability to harm Israel, which has actually been augmented.[26] Because of missiles, chemical and biological weapons, and because of efforts in the region to acquire nuclear weapons, Rabin warned that a future war could entail a large number of Israeli civilian casualties.[27] Similarly threatening is the fear of a surge in the power of Islamic radicalism.[28] The radical Muslims could take over Arab countries and engage in terror, which could become an increasingly politically difficult problem for the Labor-led government. Foreign Minister Peres has also identified the main threats to Israel as coming from a combination of nuclear weapons and extremist Islam.[29] Therefore, the major enemy of the Rabin government became Islamic Iran, which sponsored subversion and terror and was engaged in acquiring a nuclear option.

[23] Speech delivered by Yitzhak Rabin to Graduates of the National Security College, 12 August 1993, Official Text, 3, (Emphasis in original.)

[24] See Yossi Beilin, *Israel—40 Plus* (Tel Aviv: Yediot Aharonot, 1993).

[25] *Haaretz*, 10 October 1994. (Emphasis added.)

[26] See "Interview with Prime Minister Rabin," *Bamahaneh*, 23 September 1992, 9.

[27] Ibid. See also statements of the Israeli Air Force Commander Herzl Bodinger, *Haaretz*, 15 June 1992.

[28] "Interview with Rabin," *Maariv*, Shabat Supplement, 24 June 1994; see also the report of his remarks to the Knesset Committee for Security and Foreign Affairs, *Haaretz*, 15 March 1995.

[29] Peres, *The New Middle East*, 83.

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Yet the threats are perceived as having a redeeming value: they are beneficial to the peace process because Arab secular elites share Israeli apprehensions about the Islamic fundamentalist groups' challenge to the stability of Arab regimes and the emergence of an Iranian nuclear arsenal.[30] Furthermore, the peace process and its expected political and economic offshoots have been regarded by Rabin and others as a panacea for healing most regional problems.[31] Peres believes that the peace accords "will lay the groundwork for the superstructure that will provide security for all people and all nations of the Middle East."[32] His protege, Yossi Beilin, shares such a view and points out that only hastening the peace process could have a positive effect on the struggle against terror.[33]

The general feeling of the present Israeli leadership is that the main threats are concentrated in the more distant countries, while relations with Israel's Arab neighbors are improving. In short, the Labor-led government perceives the peace process as an important window of opportunity to prevent a war with Israel's immediate neighbors, but also as a way of contributing to a regional atmosphere more suited to neutralization of long-range missiles and nonconventional weapons.

The optimism about the prospects of peace and stability in the Middle East are connected to the assessment of a benign international environment. With the Soviet Union no longer around, the need for a world-power ally to counter Soviet presence in the region has dissipated. Rabin believed that as long as Israel negotiates in good faith with the Arabs and displays a willingness to compromise and to accept risks in the peace process, American general support is secure. Furthermore, the looming threat of Islamic radicalism to the West was considered by many in the Israeli political elite as a cementing factor in the American-Israeli alliance. In contrast to the past, Israel no longer feels isolated, which has always been a burden for its extraregional patron. Actually, many new and older countries regard Israel as a good conduit to improving relations with the world hegemon—the United States. Therefore, the general feeling among Israeli decision makers in the mid-1990s has been that the American-Israeli relationship is on a stable course. This is in contrast to the fears of abandonment characteristic of Israeli-great power relations in the past.

A Reevaluation of the Nature of National Power

Along with these new perceptions of the global and Middle East environments, Labor leaders appear to have developed an altered concept of national power

[30] For the role of common aversions in collaboration, see Arthur Stein, "Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World," *International Organization* 36 (Spring 1982): 304–11.

[31] See the report of Rabin's speech to the Knesset in *Haaretz*, 21 January 1993.

[32] Peres, *The New Middle East*, 77.

[33] *Haaretz*, 1 December 1994; see also Beilin's speech in the Knesset on this issue, *Haaretz*, 17 February 1993.

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and security. Peres has actually belittled the importance of military prowess. In a speech to a group of scientists in 1989, he claimed that it is not the size or the strength of its army that determines a country's power, but rather its scientific and technological achievement, stressing that in the present world, economy is more important than strategy.[34] At the end of that year, in reaction to the developments in Eastern Europe, Peres was more explicit about the depreciation of military power. He observed that weapons had become so expensive that their purchase could be economically destructive, while those things that are truly important can not be attained through military force.[35] His book, which analyzes the prospects for the emergence of a new Middle East, regards war as futile and obsolete and questions the advantage of tanks, cannons, and jets "in the face of nuclear, chemical and biological warfare."[36] For him, these challenges to security must be met with political answers: the peace process, rather than military means.[37]

Changes in Rabin's thinking were more recent, but even more striking. In his first address to the Knesset as prime minister, he said that security is not only embodied in the number of tanks, airplanes, and missile boats, but that, "Security is also, and may be first-of-all the human being: the Israeli citizen, . . . his education, his home, his school, his street, his neighborhood, the society in which he grows . . ."[38] In his midterm report, published in June 1994, Rabin, like Peres, underscored the importance of economic factors: "Steps toward a rapprochement between Israel and the Arab states create a process that turns economics into the moving force that shapes the regional relations instead of nationalist interests that were dominant in the past."[39] Addressing the dangerous Islamic threat, Rabin pointed out "that practically the only way to dry the swamp of radical Islam is through economic development and an improved standard of living."[40]

The emphasis on the importance of economic factors in dealing with national security problems is the result of two intellectual influences—socialism and liberalism. The present Israeli leadership, Peres in particular, has socialist ideological baggage, which is gradually replaced or complemented by liberal ideas coming from the United States. Both ideologies relate great importance to the economic dimension in the international equation.[41]

[34] For the transcript of Shimon Peres speech, see *Haaretz*, 2 June 1989. For an elaborate argument about the changing nature of power, see Seyom Brown, "The Changing Essence of Power," *Foreign Affairs* 52 (January 1973): 286–299.

[35] Shimon Peres, "The New Middle East in a Brave New World," *Jerusalem Post*, 8 December 1989.

[36] Peres, *The New Middle East*, 49, 78.

[37] Shimon Peres, "The Knife and the Missile," *Maariv*, Shabat Supplement, 26 March 1993, 10.

[38] Rabin's address when presenting his new government, *Knesset Minutes*, 13 July 1992.

[39] See *Haaretz*, 29 June 1994.

[40] "Policy Statement by PM Yitzhak Rabin to the Knesset," 3 October 1994, Official Transcript.

[41] For the relations between economic ideas and international relations, see Robert Gilpin, "Three Models of the Future," *International Organization* 29 (Winter 1975): 37–63.

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Technology was always regarded by the Israeli political elite as an important component in national power, and the IDF has always aspired to a high-tech edge over its rivals. The American use of smart weapons during the second Gulf War in 1991 left a strong impression on Israel as well as on others. As a result, the Israeli high regard for smart weapons and techologically-advanced support systems has intensified.[42]

For many, modern military technology diminished the strategic value of land. Peres voiced the standard dovish argument against holding on to territories: physical barriers are no longer significant when missiles fly.[43] This was in sharp contrast to his and others' views in the past. After 1967, secure or defensible borders became the goal of Israel's foreign policy, while after 1973 there was a willingness to experiment with buffer and demilitarized zones in the Sinai.[44] The Camp David accord with Egypt of 1978 deviated from this thinking as it stipulated Israeli withdrawal to the international border, with the Sinai peninsula practically demilitarized. At that time, almost a quarter of the Labor contingent to the Knesset refrained from supporting the agreement because it did not insist on defensible borders. Nowadays, among the Labor Knesset members there is only limited opposition to the Rabin government's intent to fully withdraw from the Golan Heights, despite the party's promise before the 1992 elections to maintain an Israeli presence there. Gur implied in the Knesset that the government was considering giving up the entire Golan and pointed out that the key to winning a war these days was military technology, not territory. Furthermore, he quoted approvingly Sadat's comments about the irrelevance of defensible borders.[45] Beilin, a Laborite, also deviated from his party platform and demanded that the Jordan River no longer be considered Israel's eastern security border.[46]

According to the new prevalent thinking, strategic depth and defensible borders—articles of faith in the past—are a strategic anachronism. The notion of defensible borders, which in the past emphasized topography and geography, has acquired a new meaning. Nowadays its main elements are political. It is argued that only those borders that are mutually agreed upon by Israelis and

[42] For Israeli views on the increased importance of technology in the future battlefield, see Zeev Bonen, "The Impact of Technological Developments on the Strategic Balance in the Middle East" in Shlomo Gazit and Zeev Eytan, eds., *The Middle East Military Balance, 1993-1994* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press for the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1994), 148-63; Aharon Levran, *The Strategic and Military Implications of the Second Gulf War*, BESA Studies in Mideast Security (London: Frank Cass, 1996).

[43] Peres, *The New Middle East*, 77-78.

[44] Horowitz, "The Constant and the Changing in Israeli Strategic Thinking," 74-75; see also Yair Evron, *The Demilitarization of Sinai*, Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems No. 11 (Jerusalem: The Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, Hebrew University, 1975); Dan Horowitz, *Israel's Concept of Defensible Borders*, Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems No. 16 (Jerusalem: The Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, Hebrew University, 1975); Inbar, "Israeli Strategic Thinking After 1973," 41-42.

[45] Mordechai Gur, *Official Transcript*, 13 September 1994.

[46] *Haaretz*, 16 November 1993.

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Arabs are secure. Arab acquiescence is, therefore, more important than the military potential of a particular line drawn on a map. This perspective is found in Gur's faith in the durability of an agreement with Syria, which implies territorial withdrawal because it will be acceptable to Damascus.[47] Similarly, Peres downplayed the importance of strategic depth. At least part of the present military elite seems to go along with the political leadership's emphasis on political components in drawing borders. In the opinion of the Chief of Staff Lt. General Amnon Shahak, a Syrian embassy in Israel is more important than an early warning station,[48] while Maj. Gen Zeev Livneh stated that "peace is the best security."[49]

A corollary development is an erosion in the belief that settlements can provide security functions. Rabin once distinguished between security and political settlements. Settlements located on possible invasion routes along the border belonged to the first category. In accordance with Israel's traditional security thinking, they were incorporated in the "territorial defense," which was geared to slow the advancement of enemy forces and to substitute for a lack of strategic depth. More recently, however, Rabin announced that peace with Syria would provide more security than a few settlements on the Golan Heights.[50] His statement expressed the view of most of his cabinet members. The devaluation of the security contribution of settlements is also connected to an erosion in the Israeli attachment to the Land of Israel. The younger generation of Israeli leaders was socialized into the notion of the State of Israel, rather than the Land of Israel; and the Zionist ethos of settling in the ancient homeland is no longer as strongly adhered to as before.[51]

The new emphasis on the importance of economic and technological factors in the evaluation of national power leads to a reassessment of Israel's might and the balance of power with its neighbors. Israeli technological superiority in the Middle East and the fact that its GNP is larger than all of its immediate Arab neighbors combined undermined the traditional assumption regarding Israel's inferiority in resources with the Arab foes. Such an analysis reinforces the reduction in threat perception.

Aversion to Use of Force

In addition to depreciation of the importance of military power, one can discern a clear trend among Israeli leaders toward a greater reluctance to use force. Early signs appeared following the 1973 war and became more pronounced after the 1982 war in Lebanon. Reluctance on a large part of the current Israeli political

[47] *Official Transcript*, 13 September 1994.

[48] Aryeh Kaspi, "Interview Amnon Shahak,". *Al Hamishmar*, 25 April 1993.

[49] *Bamachane*, 25 May 1994, 33.

[50] *Yediot Aharonot*, 22 April 1994, 3.

[51] For the rise of statism as the main component of the Israeli civil religion, see Charles S. Liebman and Eliezer Don-Yehiya, *Civil Religion in Israel* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 81–122.

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leadership to approve of preemptive and preventive strikes transpires from the public debate about Israeli military involvement in Lebanon from 1982 to 1985.[52] Following the 1982 invasion, the Labor party included in its platform a clause requiring a large consensus if force was to be exercised. This unprecedented stance is another indicator of a growing unwillingness among the Labor leadership to use force and an accompanying restraint on Israel's freedom of action.

The ill fated Lebanese campaign also served as a clear lesson on the limits of Israel's military power. The Israeli army was in Beirut, but Israel could not translate its military superiority into the achievement of political goals; peace with Lebanon proved elusive. Similarly, the Palestinian Intifada, which started in 1987, educated the Israeli leadership about how difficult it is to capitalize on superior military power versus a civilian uprising. Though Israel succeeded in bringing the PLO to accept a two-state solution and a phased settlement, the Palestinians made progress toward establishing statehood. Israeli reluctance to police the territories increased as did the willingness to part with some of the land.[53]

The Israeli military reaction to Palestinian violence was a conscious policy of moderate use of force in order not to evoke too much domestic opposition, as well as to prevent the bulk of the Arab population from feeling they had nothing to lose.[54] Yet, Laborite doves such as Uzi Baram, David Libay, and Ora Namir, all ministers in the Rabin government, criticized the Intifada policy as being too harsh. Rabin served at that time as defense minister. In January 1993, Baram even suggested taking away the rifles from the IDF soldiers before they entered refugee camps.[55]

Restraint in the use of force is not a feature exclusive to Labor. During the 1990–1992 period, the Likud leader, Yitzhak Shamir, reigned over the most right-wing government in Israeli annals. Yet, the policy toward the Intifada remained as it was devised by Rabin, while several security challenges remained unanswered. In October 1990 the Syrians used their air force to depose General Michel Aoun in Lebanon, in clear violation of the "red lines" between Israel and Syria – the understandings concerning the limits on Syrian military presence and activities in Lebanon. Even unequivocal Arab aggression against Israel's population centers did not evoke a military response. Shamir's government refrained from retaliating against the 1991 Iraqi missile attacks, despite explicit threats to

[52] Efraim Inbar, "The 'No Choice War' Debate in Israel," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 12 (March 1989): 22–37. The author's interviews with sixty-seven members of the Knesset during the summer of 1990 reinforce this finding.

[53] Giora Goldberg, Gad Barzilai, and Efraim Inbar, *The Impact of Intercommunal Conflict: The Intifada and Israeli Public Opinion*, Policy Studies No. 43 (Jerusalem: The Leonard Davis Institute, the Hebrew University, February 1991).

[54] Efraim Inbar, "Israel's Small War: The Military Response to the Intifada," *Armed Forces and Society* 18 (Fall 1991): 29–50.

[55] *Haaretz*, 27 January 1993.

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do so. The international circumstances were such that they dictated great caution and restraint.

The peace process has also constrained Israel's freedom to use force, as Israeli governments now have to consider the reaction of Arab moderates to any Israeli attacks against Arab targets. The greater acceptance of Israel in the region makes it more difficult for Israel to apply its traditional security doctrine, which emphasizes the use of force to enhance deterrence. Specifically, there is an inherent tension between maintaining a deterrent posture and pursuing a policy of conciliation meant to lower tensions and facilitate peace talks.[56] For example, preparations for dealing with missile attacks from neighboring or distant countries has a threatening element. Israel, particularly under Rabin, adopted a strategy of reassurance to Arab neighbors that Israel's intentions and desires were peaceful, signaling that the use of diplomacy could be more productive than the use of force.[57]

The Rabin government limited its response to Hizballah attacks from Lebanon in order to minimize tensions that could interfere with the peace negotiations with Syria. In the context of the problems along Israel's northern border, Gur stated that "Israel will use all available political avenues before taking military action in order not to harm the peace process."[58] Only after many months of restraint, did the Rabin government react with massive firepower in July 1993 following repeated Katyusha attacks on Israeli settlements along Israel's northern border, making clear its intent to refrain from any escalation. In December 1994, Rabin criticized the new Northern Command CO, Maj. General Amiram Levin, for calling for a more offensive mindset in dealing with the increase in Hizballah attacks in southern Lebanon.[59] Moreover, IDF officers continue to complain that the political echelon is tying their hands in their struggle with the Hizballah.[60]

Limiting IDF initiative in regard to the Palestinians was also advocated by several ministers. Communication Minister Shulamit Aloni of the left-wing Meretz party even demanded that Israel stop hunting Hamas and PLO activists in Israeli-ruled territories, because such searching interferes with the negotiations over the interim agreement with the Palestinians. Restraint has been most prominent within Labor and dovish circles, where it is argued that the use of force can arouse traditional Arab fears of Israeli aggression and expansionism. In short, Israeli military actions have become tied to a set of political considerations more complex than those that had been prevalent in the past—when there was a united hostile Arab front against Israel.

[56] For a discussion of Israeli deterrence in the context of the peace process, see Efraim Inbar and Shmuel Sandler, "Israeli Deterrence Strategy Revisited," *Security Studies* 3 (Winter 1993/94): 346–48.

[57] For an analysis of such a strategy, see Janice Gross Stein "Reassurance in International Conflict Management," *Political Science Quarterly* 106 (Fall 1991): 431–51.

[58] *Haaretz*, 11 November 1992.

[59] *Haaretz*, 13 December 1992.

[60] For a recent complaint, see *Maariv*, Shabbat Supplement, 27 January 1995, 19.

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It is not just political calculations that inhibit the use force; social forces are also at work. The first phenomenon is the changed status of the IDF in Israeli society.[61] The army was once a revered national institution with many auxiliary roles. Nowadays, it has lost some of its luster, and service in the IDF is no longer considered a necessary entrance card into Israeli society. The IDF is becoming more of a professional interest group, subject to increased public criticism. Debates over the IDF performance in the Lebanese campaign and the Intifada contributed to the decline in the standing of the IDF as the embodiment of national consensus.[62] Consequently, this decline in IDF prestige has negatively influenced the attitudes toward its modus operandi—use of force.[63]

Furthermore, the public is nowadays much less tolerant of military miscalculations, which make the politicians more careful in deciding on the use of force. Though avoiding losses in battle has always been part of military planning, there is now in Israel an unprecedented high sensitivity to casualties. Their number has become an important criterion for judging the success of military actions. For example, a major factor in the refusal of the political leadership to approve military action in Southern Lebanon in recent years is the fear of casualties. According to a senior officer, Rabin instructed the IDF commanders in the north to limit activities even at the expense of achieving military goals in order to prevent casualties.[64] In addition, the new phenomenon of IDF openness to the involvement of the conscripts' parents in daily military routine (believed to make transition to military life easier, as well as to provide for good public relations) is beginning to have negative effects on the operational aspects of the army activities.[65]

Another constraint on using force, particularly in the territories, involves the greater consideration given to legal factors by the political leadership. Since 1973, a complex of quasi-judicial and judicial controls gradually emerged that limited the freedom of action of the government in the security sphere.[66] Security decisions such as the rules of engagement in the territories and in Southern

[61] For the changing interactions between the IDF and Israeli society, see Stuart A. Cohen, "The Israel Defense Force (IDF): From a 'People's Army' to a 'Professional Military'—Causes and Implications," *Armed Forces and Society* 21 (Winter 1995): 237–54; and his "How Did the *Intifada* Affect the IDF," *Conflict Quarterly* 14 (Summer 1994): 7–22.

[62] Stuart A. Cohen, "'Masqueraders' in the Israel Defense Forces, 1991–1992: The Military Unit and the Public Debate," *Low-Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement* 2 (Autumn 1993): 293–96.

[63] For a similar argument about the decline of Western armies and consequent restraint, see Pascal Venesson, "Peace and Paralysis: Decline of Western Military Elites and Non-Intervention in International Politics" (paper presented for delivery at the 16th World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Berlin, 21–25 August 1994).

[64] Immanuel Rosen, "The Security Zone: The Price is Too High," *Maariv*, Shabat Supplement, 27 July 1993, 8. See also Eitan Rabin, "We Have Seen This Movie Several Times Already," *Haaretz*, 12 July 1993.

[65] Zeev Schiff, "The Children Are Too Tired," *Haaretz*, 8 February 1995.

[66] See Menachem Hofnung, *Israel's Security Needs Versus The Rule of Law* [Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Nevo, 1991).

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Lebanon are increasingly subject to legal scrutiny. Rabin often complained that the struggle against the Intifada was hindered by the insistence of the Justice Ministry on a proper legal basis for Israel's military actions in the territories; his statement that he was looking for a partner to take care of internal security in Gaza without the High Court of Justice and human rights watchdog organizations is well known.[67]

The strongest social force restricting the use of force is a general fatigue because of the protracted conflict. In recent years, Israeli society has shown signs of becoming increasingly beleaguered, war weary, and impatient for a "solution" to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Israeli society has paid dearly in materiel and casualties over the course of six wars, creating a natural thirst for an end to the violence. Studies have shown that wars have a psychological toll not only on the Israeli soldiers who participated in battle, but on their families as well. Veteran soldiers are increasingly sensitized to the price of protracted conflict as a result of their war experiences. Such awareness leads to a greater desire for peace.[68] Another indication of conflict fatigue is the decline in the enthusiasm of the Israeli teenagers to serve in the IDF.[69] In March 1995, the IDF released new findings showing a gradual decline in the percentage of volunteers for combat units.[70] Public polls show a consistent dovish trend over time. Concretely, it means a greater willingness to part with the territories taken in 1967 and a somewhat greater reluctance to use force.[71] The social factor has been properly termed "the forgotten dimension of strategy."[72] In many instances of protracted conflict, the protagonists have been worn out by their dispute, and the outcome of conflict is thus determined not only by superior military strength but also by perseverance and ability to suffer pain.[73]

Fatigue from policing the territories and confronting hostile civilians played a factor in the Israeli acceptance of the 1993 Israeli-Palestinian accord, which entailed relinquishing control of Gaza and Jericho. Exhaustion in a protracted conflict leads the protagonists to redefine their goals. As a result, Israeli nation-

[67] *Yediot Aharonot*, 3 September 1993, 4.

[68] For a study on the serious impact on wives of traumatized soldiers, see Zehava Solomon et al., "From the Battlefront to the Homefront: Research on Secondary Traumatization," *Refuah* [Hebrew] 124 (June 1993): 750–56; Yuval Neria, *Life in the Shaddow of War—Psychological Aspects* [Hebrew] (Jerusalem: The Leonard Davis Institute, The Hebrew University, April 1994).

[69] Amira Segev, "Interview with Reuven Gal," *Haaretz*, 11 October 1994.

[70] *Haaretz*, 22 March 1995.

[71] Goldberg et al., *The Impact of Intercommunal Conflict*; Gad Barzilai and Efraim Inbar, "Do Wars Have an Impact? Israeli Public Opinion After the Gulf War," *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 14 (March 1992): 48–64; Asher Arian, *Israeli Security and the Peace Process: Public Opinion in 1994*, JCSS Memorandum no. 43 (Tel Aviv: JCSS, Tel Aviv University, March 1994).

[72] Michael Howard, "The Forgotten Dimension of Strategy," *Foreign Affairs* 57 (Summer 1979): 975–86.

[73] See Steven Rosen, "War Power and the Willingness to Suffer" in Bruce M. Russett, ed., *Peace, War and Numbers* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1972), 167–83.

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alism is undergoing changes with clear foreign policy implications.[74] The legitimacy of the past Israeli uses of force is being questioned. The ethos of Greater Israel has become less popular in Israel. The pioneer settlers of yesterday are increasingly viewed by many Israelis as an obstacle to peace. The strategic advantages of topography and settlement are presently debated more than ever before, as are, of course, the human and economic price to keep the settlements.

Leaders such as Rabin and Gur realized that Israeli society displays signs of fatigue and is more reluctant to pay the price for the protracted conflict with the Arabs. Rabin compared the behavior of the Israelis when bombed from the air by the Egyptians in 1948 to what happened during the missile attacks in 1991. In 1948 over thirty civilian casualties left no imprint on daily life in Tel Aviv, while in 1991 the city and its suburbs was deserted by tens of thousands. His conclusion was that Israelis lost some of their perseverance and determination.[75] Lt. General Ehud Barak, the former chief of staff (1991–1994) often expressed concern about Israel's social fiber. For example, he described the changes in Israeli society: ". . . accumulated weariness and cynicism, accompanied by an aggressive and intrusive media, depreciation of the Zionist deeds, the development of a cleavage in the consensus over Israel's political goals, even over the objectives of the use of force (we have seen it in Lebanon and in the Intifada)—all these create a perception, as well as reality of weakness."[76] Barak's evaluation was widespread among the higher echelons of the army.

Finally, there is a new phenomenon in the Israeli political elite: the criticism of military operations in cost-effective policy terms is complemented by a growing normative criticism of Israeli use of force. There is talk of how the constant fighting is corrupting the youth and making them intolerant, that being a society at war has a price. There is a greater fear now about the psychological brutalization of Israeli society, a concern not expressed before the 1980s.[77] Present cabinet member, Laborite Yaakov Tzur listed among other bad features of the Lebanon imbroglio the "distortion of our moral image."[78] He feared moral corruption as a side effect of the constant preoccupation with war. Since the beginning of the Intifada in December 1987, more voices have been heard expressing the negative

[74] This is an issue unstudied yet in Israeli society. For a preliminary study of changes in American society and the impact on foreign policy, see Jack Citrin, Ernest B. Haas, Christofer Muste, and Beth Reingold, "Is American Nationalism Changing? Implications for Foreign Policy," *International Studies Quarterly* 38 (March 1994): 1–31.

[75] Rabin's public lecture to the Forum for Security, Judaism and Society, 8 January 1995. See also Aluf Ben, "Preference for the Rear," *Haaretz*, 20 July 1993.

[76] *Maariv*, 16 April 1994.

[77] For a more extensive discussion, see Efraim Inbar, "Attitudes Toward War in the Israeli Political Elite," *Middle East Journal* 44 (Summer 1990): 431–45. We also witness a recent Israeli intellectual vogue to question the morality of the Zionist enterprise and the use of force needed to establish and defend the Jewish state. For a report on this trend, see Calev Ben-David, "Heroes Under Attack," *Jerusalem Report*, 29 December 1994, 12–17.

[78] Ibid., 442.

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impact on Israeli society of the use of force against civilians. Gur and Namir expressed their concerns that this type of engagement is a breeding ground for racism and a cult of force.[79] Peres quoted Sir Thomas More's *Utopia* in discussing the moral effects of the Intifada: "The war corrupted their own citizens by encouraging lust for robbery and murder; and the laws fell into contempt."[80] Aloni directed her criticism not only at engagements with the Palestinians, but also at the Israeli strategy in southern Lebanon because Israeli forces were "occupying land in a foreign country."[81] The moral reservations about specific military actions were an additional layer in the growing aversion to the use of force within the Israeli political elite.

Erosion of Self-Reliance

Greater Israeli reluctance to use force in order to meet regional challenges blends well with the changes in threat perceptions and the reevaluation of national power. These developments also undermine the self-reliance doctrine and encourage Israeli leaders to entertain notions of cooperative security.

Indeed, Israelis have come to the conclusion that some of the impending regional threats cannot be dealt with unilaterally. This contradicts Israel's basic self-reliance strategy. One might have expected an intensified search for self-reliance given the relative freedom of action and the easy access to sophisticated weaponry that characterize the post-cold war world from a small state perspective.[82] But Israel is moving in the opposite direction. Israeli leaders are not prepared to entrust the country's security to others. Yet, in light of the new threats, senior political and military officials appear to have accepted a revised paradigm of national security, in which self-reliance has become less central.

Following the missile attacks in 1991, Israel realized that its population centers were vulnerable to enemy attack, and distant foes have such a capability. Actually, Israeli leadership was alerted to this possibility in 1988, as extended-range Scud-C missiles were used by Iraq against Iran during the first Gulf War. The missile threat meant primarily that in contrast to the past the Israeli Air Force (IAF) could no longer protect the rear, and, consequently, that Israel lost its escalation dominance. The emerging symmetry in the capacity of Israel and the Arabs armed with missiles to inflict considerable damage on each other's population centers allows greater Arab freedom of action in limited war (a limited invasion, or a war of attrition, or a limited missile attack) because Israel might hesitate to

[79] Ibid, 442–3.

[80] Peres, *The New Middle East*, 58.

[81] *Haaretz*, 25 December 1994.

[82] Indeed, the rise of Third World arms producers in the new international system allows recipient countries to procure arms with less political dependency upon their suppliers, giving such countries the ability to pursue their ambitions more freely. See Amit Gupta, "Third World Militaries: New Suppliers, Deadlier Weapons," *Orbis* 37 (Winter 1993): 57–68.

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escalate. Previously, the threat of escalation was considered an effective way to force the rival to stop an armed conflict.

Also new was the realization that it is very difficult to confront challenges that emanate far away from Israel's borders. The Israeli decision not to retaliate for the 1991 Iraqi missile attacks was primarily due to American pressure, but it included an element of skepticism about Israeli ability to take care of distant targets at little cost. The American failure to destroy even one mobile missile launcher in 1991 was not very encouraging, although the Israeli military believed it could have done a better job than the Americans.

Similarly, the new threat of proliferation of nuclear weapons poses a problem for self-reliance. In 1981, Israel eliminated the Iraqi nuclear threat for some time. But it is now questionable whether Israel can repeat such a feat single-handedly. The new Middle Eastern nuclear aspirant, Iran, is even farther away than Iraq. The limited success of the American air strikes against Iraq nuclear installations and its hesitations to use force against North Korea show that in the 1990s, even a superpower has difficulties in destroying key components of a country's nuclear infrastructure. There are significant operational difficulties in such endeavors, in addition to a critical lack of sufficient intelligence.

Israel is fully aware of its limitations in this regard and is looking for international cooperation to meet the new challenge. The government feels that Iranian nuclear efforts trouble not only Israel, but the West too. Beilin announced from the Knesset rostrum that Israel has lobbied West European and other countries, including China, to restrain the Iranian nuclear effort.[83] The former chief-of-staff, Barak, said that the Iranians "threaten the flow of oil to the free world, the stability of pragmatic regimes and the internal balance in the Arab world, and the economic growth of Europe and Japan. In this sense they deserve a worldwide preventive effort. What is needed is an international front."[84] According to Rabin, only the United States can lead an international effort to stop nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.[85] Even Ariel Sharon and Benyamin Natanyahu, both reputed hawks, have expressed similar views.[86] Israel relied on the United States also in the attempt to prevent the sale of North Korean Nodong missiles to Iran, for which Israel is in range.[87]

Rabin declared that Israel prefers to exhaust every diplomatic avenue before considering the use of force to prevent other parties from "preceding it in the acquisition of nuclear weapons."[88] Despite a willingness to wait for action on the part of the international community in dealing with this nuclear threat, Israel has not entirely relinquished the option to "solve" the problem on its own. Israel's

[83] *Haaretz*, 17 February 1993.

[84] Interview to *Bamahane*, 5 January 1994, 11.

[85] *Davar*, 17 January 1992, 18.

[86] Ariel Sharon, "The Oslo Agreement: A Seed for War," *Yediot Aharonot*, Shabbat Supplement, 2 February 1994, 3; for Natanayahu's statement, see *Davar*, 17 February 1993.

[87] See *Haaretz*, 1 November 1994, A4; *Maariv*, 16 December 1994, A3.

[88] See "Interview with PM Rabin," *Bamahaneh*.

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1994 decision to purchase F-15I fighter planes was clearly designed to allow the IAF the capability to deliver in all weather conditions a large payload of explosives at ranges of over 1000 miles. As long as Iran is an international pariah, there is some political latitude for a preemptive attack. However, the effectiveness of such an attack remains in question.

Similarly problematic are the prospects of an effective defense against missiles, which could strengthen self-reliance. Israeli political leadership is attracted to an active defense posture. It can hardly refuse to pursue an option that offers protection to the civilian population, while minimizing the need for preemption. But the attitude of many within the military toward proposed active defense measures against missiles, such as the Arrow anti-missile defense system, is very ambivalent.[89] The Arrow arouses little enthusiasm within the military because of the technological uncertainty surrounding its development and deployment, and the system's projected cost of $3–5 billion.[90]

Rabin said in the Knesset that Israel is "still far away from technological and financial solutions to fully realize (the Arrow program)."[91] In the main, he accepted the IDF point of view on the Arrow and assigned the antiballistic missile (ATBM) system a lower budgetary priority than it occupied during the tenure of the previous minister of defense, Moshe Arens. He also decided to stop the development of an Israeli warning system, which also undermines self-reliance.[92] Therefore, even if the ATBM system is deployed, Israel will still depend on American satellites for early warning, which is critically important for the movement of Israel's population into sheltered areas in case of missile attacks.

The dangers of missile and nuclear proliferation have generated greater openness to exploration of alternative cooperative and regional security arrangements. The security establishment is uneasy; military technology that would allow Israel unilaterally to defend itself against long-range weapons and enemies is not truly available. Furthermore, the technology that can deal with ballistic missiles threats is so complex and expensive, that Israel has little chances of doing it alone.[93] Foreign Minister Peres commented on the threat Israel faces from the potential combination of nuclear weapons and Islamic fundamentalism, and concluded "that the modern era offers no foolproof means of national defense other than a wide-ranging regional arrangement."[94] Even the more conservative Deputy

[89] Ben, "Preference for the Rear." For a critical analysis of the active defense option embodied in the Arrow, see Reuven Pedatzur, *The Arrow System and the Active Defense Against Ballistic Missiles*, Memorandum No. 42 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, October 1993).

[90] See Bodinger's preference for an American system to save costs and to utilize the American aid funds, *Davar*, 15 June 1992, 2.

[91] *Haaretz*, 21 January 1993.

[92] *Haaretz*, 30 April 1993.

[93] Patrick J. Garrity, "Implications of the Persian Gulf War for Regional Powers," *Washington Quarterly* 16 (Summer 1993): 156–7.

[94] Peres, *The New Middle East*, 83.

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Minister of Defense Gur suggested some international organization along the lines of the anti-Iraq coalition "that can stop belligerency . . . or better yet, prevent [it] ahead of time."[95]

A result of the erosion in self-reliance is a marked increase in Israeli willingness to trust and support the involvement of international actors and forces in the Middle East and to experiment with collaborative security arrangements. Indeed, Peres claimed that the traditional approach to security that emphasizes self-reliance is no longer relevant and that it has to be substituted with a regional approach.[96] He articulated a comprehensive security vision for Israel by proposing a Mideast security and development "super structure" covering such issues as arms control, nonaggression, economic cooperation, and human rights. His concept, which was initially aired in Washington in May 1994, is modeled after the 1975 Helsinky accord and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).[97] Peres believes that the CSCE process was successful in Europe and ought to be emulated in the Middle East. This conviction stems from his emphasis on the importance of economic factors at the expense of politico-military developments. In short, new perceptions of the environment and of national power substitute to some extent for the rooted realpolitik approach that emphasized self-reliance.

Another example of the shift in Israeli doctrine away from self-reliance is its attitude toward arms control, once an issue of little importance to Israeli leaders. In the 1990s, Peres believes that the Middle East actors must imitate the approach of the superpowers and realize that "cooperation was essential and arms control has to become the call of the day."[98] In October 1991, Israel accepted the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in response to American pressure. This move reflected Israeli interest in pursuing limitations on missile proliferation in the Middle East. Further thought on the issue was given throughout 1992 by the Defense and Foreign Affairs Ministries, formulating by the end of the year Israel's arms control policy. In September 1992, the Israeli cabinet decided to sign the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), relinquishing Israel's previous insistence on prior Arab signature.[99] Israel prefered to focus on control of conventional forces and chemical weapons, and only toward the end of the peace process to broach the question of nuclear weapons. By the end of 1993, Israel had also begun to comply with international demands to report its arms sales to the United Nations arms registrar. This stands in contrast to its previous

[95] Mirsky and Rice, *Towards A New Era in U.S.-Israeli Relations*, 31.

[96] Peres, *The New Middle East*, 61–64.

[97] *Jerusalem Post*, international ed., 4 June 1994, 2; see also Aluf Ben, "Full Withdrawal in Exchange for Comprehensive Regional Peace," *Haaretz*, 22 June 1994.

[98] Peres, *The New Middle East*, 64. See also the interview with Peres, *Haaretz*, 11 February 1993.

[99] See the address by Shimon Peres at the signing of the CWC in Paris, 13 January 1993, in Efraim Inbar and Shmuel Sandler, eds., *Mideast Security: The Prospects for Arms Control*, BESA Studies in Mideast Security (London: Frank Cass, 1995), 251–54.

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arms sales policy of total secrecy.[100] In May 1994, Israel agreed to an American request to ban the export of antipersonnel mines.

Israel still prefers a regional approach to arms control, as opposed to a global regime with the involvement of international agencies.[101] It advocates a Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone with a regional mechanism for monitoring and inspection, rather than just joining the NPT. Israel took seriously, for example, the multilateral Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security.[102] The reduced threat perceptions and the expected regional détente could facilitate the emergence of effective verification procedures, which are a common barrier in the establishing of an arms control regime.

Yet, Israel has firmly resisted pressure by Arab countries and others to sign the NPT. Though the pressure mounted before the Review and Extension of the NPT conference in the spring of 1995, Israel refused to give up its nuclear option. But it did announce in February 1995 that it would enter negotiations to join the NPT and to establish a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone two years after a comprehensive peace was established. Presenting a deadline, even if not a very definite one, is a slight departure from previous positions. Furthermore, the Clinton initiative on arms control in August 1993, which envisions a freeze on the production of fissionable materials, was considered at the highest Israel echelons.[103] The formulation of an international treaty to cut off production and storing of fissionable materials will put further pressure on Israel to reconsider its nuclear stance. Accepting a freeze would be a major change of policy, reinforcing the move away from self-reliance.

Another indication of such a move is a greater interest in involving the United States in providing security services for Israel. During the Gulf War, Likud-led Israel accepted the presence of Patriot SAMs manned by American soldiers. In 1993, Rabin explicitly expressed his desire for "active American participation in the security of Israel."[104] Specifically, he asked the Americans to station Patriot batteries in Israel and for bilateral cooperation in deploying ATBMs.[105] Moreover, Israel made several requests to be incorporated in the Global Protection System against missiles, which the Americans have considered establishing.

Israel is also interested in the stationing of American troops on the Golan Heights as part of an Israeli-Syrian peace treaty involving an Israeli withdrawal. This corresponds to greater Israeli willingness, evident since 1973, to accept the

[100] *Haaretz*, 16 November 1993.

[101] Efraim Inbar, "Israel and Arms Control," *Arms Control* 13 (September 1992): 217; Gerald M. Steinberg, "Middle East Arms Control and Regional Security," *Survival* 36 (Spring 1994): 126–31.

[102] For the work of ACRS, see Shai Feldman, "Progress Toward Middle East Arms Control" in *The Middle East Military Balance, 1993–1994*, 182–210.

[103] Aluf Ben, "A Dispute Over Clinton's Initiative," *Haaretz*, 28 December 1993; Aluf Ben, "Minimizing the Peace Risks," *Haaretz*, 11 February 1994; Ran Adelist, "What Do We Do with it?" *Hadashot*, Weekend Supplement, 22 October 1993, 1–3.

[104] *Yediot Aharonot*, 21 January 1993.

[105] *Yediot Aharonot*, 16 November 1993; *Haaretz*, 13 November 1993.

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presence of foreign troops along its borders in the context of security arrangements between Israel and its neighbors. Monitoring forces are viewed as useful trip-wire arrangements, warning of hostile moves and somewhat slowing the transition to war. They also raise the political cost of violating the status quo. An American role on the Golan Heights, Israeli doves believe, will make full withdrawal on the Golan more palatable and easier to sell to the Israeli public. In December 1995, Peres even suggested a U.S.–Israeli Defense Treaty, which had previously been discarded as limiting Israel's freedom of action.

An additional impetus in the Israeli search for alternatives to self-reliance is exhaustion with the protracted conflict, which influences the willingness to divert necessary economic resources to sustain a self-reliant posture. Israel's economy has shown consistent growth in the 1990s. This economic performance enhances Israel's ability to become militarily and politically self-reliant. But economic gains are translated into a self-reliant posture only if the political leadership choses to act accordingly. In Israel's case, economic resources have been diverted to domestic needs and consumer consumption. The Rabin government came to power in 1992 with a clear commitment to rearrange Israeli priorities, giving precedence to neglected domestic issues such as unemployment, education, and transportation infrastructure. Instead, Defense Minister Rabin cut the defense budget and rejected IDF's requests for a budget allocation equivalent to a fixed proportion of the GNP. Defending his government record on dealing with poverty, Rabin stated that he closed an air base and two squadrons of fighter planes.[106]

The trend of lowering defense expenditures in the Middle East in the latter part of the 1980s ended with the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and has been replaced with a renewed arms race. The reluctance to engage in expensive military buildup is an incentive for reaching understandings on the establishment of an arms control regime for the region, particularly in respect to conventional capabilities. Peres pointed out that continuing the arms race and maintaining a modern army will destroy the economy.[107] The IDF is fully aware of the high cost of maintaining an advanced army.[108] Furthermore, the use of sophisticated force with great and accurate firepower is increasingly expensive.

Economic constraints are predominant in one area where Israel has given up the quest for selective self-sufficiency – weapons development. In 1987 pressure from the United States and from several domestic circles led Israel to reconsider building the Lavi advanced aircraft and canceled the project. The contract for building the new Israel Saar-5 corvettes was awarded to an American company, rather than Israel Shipyards, because of lack of funds. The American company is paid through military assistance funds, which have to be spent in the United States. The troubles of Israeli military industries were a result of the shrinking world market for weapons following the demise of the Soviet Union and the

[106] *Haaretz*, 8 November 1994.

[107] Peres, *The New Middle East*, 80.

[108] Zeev Schiff, "Problems of Military Might," *Haaretz*, 8 July 1994.

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greater dependency on exports by small state industries all over the world. With the change of government in Israel in 1992, the military industries lost a valuable patron, Likud Defense Minister Moshe Arens. Rabin, by comparison, held a more minimalist view of the role of these industries for Israel's national security. For him, "the military industries are too big for Israel.[109] During Rabin's recent tenure as defense minister the military industries contracted even further.

In recent years, Israel has also lowered its allocations for weapons R&D in its defense budget. According to a report by Israel's state comptroller, allocations for R&D were reduced by 43 percent from 1986 to 1994. Such cutbacks threaten to waste accumulated technological gains and highly professional manpower, in addition to increasing Israel's dependence on foreign suppliers.[110] Financial stringencies have already affected the Arrow ATBM system, and similar cuts in high-tech Israeli projects may negatively influence Israel's ability to maintain a technological edge over its rivals. In general, this economic factor is the result of the priorities in Israeli society, which is less willing to divert resources to national security at the expense of its standard of living. This preference undermines the effort for military self-reliance.

Conclusion

Israel's Labor-led government has adopted new perceptions of the external environment and embraced a changed concept of national power. These amount to a proclivity for greater trust in and cooperation with other regional states and international actors. Israel's political leadership is also less willing to use force. Israeli society displays battle fatigue and clearly prefers butter to guns. It is less likely than ever before to support sacrifices needed to attain greater measures of self-reliance. Israeli attitudes toward the use of force have become more congruent with the prevalent mood in the West, where there is a high sensitivity to casualties, increased apprehensions about the high economic cost of building and using military force, and declining belief in the legitimacy of its use. All these factors push Israel into a search for alternative security measures. This is very obvious in its policy on arms control and the emerging nuclear threat. More ambiguous signs are the weakening of the indigenous capability to produce weapons and considerations on limiting nuclear options.

Though Israel has not changed yet its national security doctrine, there is a noticeable departure from past premises and policies. Rabin's death may well intensify this shift. He was the least dovish member of his government, and he served as a brake on the attempts of Peres to implement policies according to his visionary ideas. The new thinking, which is predicated on an optimistic evaluation of the environment, leads to a greater dependence upon the goodwill of other international actors. This is very problematic in terms of national security

[109] *Haaretz*, 20 November 1992.
[110] *Haaretz*, 19 May 1994.

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if the Middle East remains a volatile region, where the use of force is part and parcel of the rule of the game. But considering the limitations upon a small state, Israel may have no choice but to engage in an historical gamble and rely on others to deal with some of the threats that it faces. Israel must remember, however, that even gamblers should use caution.*

* I recognize and appreciate the comments made by Stuart Cohen, Benjamin Frankel, Shmuel Sandler, Gabi Sheffer and other participants of the international conference on "The National Security of Small States in a Changing World" co-organized by the BESA Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University and the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations at the Hebrew University in April 1994.

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Media Coverage of Issues and Candidates: What Balance Is Appropriate in a Democracy?

GRAHAM P. RAMSDEN

This article is designed to explore a normative question: How should the American media balance its issue and candidate coverage during political election campaigns? Virtually everyone agrees that the media have a profound effect on the electorate's thinking. Given their enormous influence, however, it is remarkable how little has been said about what the media should cover in a properly functioning democracy. There are pundits of various types who bemoan both the lack of focus on the issues and the excessive attention paid to the "horse race," but no one to my knowledge has developed a rationale to explain why this state of affairs is wrong. The question is undoubtedly a muddy one, and some might argue that it is inappropriate even to suggest to the media what they should cover. I take the position, however, that because of the media's enormous influence, it is worth asking how issue and candidate coverage should be balanced.

Media Influence

The balance of coverage provided by the media is only worth worrying about if the media are influential. Past work suggests they are, in that the media influence how voters think about the issues and also how they think about the competing candidates. With regard to issues, past work shows that documentaries, news stories, advertisements, and "docudramas" are able to shape and even change voter's minds.[1] Yet while the media might occasionally influence attitudes, they

[1] Stanley Feldman and Lee Sigelman, "The Political Impact of Prime-Time Television: The Day After," *Journal of Politics* 47 (May 1985): 556–78; Shawn Rosenberg and Patrick McCafferty, "The Image and the Vote: Manipulating Voter's Preferences," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 51 (Spring 1987): 31–47.

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are more frequently effective as a spotlight. Because the media are virtually the only source of campaign information, the public will ponder only those issues bathed in the media glare. As Bernard Cohen put it, "It [the press] may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think *about*."[2] This linkage was clearly demonstrated in a set of experiments done by Shanto Iyengar and Donald Kinder in the late 1980s. They were able to show that even small doses of television news coverage were enough to cause shifts in the relative importance viewers assigned to the issues of the day.[3]

Not only do the media tell us what issues to consider, they also tell us which policy issues to use as criteria to evaluate the candidates. If, for example, the media repeatedly and prominently raise concerns about the economic situation, then to the extent that voters are worried about the issues, it is a candidate's ability to handle the economy that becomes the basis upon which that candidate rises or falls. This is known as the priming effect, and it holds true for character issues as well.[4] If integrity is a central concern of the press, as it was during the 1976 presidential campaign, that characteristic will become the one used most often to assess the merits of the candidates. These findings cause some concern, for if the media devote too much coverage to inappropriate issues or character subjects, then the electorate may make decisions based on imperfect criteria. The electorate, for example, may well have made the crucial mistake of ignoring Jimmy Carter's inexperience simply because the press failed to make an issue of it. Thus, it is worth exploring what message the media should be communicating.

In addition to setting the issue agenda and telling us what criteria to use to evaluate the candidates, the media also influence our perceptions of which candidates merit consideration. There is little doubt that people learn about the candidates through the media. This learning in turn has impact on perceptions and eventually on the choices voters make at the polls.[5] The ways in which the media influence voter candidate assessments can occasionally be obvious and the result of a conscious effort. Newspaper endorsements, for example, have been known to influence both perceptions and the vote.[6] Ronald Reagan was

[2] Bernard C. Cohen, *The Press and Foreign Policy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963), 13.

[3] Shanto Iyengar and Donald B. Kinder, *News that Matters: Television and American Political Opinion* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 33.

[4] Ibid., 80.

[5] Henry E. Brady, "Is Iowa News?" in Peverill Squire, ed., *The Iowa Caucuses and the Presidential Nominating Process* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), 89–119; Henry E. Brady and Richard Johnston, "What's the Primary Message? Horse Race or Issue Journalism?" in Nelson W. Polsby and Gary R. Orren, eds., *Media and Momentum: The New Hampshire Primary and Nomination Politics* (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1987), 127–186.

[6] Robert S. Erikson, "The Influence of Newspaper Endorsements in Presidential Elections: The Case of 1964," *American Journal of Political Science* 20 (May 1976): 207–233; Harold A. Scarrow and Steve Borman, "The Effects of Newspaper Endorsements on Election Outcomes: A Case Study," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 43 (Fall 1979): 388–93; Tim Counts, "Editorial Influence on the Republican Vote in the 1948 Presidential Election," *Journalism Quarterly* 66 (Spring 1989): 177.

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able to come from behind and win the New Hampshire primary in 1980 largely as a result of the endorsement of the Manchester *Union Leader*.[7] Yet such blatant editorial support is not the only way the media can influence candidate perceptions. There are other ways that tend to be much more subtle. For a start, the way a candidate is portrayed in the media is frequently the way he or she is perceived by the voters.[8] If George Bush's supposed wimpish qualities are continuously highlighted in the press, the public will indeed come to accept that characterization. Similarly, the media can have a significant impact on voter perceptions of candidate viability. If the media say that a candidate is doing well, the public will accept that assessment. In fact, the average person's perceptions of each candidate's viability quickly comes to mirror the evaluations of the press. As Henry Brady points out, people learn very quickly who is ahead and who is behind, whereas they take much longer to learn about a candidate's stands on the issues.[9] This is a function of what the media cover; since the media spend more time covering viability issues than anything else, it is not surprising that the people know more about viability than they know about more substantive issues.[10] What is crucial to our understanding of the media's power, however, is that voters actually end up acting on their knowledge of viability. According to Larry Bartels, voters cast their ballots on the basis of how well the media say a candidate is doing.[11] Voters behave strategically and want to avoid wasting their vote on a candidate the media say has no chance of winning. As a result, after factoring in considerations of viability, voters might well vote for their second choice candidate because he makes up for his perceived shortcomings by having better prospects.[12] What this translates into, according to Bartels, is a momentum in favor of candidates portrayed in the media as being viable.[13] In 1984, for example, Gary Hart was able to use his second place finish in Iowa's Democratic party caucuses to convince the media that it was he, not John Glenn, who was the only viable alternative to Walter Mondale. Once the media concurred with that assessment, Hart was able to use all the favorable coverage he got to win the New Hampshire primary. Such a victory would not have been possible without the media's cooperation.

In addition to simply telling the public who is more viable, the media can also provide clues about viability by how much coverage they choose to allocate

[7] David W. Moore, "The Manchester Union Leader in the New Hampshire Primary" in Polsby and Orren, eds., *Media and Momentum*, 123.

[8] Thomas E. Patterson, "The Press and Candidate Images," *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 1 (Summer 1989): 123.

[9] Brady, "Is Iowa News?" 116.

[10] Michael J. Robinson and Margaret A. Sheehan, *Over the Wire and on TV: CBS and UPI in Campaign '80* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1983), 147–151; Brady and Johnston, "What's the Primary Message? Horse Race or Issue Journalism?" 168–178.

[11] Larry M. Bartels, *Presidential Primaries and the Dynamics of Public Choice* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 50–53.

[12] Ibid., 108–135.

[13] Ibid., 139–171.

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each of the candidates. Because most people are unwilling to put in the time and effort needed to learn all there is to know about the candidates, they will simply assume that the ones most worthy of their consideration are the ones most heavily covered by the media.[14] As John Geer put it, "One reason the candidacies, for example, of Fred Harris, Reubin Askew, or Pete DuPont never got off the ground was because voters gained little information about them and hence did not give them careful consideration."[15] In short, large amounts of media coverage make a candidate appear worth looking at.

A final point to be made here is that the issues or candidates emphasized by the media matter—regardless of volume. A critic could argue that it does not matter if the horse race gets the highest percentage of coverage, so long as the issues are still adequately covered. Such criticism, however, assumes that since issue information is there to be considered, people will still consider it, despite the fact that it is drowned out by the horse race. That assumption is incorrect. In truth, readers remember what is emphasized, regardless of volume.[16] Iyengar and Kinder make the same point about the agenda-setting function of the media; by emphasizing some issues and ignoring others, the media influence the issues the voters think about.[17] The public remembers that issue given the most coverage, regardless of how much coverage is allocated to other issues or indeed to the campaign as a whole.

Since the media tell voters what issues to think about, what bases to evaluate the candidates on, and which candidates are worth considering, their message is worth worrying about. Unless the media communicate an appropriate balance of issue and candidate coverage, they may inhibit the average voter's ability to make good choices on election day. If this is the case, then the media's influence is thwarting democracy rather than accommodating it.

It is essential to make clear immediately that there is no way to guarantee that appropriate coverage will produce properly informed voters. Yet if coverage is appropriately balanced, then it becomes possible for them to be informed in the right way, and this could allow us to share in V. O. Key's hope that the voice of the people will echo the quality of the information given them, and that voters will make quality choices.[18] For those who want to become informed and perhaps use their knowledge to influence others, properly presented coverage allows them the opportunity to do so. And, even if V. O. Key has overstated things a bit and

[14] Christopher F. Arterton, *Media Politics* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1984), 7; James W. Ceasar, *Reforming the Reforms* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1982), 60; Thomas E. Patterson, *The Mass Media Election: How Americans Choose their President* (New York: Praeger, 1980), 95–105.

[15] John G. Geer, *Nominating Presidents: An Evaluation of Voters and Primaries* (New York: Greenwood, 1989), 96.

[16] Charles K. Atkin, John Galloway, and Oguz B. Nayman, "News Media Exposure, Political Knowledge and Campaign Interest," *Journalism Quarterly* 53 (Summer 1976): 231–37.

[17] Iyengar and Kinder, *News that Matters*, 16–33.

[18] V. O. Key, Jr., *The Responsible Electorate* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966), 1–8.

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voters are confused in spite of properly balanced coverage, we can be almost certain that they would be even more perplexed if the media balanced their coverage inappropriately. In other words, while appropriately balanced coverage of a campaign will not guarantee an appropriately informed electorate, its presence at least allows for that possibility. Its absence, on the other hand, virtually guarantees misunderstanding, both among the interested—who cannot get the information they need—and the apathetic, who do not care. What, then, should the media cover to allow voters the opportunity to get the information they need to make appropriately informed choices on election day? Whether that information is actually absorbed and applied by the voters is another question for another time.

Balancing Coverage in a Democracy

How should the media in a properly functioning democracy balance their issue and candidate coverage during electoral campaigns? There are two ways to answer this question: the first would be to figure out what criteria voters use to make their decisions and then to stipulate that coverage be tailored accordingly. Thus, if voters assess candidates on the basis of their integrity or some other character criteria, we could require that the media devote the majority of its coverage to the characters of the competing candidates. We know from the literature on the subject that the personal qualities of the candidates do actually have a large impact on voter's decisions.[19] Character factors have a particularly strong impact on voter decisions in the primaries, where party identification cannot guide people's choices. We also know that a candidate's perceived chances can, to the extent that someone does not want to waste a vote, also influence a voting decision, though the effect is not especially strong.[20] A candidate's position on the issues, regardless of whether the election is a primary or not, has relatively little effect on how a voter will vote.[21] Knowing all of this, we could conclude that since voters in presidential primary elections decide on the basis of character first, viability second, and issues last, coverage should be allocated accordingly. That is what would happen if coverage were allocated in accordance with how voters decide. Adopting such a way of deciding what the media should cover, however,

[19] Daniel C. Williams, Stephen J. Weber, Gordon A. Haaland, Ronald H. Mueller, and Robert Craig, "Voter Decision-making in a Primary Election: An Evaluation of Three Models of Choice," *American Journal of Political Science* 20 (February 1976): 37–49; J. David Gopoian, "Issue Preferences and Candidate Choice in Presidential Primaries," *American Journal of Political Science* 26 (August 1982), 523–46; Barbara Norrander, "Correlates of Vote Choice in the 1980 Presidential Primaries," *Journal of Politics* 48 (February 1986): 156–66; Alan I. Abromowitz, "Candidate Choice Before the Convention," *Political Behavior* 9 (March 1987): 49–61; Patrick J. Kenney and Tom W. Rice, "Voter Turnout in Presidential Primaries," *Political Behavior* 7 (June 1985): 101–12.

[20] Bartels, *Presidential Primaries and the Dynamics of Public Choice*, 108–135.

[21] Gopoian, "Issue Preferences and Candidate Choice in Presidential Primaries," 523–46; Thomas R. Marshall, "Issues, Personalities, and Presidential Primary Voters," *Social Science Quarterly* 65 (September 1984): 750–60; Norrander, "Correlates of Vote Choice in the 1980 Presidential Primaries," 156–66; Bartels, *Presidential Primaries and the Dynamics of Public Choice*, 86.

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is inappropriate for one overriding reason: since the criteria people use to choose between the candidates is already heavily influenced by the media,[22] to ask the media to allocate their coverage based on how people decide is the same as asking the media to mirror what they have already told the voters. The effect is cyclical. If a voter is evaluating a candidate in terms of his or her prospects, the voter is adopting that criteria because he has heard a lot about viability in the media. We know that this sort of thing happens,[23] so as a result, if how people decide has been determined by the media, then it makes no sense to determine what the media should cover on the basis of how people decide. Instead, another standard must be found that is fixed and independent of media influence.

The second approach to establishing what the media should cover in elections is to ask what democracy requires and then match coverage accordingly. In the remainder of this article, I argue that democracy requires the media to provide coverage of each candidate's issue positions and character. Furthermore, they must let the public know what each candidate's prospects are, and they must tell the public what the candidate is doing from day to day. All of this is information the public has a legitimate right to know. More importantly, I argue that it is also necessary to rank the various possible types of issues that could be covered in terms of the relative amounts of coverage that should be assigned to each. The relative allocation of issue coverage matters, because readers remember what the media emphasize, and they use that information as a basis to assess the candidates. With this in mind, I argue that the media should rank their coverage in terms of policy issues first, character issues second, horse race stories third, and events stories last. Furthermore, I argue that early on in political campaigns, all candidates deserve to be treated equally; as the race progresses, the media should then look to the process for clues about how to allocate coverage.

Exactly what the press should cover in a democracy is rarely covered in any detail in the literature. Usually the topic is discussed only very generally and frequently in a way that emphasizes the role the media serve as a link between the people and their government. In a statement of this sort, for example, President John F. Kennedy once said in a speech to the nation's broadcasters:

> The flow of ideas, the capacity to make informed choices, the ability to criticize, all of the assumptions on which political democracy rests, depend largely on communications. And you are the guardians of the most powerful and effective means of communication ever designed.[24]

Similarly, Carl J. Friedrich once observed:

> The emergence of constitutional government, and in particular the crystallization of the systems of popular representation as we know them, are inextricably interwoven with the growth of the modern press. Without it, constitutional government is unimaginable.[25]

[22] Iyengar and Kinder, *News that Matters*, 63–72.
[23] Patterson, *The Mass Media Election*, 95–105.
[24] Dean Alger, *The Media and Politics* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1989), 6.
[25] Carl J. Friedrich, *Constitutional Government and Democracy* (Waltham, MA: Blaisdell, 1968), 502.

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Statements such as these, which stress the importance of the media to democracy, are made all the time, but few go on to say exactly what the press should cover to fulfill the role assigned it in a democracy. Two works that are a little more specific than most, though not as specific as I would like, are Dean E. Alger's book, *The Media and Politics*, and Henry E. Brady and Richard Johnston's article, "What's the Primary Message: Horse Race or Issue Journalism?" Alger bases his analysis on the belief that choice is a prerequisite of democracy: "Choice is at the core of democracy; the absence of choice means that democracy is lessened to one degree or another, depending on the nature of the lost choice."[26] Assuming that choice is necessary, Alger then goes on to say what voters must learn from the media if they are to make their choices in an informed manner. First, he says, the public needs information on the candidates' qualifications to see whether each is qualified for the job he or she is seeking. Second, Alger requires that the media provide background on each candidate's issue positions, as well as on their general political philosophies. Third, the public needs to get from the media some idea about the character of the competing candidates. Fourth, in order to judge the fitness of each candidate for the office, some description of the office itself is required. Finally, Alger says that the issues of the day must be fully discussed so that the candidates can be evaluated in that context.[27] All of this seems to point to the importance of substantive issues, whether they be issues of character or policy. Nowhere does Alger require that the media give details about viability or campaign events. The problem, however, is that Alger is still not as specific as he could be, in that he does not directly say how much coverage should be allocated to policy issues, how much to character issues, etc. All we can conclude with certainty from his list is that substantive issues in general should take precedence.

Henry Brady and Richard Johnston arrive at their assessment of what the press should cover by asking what the voters need to know to play their role in a "good nominating process." Their answer is that, "A minimal requirement . . . for the success of primaries is the availability of information about the character, purposes, electability, and leadership abilities of the candidates."[28] They say that character is important because of its relationship to a candidate's ability to govern. His "purposes" or policy positions need to be known so that voters know where the candidate will take the country. Electability is something the voters also need to know about. It gives them some idea whether a candidate is deserving of their support or a legitimate contender for their consideration. Finally, whether a candidate has leadership abilities pertains to both his character and his viability. The authors argue that the voters need to know whether a candidate has both the character and the support necessary to be an effective leader. Taken together, Brady and Johnston's recommendations echo Alger's point: substantive issues of

[26] Alger, *The Media and Politics*, 7.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Brady and Johnston, "What's the Primary Message?" 133.

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either character or policy must be covered. Brady and Johnston differ from Alger only in stipulating that the media should also give attention to each candidate's viability. The problem, however, is that we are still not told what issues must be covered; nor are we told what subjects deserve priority. A way still needs to be found to rank the various possible types of issues that could be covered in terms of the relative amounts of coverage that should be assigned to each.

Another way to get at what issues the press should cover and in what proportions is to look at the voter. A look at how others say a voter should decide might indicate what that voter needs to consider as he makes his decision. This in turn would indicate what the press needs to tell that voter. Not surprisingly, the voting behavior literature is almost unanimous in saying that the "ideal" voter is an "issue" voter, one who makes his decision based on a weighty consideration of the issues. As Edward Carmines and James Stimson put it,

> The common—indeed, universal—view has been that voting choices based on policy concerns are superior to decisions based on party loyalty or candidate image. Only the former represent clearly sophisticated behavior. Indeed, the policy-oriented vote is a defining characteristic of that mythical specimen, the classic democratic citizen.[29]

If issue voting is assumed to be appropriate in a democracy, then it also follows that lots of issue coverage is also appropriate in a democracy. Many who study the media and politics make exactly that assumption when they criticize the media's propensity to focus on the horse race aspects of the campaign. Thomas Patterson, for example, argues that too much "horse race" coverage means that, "Voters consequently are more conversant about candidates' campaign styles and successes than about their platforms and leadership skills."[30] The problem that is still apparent, however, is that no one has said why issue voting (and hence issue coverage) is more desirable. Carmines and Stimson make this point when they claim, "The assumption has been, in fact, so noncontroversial and such an integral part of issue voting that those focusing on the topic have felt no need to justify it. Indeed, it is rarely mentioned at all. . . . "[31] A voting behavior study might be able to get away without justifying the importance of issue voting, but here, where it is necessary to say exactly what should be covered and in what proportion, it is necessary to say exactly why issues deserve the most coverage.

So what is it about the "ideal" voter that should make him require lots of issue coverage from the media? For an answer, we can return to others' descriptions of how voters should choose between candidates. The reasoning, again, is that discussions of how a voter should decide should indicate what the voter should consider, and in turn, that should provide clues about what the media should make available. We can start with Jean Jacques Rousseau, who said that, "Each

[29] Edward G. Carmines and James A. Stimson, "The Two Faces of Issue Voting," *American Political Science Review* 74 (March 1980): 79.

[30] Patterson, *The Mass Media Election*, 174.

[31] Carmines and Stimson, "The Two Faces of Issue Voting," 79.

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citizen, in giving his suffrage, states his mind on that question; and the general will is found by counting the votes."[32] Rousseau's work argues that the "general will" emerges from the amalgamation of lots of votes, but he says virtually nothing about the basis of those choices. He says only that each voter, "states his mind on that question," but whether that choice is based on issues, calculations of viability, or some other criterion is not made clear.[33] Another description of the ideal voter is also not specific about the criteria voters should use. According to Stanley Kelley:

> The voter canvasses his likes and dislikes of the leading candidates and major parties involved in an election. Weighing each like and dislike equally, he votes for the candidate toward whom he has the greatest net number of favorable attitudes, if there is such a candidate. If no candidate has such an advantage, the voter votes consistently with his party affiliation, if he has one. If his attitudes do not incline him toward one candidate more than toward another, and if he does not identify with one of the major parties, the voter reaches a null decision.[34]

From this, we know that each voter must weigh each "like and dislike" equally, but the criteria used to arrive at those likes and dislikes is not specified, so it is not possible to ascertain what the media must provide to help voters discover what they like and dislike.

A third discussion of the ideal voter from Bernard Berelson, Paul Lazarsfeld, and William McPhee's *Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign* is a bit more helpful. They say that the ideal voter in a democracy should be actively interested in public affairs, knowledgeable, rational, and governed by principle.[35] While this too is fairly vague, it does provide a few clues about the criterion voters should use and by implication what the press should tell them. When Berelson et al. require that a voter be rational, they say that he "is expected to have arrived at his principles by reason and to have considered rationally the implications and alleged consequences of the alternative proposals of the contending parties."[36] A rational decision for Berelson and his colleagues is an issue-based one. Similarly, when they say that the voter should be knowledgeable, they say that he "is supposed to know what the issues are, what their history is, what the relevant facts are, what alternatives are proposed, what the party stands for, what the likely consequences are."[37] These voters are only likely to possess this sort of knowledge if the media provide it. Finally, Berelson and his colleagues require that the voter be "principled," meaning that he should cast his vote on

[32] Jean Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract* (New York: Hafner, 1947), 95-96. (Original work published in 1762.)

[33] Ibid.

[34] Stanley Kelley, *Interpreting Elections* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), 11.

[35] Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, *Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), 306-311.

[36] Ibid., 309.

[37] Ibid., 308.

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the basis of principle, "not fortuitously or impulsively or habitually, but with references to standards not only of his own interest but of the common good as well."[38]

Berelson et al.'s work is useful because it hints at some of the reasons why issues should have primacy in the media's election coverage. By specifying that the rational voter should assess the "alternative proposals" of each side, the authors are implying that voters should judge candidates based on their positions on substantive issues, rather than on considerations of viability or anything else. That, for our purposes here, suggests that the press would best serve the rational voter by providing lots of issue coverage. In addition, Berelson et al.'s requirement that voters be knowledgeable clearly specifies that it is the issues they should be knowledgeable about. Finally, their requirement that voters be principled is also closely linked to issues. The reason is that it is difficult to be "principled" about things like a candidate's viability or a candidate's recent campaign schedule. Principle is something we normally associate with one's views on the issues. Taking together what Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee have to say, it is apparent that an argument in favor of the primacy of issue coverage is beginning to take shape. For a voter to be principled, rational, and knowledgeable, as they define it, he must have an understanding of the issues. The only problem is that the argument is still a little weak. True, if voters have to be principled, it is difficult to see how they could be principled about anything but substantive issues. That point does effectively demonstrate the importance of issues and issue coverage. Yet the authors do not say why rationality has to be issue based, nor do they say exactly why the only useful knowledge is knowledge of the issues. To make the argument for why issues deserve more coverage a little stronger, we need to look elsewhere.

An oft quoted source for information on how voters behave in American democracy is James Madison's *The Federalist*, Nos. 10 and 51. In these papers, written to persuade the states to adopt the newly written constitution, Madison makes the assumption that people are goal oriented; they are instrumentally self-interested. Any action, such as voting, is instrumentally self-interested when "it is designed to help produce some outcome that is consistent with the individual's goals."[39] Assuming that voters behave this way, Madison inferred that elections were the means through which voters tried to realize their instrumental self-interest. Put differently, elections existed so that voters, through their choice of candidates, could see that their goals be communicated and acted upon. The key point is that this conception of elections as instrumental implies that voters must make their choices based primarily on the issues. There are two characteristics of this so called "instrumental model of elections" enunciated by Madison and

[38] Ibid, 308–309.

[39] Walter J. Stone, *Republic at Risk: Self-Interest in American Politics* (Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks Cole, 1990), 28.

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others that lead to this conclusion.[40] The first is that if elections are considered instrumental, then it can be inferred that elections communicate popular preferences. Put differently, elections produce a mandate where the victorious candidate can claim that his positions on the issues have been endorsed by the electorate. To the extent that elections do exist to communicate popular preferences or a mandate, it is difficult to see how such preferences could be based on anything but the issues. It would not be credible for a candidate to claim that his election was an endorsement of his campaigning ability or even his pleasing personality. If an election is meant to be the means through which the electorate communicates its preferences in the form of a mandate, it follows that such a mandate could only be based on the issues. Furthermore, for voters to be adequately equipped to communicate that mandate, they need the media to inform them about the issues.

A second characteristic of the instrumental model of elections is the expectation that elections promote governmental accountability to the people. Not only do elections serve to communicate a preference, they also exist to render judgments on past government performance. Again, the presumption is that such judgments will be based on a government's past policies; a government or candidate, for example, will be held responsible for the state of the economy, crime rates, or the conduct of foreign policy. These are substantive concerns, and if voters are to hold candidates accountable, they need to understand their positions. Once again, virtually the only way they are going to learn this information is if the media provide it. It is possible that a candidate could be held accountable for his campaign behavior, for his personal flaws, or perhaps even for the fact that his campaign never got to the point where it was considered viable. But generally speaking, most of us can accept that when a candidate or a candidate's party is being held accountable, it is primarily for its policies, not anything else. As a result, the press needs to cover the issues to allow voters to become informed enough to hold candidates responsible for their actions.

The above discussion of the instrumental model of elections strengthens somewhat the argument in favor of the primacy of issue coverage in the media. Instead of just going along with the tacit understanding or assumption that issues are important, we now have a better understanding of why. More specifically, without an understanding of the issues, voters would not be able to communicate a mandate or hold candidates accountable. Furthermore, this understanding of the importance of issue voting also allows us to rank order the two different categories of issue coverage. The instrumental model of elections suggests that substantive issues are more important than character issues. The reasoning is that the communication of a mandate is much more likely to be issue based than character based. While a voter will vote for a candidate who shares his views on the issues, even if he has doubts about that candidate's character, he will rarely vote for a candidate whose personality pleases him, but whose issue positions he finds objectionable.

[40] Ibid., 50–52.

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Were voters to vote solely based on character issues, any mandate a candidate would receive would be without substance; a candidate would only have a mandate to be something, rather than a mandate to actually do something. A voter would be voicing no control over the direction of the nation's policies. Since Madison's instrumental voters are goal oriented, this would make little sense. Thus, voters intending to communicate a mandate need more information from the media on policy issues than character issues. Much the same logic applies to the question of accountability; an instrumental voter is much more interested in what the candidate has done—and whether that parallels the voter's goals—than he is in what the candidate has been like. The candidate's character was only relevant to the extent that it affected his ability to carry through on his policy promises, and that is a secondary consideration.

Gary Orren echoes Madison's belief that elections are a means of assuring governmental accountability.[41] But he also adds that elections are a means of assuring legitimacy: "The government's legitimacy derives not from divine right or the power of the sword, but specifically and exclusively from the fact of election."[42] Orren is not alone in making this observation. Without elections, a government's claim to power is always in doubt. In a sense, whether a leader can claim legitimacy is affected by many of the same factors that determine whether he can claim a mandate. But to make the question of legitimacy relevant to my argument, it is not unreasonable to say that legitimacy can be imperiled not only by the absence of elections, but also if voters make choices based on frivolous criteria. Put differently, were an officeholder to be chosen on the basis of anything but his positions on the issues, it would be relatively easy to vilify his claim to be a legitimate representative. Generally speaking, the average voter would be much more willing to accept the policies of a leader if those policies were the reason the voters had supported him in the first place. If a leader had been chosen because of his sterling character, it would be difficult for him or her to claim the legitimate right to institute a set of policies. For these reasons, if voters are to confer legitimacy on elected officials, they need to base their decisions on the issues. That, of course, requires that the media keep the voters informed on those issues. Seen this way, we have yet another argument in favor of the primacy of issue coverage in the media.

The next step is to determine what sort of coverage should rank second to issue coverage in the amount of coverage allocated. Clearly, issues deserve the greatest proportion of coverage, and within that category policy issues deserve more coverage than character issues. What we need to know now is the sort of information the voter needs that is relevant to his choice, but that is not quite as important as information on the issues. My answer is that once a voter has ascertained where a candidate stands on the issues, that voter is then in a position to factor in whether that candidate's prospects are good enough to merit his

[41] Gary Orren, "The Linkage of Policy to Participation" in Alexander Heard and Michael Nelson, eds., *Presidential Selection* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1987), 75–119.

[42] Ibid., 77.

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support. The voter will want information on a candidate's viability; he will want to know whether his vote might be wasted on a candidate whose prospects are dim. If a candidate's chances are slim, the voter may go with a second choice whose position on the issues is not as congenial. The key, however, is that the voter will want to know where the candidate stands on the issues first, before he makes the assessment of whether the candidate's prospects are good enough to merit a vote. As a result, information on viability is useful, but it is not quite as useful as information about the issues. This means that coverage in the media should be ranked accordingly. Some coverage of the horse race is appropriate, as long as it does not drown out coverage of the issues. This argument closely mirrors the description Anthony Downs provides of how the ideal voter decides. Downs says that the voter should take the following steps as he makes his decision:

1. By comparing the stream of utility income from government activity he has received under the present government (adjusted for trends) with those streams he believes he would have received if the various opposition parties had been in office, the voter finds his current party differentials. They establish his preference among the competing parties.
2. In a two-party system, the voter then votes for the party he prefers. In a multiparty system, he estimates what he believes are the preferences of other voters; then he acts as follows:
   a. If his favorite party seems to have a reasonable chance of winning, he votes for it.
   b. If his favorite party seems to have almost no chance of winning, he votes for some other party that has a reasonable chance in order to keep the party he least favors from winning.
   c. If he is a future-oriented voter, he may vote for his favorite party even if it seems to have almost no chance of winning in order to improve the alternatives open to him in future elections.[43]

Downs's calculus is worth outlining in full because it makes an important point about order. According to Downs, voters decide where the candidate stands on the issues and whether that is congenial (Step 1) before they factor in assessments of his viability (Step 2b). Admittedly, Downs's analysis refers to a choice that has to be made between a multiplicity of parties, rather than between a multiplicity of candidates; but in a primary or caucus, the reasoning is the same. The candidate's issue positions should be considered before his viability. Furthermore, the very fact that a voter will go for a second choice who is close on the issues if his first has no chance, implies that the voter has already given consideration to the issue positions of the second choice. Clearly, since issues are the first thing a voter considers, media coverage should accommodate that tendency and provide less coverage of the horse race and more of the issues. Finally, if you are the voter in Step 2c, who votes for his favored candidate regardless of his prospects, viability for you is not even a consideration. Therefore, you do not care whether the media reports on that aspect of your favored candidate's campaign.

[43] Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1957), 50–51.

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From a voter's perspective, knowing something about viability is useful, because it allows him or her to narrow the range of candidates he or she has to choose between. Thus, a little horse race coverage is needed to make it easier for the voter to winnow out the unfit. As Christopher Achen has said, voting based on "momentum" (a viability question), "need not be irrational herd-following. It may be instead a reasonable calculation as to the strongest candidate of one's own persuasion and tendance."[44] But even after factoring in viability, an understanding of where the candidates stand on the issues is still needed to insure that those candidates that remain after the winnowing process approximate the issue views of the voter. If voters were choosing solely on the basis of viability, they would not be fulfilling any of the roles assigned them in a properly functioning democracy. To vote on the basis of viability would be neither principled nor goal oriented, nor would it allow elected officials to claim either legitimacy or a mandate. Lastly, voting on the basis of viability is no way to hold an elected official accountable. The problem is that in the real world people vote on the basis of viability, because that is what they know most about.[45] That is the fault of the media for devoting too much of its coverage to the horse race aspects of the campaign. Clearly, while the horse race needs to be covered, it deserves much less coverage than it has been getting.

The media should allocate its coverage in terms of policy issues first, character issues second, and viability third. In addition, there is a fourth type of coverage—that devoted to the day-to-day activities of the campaign—that I argue deserves the least amount of coverage of all. While the public might be interested in the fact that a candidate took part in a debate, spoke at the local high school, marched in a Fourth of July parade, or rode his bicycle across Iowa, knowledge of these things does not help the voter make a decision. Events coverage is news to the same extent as any other information reported by the media, and it deserves its fair share of coverage. What is important to keep in mind, however, is that since voters remember what the media emphasizes, you do not want there to be so much events coverage that the voters forget information they may have heard—but in smaller quantities—about the candidates' issue positions, character, or viability. Since factors directly relevant to the voter's decision deserve priority, events coverage should be allocated the smallest portion of the space the media give over to coverage of a campaign.

Having now established what the appropriate balance of issue coverage in a democracy should be, the next step is to see how democracy would wish to see coverage allocated between the candidates. Democracy requires not only an appropriate balance of issue coverage, but an appropriate balance of candidate coverage as well. When I talk about the balance of candidate coverage, I am only concerned with establishing how coverage should be balanced in terms of

[44] Christopher H. Achen, "Democracy, Media, and Presidential Primaries" in Peverill Squire, ed., *The Iowa Caucuses and the Presidential Nominating Process* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), 178.

[45] Brady, "Is Iowa News?" 116.

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amount, not tone. I argue that the tone of a candidate's coverage does not matter in part because unless a candidate does something especially egregious, all coverage is good coverage, since it gets the candidate in the public eye. Furthermore, to assess the tone of a candidate's coverage is to ignore the likelihood that the way coverage reflects on a candidate can vary with the audience. If a candidate makes a reference to the shoddy quality of American cars (as Pat Robertson did during the 1988 Iowa caucuses) that comment might be seen as a positive and courageous statement of blunt truth to some, and a negative and unfair characterization to others. I am trying to establish how much coverage each candidate should get, not what that coverage should look like. The reality, as Michael Robinson and Margaret Sheehan make clear, is that,

> For the most part, both media [CBS and UPI] granted equal access to "equal" players: dismissing the also-rans and the minor parties; giving considerable and equal attention to the frontrunners; giving extraordinary attention to anybody doing better than expected.[46]

But is this fair? For those who believe that democracy in general depends on the right of the people to make choices, the answer is probably no. By choosing a certain candidate, voters can render judgments on what has been and what should be, and in the act of making that choice, voters can confer legitimacy on an officeholder. The crucial point, however, is that the degree to which the voter can do any of these things is limited if the range of candidates the voter can choose between is also limited. And, as should now be clear, that choice will be limited if the media restrict coverage to only a few candidates. This is a problem, because if voters are to confer a mandate, as Madison would require, the assumption is that there will be a candidate who shares the public's views and can give voice to them. Yet if the majority of the voters are pro-choice, for example, their interests will not be served if there is a limited pool of candidates, all of whom are pro-life. Much the same can be said about legitimacy; the victor of a race between two candidates who do not share the views of the public will have trouble justifying the legitimacy of his or her rule. Such scenarios become more and more likely as the number of candidates to choose between goes down. Similarly, if the voters are a little uncertain about the direction in which they would like the government to go, the fewer candidates there are, the fewer policy options they will be exposed to, and the smaller their chances will be of deciding how they feel about the issues. As Dean Alger puts it, "It is in the competition among alternatives that the public is made aware of the choices in directions for governance."[47] Taken together, all this clearly demonstrates that the absence of choice is hurtful to democracy. To quote Alger again, "Choice is at the core of democracy; the absence of choice means that democracy is lessened to one degree or another, depending on the nature of the lost choice."[48] As a result, since choice is so crucial to the proper functioning of democracy, it is absolutely essential

[46] Robinson and Sheehan, *Over the Wire and on TV*, 69.
[47] Alger, *The Media and Politics*, 7.
[48] Ibid.

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that the media not artificially constrain that choice by limiting their coverage of some of the candidates.

So choice is important. But does that mean that the media this year should allocate equal amounts of coverage not only to Bill Clinton and Robert Dole, but to Phil Gramm, Lamar Alexander, and the other lesser known candidates as well? From the perspective of the newspaper editor with many candidates to cover and only a few reporters, a pragmatic argument can be made that limited resources require that coverage be limited to only a few candidates. But there is also another reason that accommodates the needs of democracy that the media can use to justify limiting the range of candidates they cover. If the field of candidates is narrowed down by factors inherent to the democratic process and beyond the media's control, then the media are justified in limiting the range of candidates they choose to cover. It makes no sense for the media to continue covering candidates who in presidential elections consistently fail to garner significant portions of the vote in the primaries. Were the media to doggedly cover every candidate, regardless of his or her performance, they would be artificially expanding the range of candidates, rather than artificially constraining it. The media should take their cues on how to balance coverage from the process. If the electorate—through polls, how it votes, whether it holds rallies, etc.—displays a certain level of support for a candidate, then the media should allocate coverage accordingly.

All of this sounds very neat until one recognizes that the media influence the very process they look to as a guide for allocating coverage. So how does the media allocate coverage between candidates by taking cues from a process of which they are an integral part? The answer, unsatisfying as it is, is that the media in a democracy must balance their candidate coverage in such a way that it reflects voter preferences—as brought out by the process—while at the same time they discount their own influence. A good example of how this can be done was provided by the *Des Moines Register* during the 1987–1988 Iowa caucus campaign. While the *Register* gave more attention to the front-runners of both parties in its regular coverage, the paper also made a real effort to offset the impact of that coverage by giving each candidate equal coverage in periodic feature stories. In this manner, the media can rank coverage based on each candidate's performance in the process, while at the same time it mutes to some degree the reinforcing influence its allocation of coverage has on the voters. Muddy as this sounds, it is, I feel, the best rule of thumb for the media to use.

If the media are to allocate coverage according to each candidate's performance in the process, then it follows that the media must adopt a different set of allocation rules depending on the stage of the campaign being covered. Late in a campaign, there are plenty of clues available from the process to indicate how coverage should be allocated. Early in a campaign, however, because the process has not yet had its say, the media must be much more equitable. There are a number of reasons for this. First, in the early stages of many campaigns (particularly presidential campaigns) there are a large number of unknown candi-

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dates. This means that the voters will inevitably be confused about where they all stand. Since the voters in that situation will usually turn to the media for information, the media have an obligation to meet that need. The only way the media can do so is to provide as much coverage as they can in equal amounts for each of the candidates. To ignore one of the candidates in these circumstances would be to artificially constrain the range of choices available to the voters.

A second reason the media have to be careful to provide equal coverage early on rests with the state of mind of the voters. Early in most campaigns, particularly presidential ones, the electorate's preferences are only weakly held.[49] This means that since the voters are not strongly committed to any one candidate, the media have a special responsibility to avoid tipping the scales in favor of any one candidate by providing weighted coverage. The media have tremendous power during this stage of the campaign, so they must take care not to abuse it. Equal coverage at this stage of a campaign would not only present the voters with a full ranges of choices, but it would do much to level the playing field during a time when the voters are most malleable. But if the media start favoring one candidate or another before the process has indicated who is more "worthy" of coverage, then it becomes the media rather than the voters who determine who goes on to do well in the remainder of the race. Conversely, the media could dismiss a candidate before the public even knows him well enough to render a judgment. It is possible, for example, that the public never got to know Pete DuPont well enough during the 1988 Iowa caucuses to decide on their own whether he merited their support. Instead, one could argue, it was the media, not the public, who sealed his fate by refusing to allocate him coverage. If the media had provided reasonably balanced coverage of Pete DuPont and everyone else, one could be certain that DuPont's rejection was because of public disfavor, not media disfavor.

I argue that once the process gets rolling, and voters start expressing preferences in primaries, then the media can start looking to the process for cues about how to allocate coverage. Until that happens, however, the media need to allocate coverage as equitably as possible. And, as the media look to the process to guide allocation decisions, they must take care to discount their own influence. I recognize that there must be enough leeway in that requirement to allow for the possibility that some candidates simply do things that are more newsworthy; it would be remiss, for example, to insist that all candidates get the same amount of coverage during the week that Gary Hart was caught entangled with Donna Rice. So while the standard can allow an occasional exception to accommodate unusual events, it argues against consistent biases in favor of one candidate or another, especially early on in a campaign, unless there are clear cues from the process that bias in favor of one candidate or another is appropriate.

[49] Geer, *Nominating Presidents*, 96.

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

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Organized Labor and the Congressional Democrats: Reconsidering the 1980s

TAYLOR E. DARK

What happened to the power of labor unions in Congress in the 1980s? For many authors, the answer is straightforward: a decline in political capacity and an ensuing exclusion from the policy-making process. Declining union representation in the workforce, economic restructuring, the decreasing credibility of liberal policies, increased business spending on campaign finance and political mobilization, greater suburbanization, the growth of Reagan Democrats among union voters, public animosity toward special interests, and, of course, Republican presidential victories: all contributed to a decisive decline in union power. Yet, important as all these factors may be, there is good reason to believe that the situation of unions in Congress during the past decade was considerably more complicated than this roster of adversity would suggest. This article argues that energetic and well-coordinated political activity by unions, combined with important changes in the institutional and political setting in Congress, actually allowed unions to offset many of these difficulties. One result was a level of influence well beyond what we would expect on the basis of the usual accounts of unalleviated union decline.

The conventional view argues that the Democratic congressional leadership turned its back on the labor movement during the 1980s. "There is no chance that Democratic elected officials in the foreseeable future will permit a declining labor movement with little public support to regain the influence and stature it had in Congress in the mid-1960s," *Washington Post* reporter Thomas Byrne Edsall insisted in 1984.[1] Similarly, University of California at Berkeley Business School Professor David Vogel argued in 1989 that "not only has union membership been declining steadily but, even more important, ties between trade unions and

[1] Thomas Byrne Edsall, *The New Politics of Inequality* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1984), 174.

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the Democratic party have measurably weakened."[2] Writing from the left, Mike Davis surmised in 1986 that congressional Democrats had become "increasingly reliant upon business PACs (Political Action Committees) and middle-class interest groups," with the unsurprising consequence being a growth in influence of "young neo-liberals with scant loyalty to labor or minorities."[3] And in 1994, historian William Berman concluded that the Democrats' improved ties with business in the mid-1980s came at the direct expense of organized labor: "As that relationship took hold, organized labor's own bargaining position with key House Democrats changed for the worse. Benefiting politically from their contact with business lobbyists, those Democrats increasingly turned a deaf ear toward labor lobbyists."[4]

There is much that is valuable in the above claims. It is true that unions were largely on the defensive in the 1980s, and that they found it very difficult to achieve legislative gains on their most crucial issues, although this is not exactly a new condition in American politics.[5] Business increased its spending on politics and became more aggressive in opposing union demands.[6] And unions seemed less and less able to effectively adjust to economic change or to articulate viable public policies in a world of heightened international competition. That which unions most wanted, such as a major reform of labor law to facilitate union organizing, they had no chance of achieving, and what they could achieve, such as a watered-down plant closing law, they barely wanted. If things were not as bad as in the 1920s, when union membership declined in absolute numbers and some unions simply faded away entirely, they were still far worse than unionists could have conceived in the 1950s or 1960s, when organized labor seemed solidly implanted in the American political and economic scene.

Still, despite all this, there is another side to the story of union political involvement in the 1980s that has received much less attention. This other side is hinted at in the words of *Washington Post* journalist, David Broder, writing two years after the Democrats recaptured the Senate in 1986: "In a time of declining membership and presumably reduced political clout, organized labor has defended and perhaps improved its place as the premier lobbying-political force in Congress, with a score of notable legislative victories in the last two years."[7] Similarly, *National Journal* noted in 1988: "A funny thing has happened

[2] David Vogel, *Fluctuating Fortunes: The Political Power of Business in America* (New York: Basic Books, 1989), 293.

[3] Mike Davis, *Prisoners of the American Dream* (London: Verso, 1986), 289, 292.

[4] William C. Berman, *America's Right Turn: From Nixon to Bush* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 117.

[5] For the historical limits on union political power, see Christopher L. Tomlins, *The State and the Unions* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985); and Robert H. Zieger, *American Workers, American Unions 1920–1985* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1986).

[6] See David Plotke, "The Political Mobilization of Business" in Mark Petracca, ed., *The Politics of Interests: Interest Groups Transformed* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), 175–198.

[7] Quoted in David Broder, "Renaissance of Labor's Power," *Washington Post*, 19 August 1988.

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on the way to the close of the 100th Congress. The agenda of organized labor, consigned to the backseat since the start of the Reagan administration, has suddenly emerged in the driver's seat."[8] Three scholars of industrial relations also concluded in 1989: " . . . the labor-Democratic party alliance has remained strong."[9] This other story seemed to be distinguished by union involvement in setting the agenda of Congress, by close ties between the Democratic congressional leadership and union lobbyists, by the passage of several union-supported initiatives, and by union success in fending off Republican attacks on pro-labor policies.

How can we reconcile these divergent views of the role of unions in Congress in the 1980s? Part of the answer can be found in the periods chosen for analysis. Those who emphasize the first half of the decade, especially prior to the Democratic regaining of a Senate majority in 1986, see mainly labor weakness. Those who examine the period after 1986 see a real if nevertheless limited labor revival. But another part of the answer must be found in a greater awareness of the role of institutional structure and change in American politics and policy. A distinctive institutional configuration came into place after 1986 that benefited the labor movement considerably. At this time, the AFL-CIO (American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations) achieved a heightened degree of internal unity, leading to an improved capacity to bargain on the part of its top leadership. At the same time, newly selected Speaker Jim Wright concentrated power into his own hands in the House of Representatives, taking advantage of the previously unrealized potential of the congressional reforms of the previous decade. These two centralizations provided the basis for a level of cooperation between labor and the Democratic leadership that few would have expected given our received ideas about the role of unions during the 1980s. A different configuration, such as a highly divided labor movement and a more fragmented congressional environment, might have produced a very different outcome even if the labor movement possessed the same aggregate resources, and the Democrats held the same number of seats. In this sense, it is in politics—in the distinctively political interplay between institutions and resources—that an important part of the explanation for the limits and possibilities of labor union power can be found.

Labor and the Democratic Leadership

The conventional wisdom cited above argued for the diminished force of organized labor among congressional Democrats in the first half of the 1980s and used that analysis to generalize about the entire decade. But given the extraordinary conditions after the 1980 elections—the thorough political repudiation of the previous Democratic administration, a major Republican victory in the presiden-

[8] Richard E. Cohen, "Labor Comes Alive," *National Journal*, 16 July 1988.

[9] Marick F. Masters, Robert S. Aktin, John Thomas Delaney, "Unions, Political Action, and Public Policies: A Review of the Past Decade," *Policy Studies Journal* 18 (Winter 1989–90): 479.

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tial election, Republican control over the Senate for the first time since 1954, the defeat of prominent liberal Democratic senators, and a gain of thirty-five Republican seats in the House—it does not seem reasonable to use events at this time as the sole basis for identifying the enduring features of labor's role within Congress and the Democratic party. The defection of conservative southern Democrats (the so-called Boll Weevils) on key votes in the House of Representatives, as well as the fact of a GOP-controlled Senate (also with its share of Democratic voting defections), meant that liberal, pro-labor Democrats had little basis for effective resistance. Enactment of the central elements of the Reagan budget and tax cuts in 1981 would be very difficult to prevent. Thus, in the years immediately after 1980 there plainly would be little opportunity for movement on the issues dear to the hearts of labor unionists and their liberal congressional allies. Moreover, with the labor movement battered by defeats in collective bargaining, the movement of plants overseas, rising international competition, and the Reagan administration's successful attack on the air traffic controllers union, unions were clearly in no position to mobilize effectively their own members as a disruptive force capable of pushing an alternative agenda.

In contrast, the latter half of the 1980s provides a different angle on the relationship between labor and the congressional Democrats, because it was only at this time that the Democrats were really able to go on the offensive against the Reagan administration, and to articulate their own distinct agenda. If unions were to advance parts of their own program, it could only be in the context of a resurgent Democratic party. The 100th Congress provided this context, when the Democrats regained control of the Senate, enlarged their majority in the House of Representatives, and sought to put the Republicans on the defensive in anticipation of the 1988 presidential elections. Thus, if the early 1980s present a picture of unions operating at the nadir of their congressional influence, the later 1980s show unions at work in a considerably more auspicious environment.

Labor's capacity to take advantage of this opportunity would depend to a large degree on the kind of relationship that union leaders and lobbyists maintained with the Democratic leadership in the House and Senate. For this reason, the consolidation of a close alliance with the House leadership during the brief tenure of Speaker Jim Wright merits close attention. Despite the tendencies toward decentralization inherent in the congressional reforms of the mid-1970s, latent within the rules was the possibility for an ambitious Speaker, under the appropriate conditions, to consolidate power and play a leadership role not seen within Congress for decades.[10] It fell to Jim Wright (D–TX) to see these opportunities, and to take them. Elected as the new Speaker in January 1987, Wright sought, with the assistance of Majority Leader Thomas Foley (D–WA) and Whip Tony Coelho (D–CA) to formulate a more coherent Democratic party agenda. The growing unity of House Democrats, primarily due to the increased liberalization of

[10] For further discussion, see David W. Rohde, *Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 105–119.

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Southern Democrats and the subsequent relaxation of internal party antagonism, suggested that the Democratic caucus would be ready for a stronger brand of party leadership. Wright was ready and willing to provide it.

Wright described his legislative ambitions bluntly: "Reagan was the counter-revolution. I wanted to get the revolution going again."[11] The Speaker considered himself "a populist and an egalitarian," who retained a New Deal commitment to an active governmental role in shaping economic development and providing a wide array of social services. While Wright's much publicized ties to oil interests and the savings and loan industry would appear to contradict such beliefs, such contradictions were certainly not unheard of in the Texas brand of New Deal politics. Much like the other Texan who inhabited the White House during the 1960s, Wright saw no necessary conflict between his efforts to maintain business support, while at the same time cultivating labor in an effort to pass liberal legislation. Wright was trying to utilize the enhanced powers of the Speaker's office in order to rebuild the broad, inclusive alliance that had characterized the New Deal Democratic party. He thus came into the Speaker's office with a larger conception of his role and a more aggressive commitment to a legislative agenda than had any of his immediate predecessors. "The House should develop a program of action . . . rather than leaving the making of policy to a fragmented group of 21 standing committees without any cohesion," Wright proclaimed. "There has to be a sense of coordinated policy, a cohesive pattern to what the institution does."[12]

Precisely because of this intent to advance a cohesive Democratic legislative agenda, Wright sought to coordinate and deepen the existing ties between the House leadership apparatus and the labor movement. *Congressional Quarterly* noted: "Wright decided, when he took over the top leadership post, that operational changes were needed in how Democrats and labor dealt with issues of mutual interest."[13] Speaker Tip O'Neill had previously designated deputy whip, Representative Pat Williams (D–MT), as the labor whip, in order to have an ongoing point of contact between the House whip operation and the labor lobbyists. Wright sought to further improve the quality of this relationship, encouraging closer coordination between union lobbyists and the highest levels of the House leadership. Representative Williams commented: "The Speaker wondered if we could develop a system for more order in the way in which we brought legislation to the floor. He also wanted to make sure that the legislation would pass when it reached the floor."[14] The goal was to reach a consensus between the leadership

[11] Quoted in John M. Barry, *The Ambition and the Power* (New York: Viking, 1989), 656.

[12] Quoted in Janet Hook, "Speaker Jim Wright Takes Charge in the House," *Congressional Quarterly*, 11 July 1987.

[13] Richard E. Cohen, "Labor Comes Alive," *National Journal*, 16 July 1988. For earlier ties, see Barbara Sinclair, *Majority Leadership in the U.S. House* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), 122–126.

[14] Cohen, "Labor Comes Alive."

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and the labor movement on a set of bills and to closely coordinate their lobbying activities in order to ensure passage.[15]

The possibilities for leadership/labor coordination were also enhanced by changes in the AFL-CIO's own lobbying operation. Shortly before Wright's selection as House Speaker, the AFL-CIO selected a new director of legislation, Robert M. McGlotten, an African-American who had been a lobbyist with the federation since 1974. McGlotten had a reputation as a flexible and highly skilled lobbyist. He replaced Ray Denison, who had served as director of legislation since former director Andrew Biemiller's retirement in 1980, and whom many on the Hill felt had not lived up to the performance of his predecessor. The federation also selected as its new associate lobbying director, Peggy Taylor, a former congressional staffer with seven years experience as a union lobbyist. Thus, the AFL-CIO now had an African-American and a woman in its two top lobbying positions—a marked departure from earlier patterns of white male dominance, and a change that would help the federation in its alliances with other members of the liberal coalition.

In keeping with the deeper alliance constructed with the House Democratic leadership, McGlotten sought to enhance the capacity of the labor movement to coordinate and prioritize its legislative activities on Capitol Hill.[16] This task was especially necessary because of the greater involvement of a wide range of national unions in Washington lobbying, in comparison to the 1960s, and the subsequent need to avoid a chaotic fragmentation of union political demands. The primary means for reaching consensus on a delimited set of legislative goals was a meeting every Monday afternoon of the most important union lobbyists. This meeting was the principal site for the forging of compromises on the set of issues which would be given priority in the federation's negotiations with the House and Senate leadership. The goal in such meetings was to maintain agreement by making sure that the principal factions of the labor movement each had at least one key issue on the list of the top five or six federation-endorsed issues. This afternoon meeting was supplemented by a larger gathering every Monday morning of the entire community of lobbyists from AFL-CIO affiliated unions. The Monday morning meeting was largely devoted to tactical issues, the dispersal of information, and the distribution of lobbying assignments. A key result of these ongoing meetings was that McGlotten could maintain the support and confidence of the community of labor lobbyists and was, therefore, in a good position to bargain on behalf of the labor movement as a whole in his interaction with party leaders.

The effectiveness of the federation was also enhanced by the subsidence of the ideological and strategic conflicts among national unions, and between some

[15] Interview by author with Tom Nides, House Speaker's leadership staff, 17 May 1990.

[16] The information that follows is based on interviews by the author with Peggy Taylor, associate director of the AFL-CIO Department of Legislation, 30 November 1989; Robert McGlotten, director of the AFL-CIO Department of Legislation, 19 January 1990; and Geri Palast, director of Politics and Legislation, Service Employees International Union, 21 March 1990.

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national unions and the federation itself, which had disrupted labor unity in the past.[17] Many of the same kinds of conflicts—over foreign policy, the direction of social change, and internal decision-making procedures—that had torn apart the Democratic party in the late 1960s also produced major ruptures within the labor movement. Dissatisfied with the AFL-CIO's more conservative political direction, the United Auto Workers (UAW) chose to leave the federation in 1968 in order to pursue a more independent political and legislative strategy.[18] Likewise, other important unions, such as the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, the International Association of Machinists, and the Communication Workers of America, also grew dissatisfied with the direction of the federation under the leadership of AFL-CIO President George Meany. By 1976, these unions and six others had gone so far as to formally organize their own coalition to participate separately from the AFL-CIO in national politics. But with the accession of Lane Kirkland to the AFL-CIO presidency following Meany's death in 1979, and with other personnel changes in the AFL-CIO's top staff, opportunities arose again for greater labor unity. Kirkland's more conciliatory and tolerant brand of leadership soon prompted the return of the UAW to the federation in 1981, and his commitment to a more active role within the Democratic party similarly satisfied those unions that had grown unhappy with the federation's political strategy. Finally, in 1987 the Teamsters union, expelled from the AFL-CIO twenty years earlier for corruption, was allowed to rejoin, and in 1989 even the long-independent United Mine Workers returned to the fold. Thus the labor movement by the late 1980s was more organizationally unified than it had been in decades.

With bargaining capacity increasingly concentrated both within the labor movement and within the House, a relationship of close cooperation could be forged between the AFL-CIO and the party leadership. As reporter John M. Barry noted in his rich account of Wright's tenure as Speaker (based on day-to-day access to the leadership and to key meetings in the House), an informal "deal" was struck between the leadership and labor: "cooperation for cooperation."[19] Labor would agree to coordinate its own agenda and strategy with that of the leadership, thereby creating a consensus around a common set of legislative priorities. Labor would deploy its lobbying apparatus in support of not only "labor bills," but also in support of the broader range of issues that the leadership sought to advance. In return, the leadership would agree to bring labor's favored bills to the floor expeditiously and with the full support of the Democratic leadership and whip operation.

While the latter form of assistance might seem to be little more than a case of the leadership carrying out its formal duties, it usually involved running up

[17] See Andrew Battista, "Political Divisions in Organized Labor, 1968–1988," *Polity* 14 (Winter 1991).

[18] John Barnard, *Walter Reuther and the Rise of the Auto Workers* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1983), 195–198.

[19] Barry, *The Ambition and the Power*.

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against the opposition of conservative and moderate Democrats who considered floor votes on controversial, labor-supported legislation an electoral liability. For example, Representative Timothy Penny (D–MN) complained in 1988:

> I think the leadership is pushing the labor agenda mostly because of the long-term relationship between the party and labor leaders. . . . We ought to be less confrontational and invite bipartisanship. I don't know why we are so unwilling to look for alternatives to achieve the same objectives with less controversy.[20]

Another Democratic member commented:

> Why do we have to keep voting on these things that have no chance of becoming law? Reagan is certain to veto it, even if the Senate ever gets off its ass and voted on it. Members are grumbling. Very few have the guts to confront the leadership, but there's resentment out there on the floor.[21]

Wright had effectively centralized power and was now using it to push a liberal agenda, including labor bills, over the wishes of many rank-and-file members who sought to avoid these controversial votes.

The closeness of the labor/leadership interaction is further illustrated in the informal, daily contacts between Wright's key staff members and McGlotten and other labor lobbyists.[22] These contacts were so extensive that the community of labor lobbyists became, in effect, an arm of the Democratic leadership. Most interesting was the willingness of the leadership to share what was considered secret information with union lobbyists. The whip apparatus regularly prepared confidential, internal counts of where Democratic members stood on impending floor votes. Although this information was given to the whips by members with the expectation that it would not be distributed even to other members, much less to outside interest groups, the leadership was willing to share this information with the AFL-CIO. As Barry observed: "Internal whip counts were very sensitive; what a member told another member was confidential, and no one in the whip organization would share a member's name with a lobbyist. But they would tell McGlotten."[23] It became a regular practice early on in the 100th Congress for the whip operation to share these counts with the top AFL-CIO lobbyists, who could then coordinate a lobbying campaign to pressure members who were not voting "correctly." The leadership also regularly sought to enlist the support of labor for a broad range of issues on the Democratic agenda, from taxes to highway projects to trade legislation.

In the Senate, the situation was different in ways that reflected the basic differences between the two chambers. The party leadership in the Senate had fewer tools for exercising power, and neither Majority Leader Robert Byrd (VA)

[20] Quoted in Cohen, "Labor Comes Alive."

[21] Quoted in Barry, *The Ambition and the Power*, 409.

[22] This section is based on interviews with Tom Nides, House Speaker's leadership staff, 17 May 1990, and Jon Weintraub, administrative assistant to Representative Pat Williams, 30 January 1990.

[23] Barry, *The Ambition and the Power*, 273.

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nor, after 1989, Majority Leader George Mitchell (ME), could achieve a concentration of bargaining capacity comparable to that achieved in the House. The changes of the 1970s had decentralized power in the Senate, just as they had in the House, but there were few new provisions for a more centralized party leadership. Majority Leader Bird's role during the 100th Congress was especially weak, with Byrd making little effort to exert policy leadership. Majority Leader Mitchell did, however, take on a more aggressive role during the 101st Congress, endorsing a domestic policy agenda almost identical to that advocated by union leaders.

Union lobbyists were not as crucial in the Senate as in the House, partly because of the greater representation of rural states in the upper body and partly because there was not as strong a leadership organization to serve as an ally. Thus, although McGlotten and other union leaders had systematic access to Mitchell, there was no equivalent whip operation for the labor unions to work with. The key facts in the Senate were that the leadership was weaker, party unity was diminished, and the filibuster increased the powers of a (usually Southern) minority to obstruct legislation. Union lobbyists could work closely with the leadership, but there would not be the kind of integral cooperation that had developed in the House.

The Resources of Organized Labor

What did labor have to exchange with the House leadership, and what made such a close alliance attractive to Speaker Wright and his allies? Contrary to popular perceptions, unions still controlled valuable resources. First, labor unions maintained an elaborate lobbying network in Washington, one which expanded in the 1980s as individual national unions developed their own political capacities.[24] This community of labor lobbyists included a number of individuals (including the AFL-CIO's McGlotten) with many years of experience in Washington and impressive reputations as knowledgeable and skillful players in the legislative process. Many of these lobbyists had developed long and trusting relationships with the leaders of the Senate and House labor committees, with other key committee leaders, and with the principal figures in the Senate and House party leadership. The activity of these lobbyists was, moreover, backed up by well funded research departments at the AFL-CIO headquarters and in many national unions—departments which provided the union lobbyists with coherent and well researched arguments in support of the unions' policy demands.

In addition, during the 1980s the AFL-CIO and the national unions expanded their capacity to engage in so-called grassroots lobbying. It has often and correctly been stated that the labor lobbyists of the 1960s and the 1970s were more proficient at insider, elite-oriented bargaining than they were at mobilizing their own mem-

[24] Marick F. Masters and Asghar Zardkoohi, "Labor Unions and the U.S. Congress: PAC Allocations and Legislative Voting," *Advances in Industrial and Labor Relations* 4 (1987): 80–83.

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bership to pressure Congress.[25] Grassroots lobbying was not as common nor as necessary in the more hierarchical Congress of the past, and labor lobbyists therefore did not put much effort into establishing the institutional capacity to flood members' offices with letters or postcards, although they were not without some capabilities in this area. Labor "got used to a Washington-based, backdoor operation," noted the chief lobbyist of the National Education Association (NEA).[26] Union leaders were also unaccustomed to using mass communications to contact and mobilize their members, a strategy which potentially posed risks as well to the maintenance of the leadership's own internal power position. One political consultant observed: "Most union leaders are elected at a convention made up of a few thousand local union officers. In their experience rising to power, they do not need to use mass communications."[27]

Despite these problems, unions spent considerable time and money during the 1980s setting up new forms of linkage to congressional districts and new capacities to generate pressure at the district level on individual members.[28] The AFL-CIO alone spent over $400,000 a year in the late 1980s on grassroots lobbying. Federation President Lane Kirkland wrote:

> In 1987 the AFL-CIO used an arsenal of grassroots weapons to build constituent pressure—Legislative Action Committees [LACs] in targeted districts, state federation teleconference strategy sessions with key members of Congress, mailgram campaigns, postcard and letter-writing efforts, face-to-face meetings with "swing vote" lawmakers, direct mail and phone bank outreach, call-in campaigns aimed at the local offices of federal legislators, plant gate handbilling, video technology and media support tactics.[29]

As one recent study based on interviews with union lobbyists concludes, " . . . labor lobbyists feel that LACs have been enormously helpful in getting legislation passed, more helpful than any device that the AFL-CIO has used in recent years."[30]

These resources took on an added importance because of the approach that unions took to lobbying. Unlike most interest groups in Washington, unions are active on an extraordinarily wide range of issues, including not only most domestic policy issues, but also many foreign policy issues. Partially because of this breadth of concern, labor lobbyists are not as committed to a single issue and, therefore, a single vote as are many other interest groups. Union leaders and lobbyists are

[25] See Paul Starobin, "Unions Turn to Grass Roots To Rebuild Hill Clout," *Congressional Quarterly*, 2 September 1989.

[26] Quoted in Bill Keller, "Once a Washington Power, Labor Now Plays Catch-Up in Lobbying and Politics," *Congressional Quarterly*, 4 September 1982.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Interview by author with Mike Gildea, AFL-CIO Department of Legislation, 28 September 1989.

[29] Lane Kirkland, *Report on Congress 1987* (Washington, DC: AFL-CIO Department of Legislation, 1988).

[30] William Form, *Segmented Labor, Fractured Politics: Labor Politics in American Life* (New York: Plenum Press, 1995), 303.

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also practiced at aggregating a wide range of interests internal to their organizations. This leads them to be both more accepting of compromise in the legislative process and more willing to work on issues that are not their first priority.

Most unions also maintained a commitment to the long-term health of the Democratic party. As J. David Greenstone noted in his analysis of AFL-CIO political involvement in the 1960s, unions identify with the party as an institution.[31] Most labor leaders believe that unions will not be able to have much influence within American politics unless the Democratic party does well. They are, therefore, willing both to subordinate their immediate interests to enlarge their definition of labor's issues in order to enhance the prospects for the party. These factors made labor a more useful force for the Democratic congressional leadership than the fragmented and specialized groups that otherwise populate the interest-group universe in Washington. Also, another distinct advantage for organized labor was its long-term commitment to lobbying. As Andrew Biemiller, the AFL-CIO legislative director in the 1960s and 1970s, once said: "You know, the real secret of labor lobbying is that we never give up. If we are defeated in one Congress, we just come back in the next Congress."[32]

Finally, unions remained major financial investors in congressional elections, despite a deterioration in labor's overall position in campaign finance since the 1970s. Much has been made, and rightly so, of the large increases in the number of corporate PACs and the subsequent rise in corporate campaign contributions in the 1970s and 1980s. Federal Election Commission (FEC) reports indicate that in congressional campaigns over this period, union PACs were easily outspent by corporate and trade association PACs.[33] In 1987–1988, labor PACs spent $34.9 million in congressional elections, while corporate PACs spent $54.4 million, and trade association PACs spent $40.9 million. Moreover, from 1977–1978 to 1987–1988, corporate PAC donations in congressional races rose more than 465 percent, and trade association PAC contributions rose nearly 259 percent, while total labor PAC contributions grew only 242 percent. As David Sousa has demonstrated in recent research, labor's percentage of the PAC donations to all Democratic congressional candidates shrunk from 52.8 percent in 1975–1976 to 34.7 percent in 1987–1988.[34] Furthermore, Sousa shows that labor's percentage of the PAC contributions to Democratic House incumbents declined from 43.2 percent in 1977–1978 to 31.3 percent in 1987–1988, and the same figure for

[31] J. David Greenstone, *Labor in American Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 357.

[32] Andrew J. Biemiller, "Reflections on the People's Lobby," *AFL-CIO American Federationist*, January 1979, 17.

[33] The following figures are drawn from Marick F. Masters, Robert S. Atkin, and John Thomas Delaney, "Unions, Political Action, and Public Policies: A Review of the Past Decade," *Policy Studies Journal* 18 (Winter 1989–90).

[34] David J. Sousa, "Union Politics in an Era of Decline" (Ph.D. diss., University of Minnesota, 1991), 107.

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TABLE 1

Aggregate Union PAC Activity, 1977–1978—1987–1988 Election Cycles (Revenues are in $1,000s)

Election Cycle	No. of Unions with PACs	Number of Union PACs	Union PAC Revenues	Union PAC Contributions	PAC Revenue per Member
1977–78	72	280	$19,563	$10,321	$ .86
1979–80	80	331	$25,677	$14,213	$1.15
1981–82	78	415	$37,474	$20,916	$1.90
1983–84	83	371	$51,133	$26,206	$2.95
1985–86	82	418	$65,311	$31,004	$3.85
1987–88	N/A	401	$75,966	$35,547	$4.47

Note: Union PAC contributions are donations made to presidential and congressional candidates during the two-year cycle.

Source: Delaney and Masters, "Unions and Political Action." Original source was Federal Election Commission reports.

Democratic Senate incumbents took an even more precipitous decline, from 47.6 percent in 1977–1978 to a meager 18.8 percent in 1987–1988.[35]

Important as these developments may be, however, the notion that unions completely lost their clout in campaign finance is seriously misleading.[36] Indeed, many political operatives and members of Congress are convinced that union political money was a more important resource for unions than their members' voting behavior.[37] In some ways, unions stabilized their position in campaign finance during the 1980s. Between the 1977–1978 and 1987–1988 election cycles, for example, unions increased their total PAC contributions in federal races from $10,321,000 to $35,547,000 and their per capita revenue per member rose from $.86 to $4.47 (see Table 1).[38] If total PAC revenues (not just congressional campaign contributions) are taken as the key unit of analysis, FEC data show that unions have maintained a fairly constant share of total PAC receipts during the 1980s.[39] In 1977–1978, labor PAC receipts were 24.5 percent of the total; in 1983–1984, they had sunk to 17.7 percent of the total; but, by 1987–1988, they were up to 20.6 percent. Over this same period, corporate PAC receipts rose from 21.8 percent of the total to 26.1 percent. While this was surely a negative change for labor, it hardly represents a collapse of union financial power.

[35] Ibid., 108.

[36] For a detailed quantitative analysis that shows this, see Gregory M. Saltzman, "Congressional Voting on Labor Issues: The Role of PACs," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review* 40 (January 1987).

[37] This conclusion is based on numerous interviews with union lobbyists, members of Congress, and congressional staffers in Fall 1990.

[38] John T. Delaney and Marick F. Masters, "Unions and Political Action" in George Strauss, Daniel G. Gallagher, and Jack Fiorito, eds., *The State of the Unions* (Madison, WI: Industrial Relations Research Association, 1991).

[39] Sousa, "Union Politics in an Era of Decline," 97.

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Part of the reason for the resiliency of unions in campaign finance was that the use of a payroll check-off system allowed many unions, even some with declining memberships, successfully to increase the size of their PACs.[40]

Moreover, the amount of union money spent on congressional campaigns is definitely not fully captured by FEC records of campaign contributions from union PACs. Much to the chagrin of Republicans, unions are clearly effective in deploying soft money – funds that are spent on nonpartisan internal communications, voter registration, and political education, and which, therefore, do not have to be reported as contributions under the Federal Election Campaign Act. Although estimates of the amount of actual spending remain hazy, there is little doubt that unions spend many millions of dollars on such activities.[41]

Union money is also directed to a disproportionate degree to Democratic challengers and to Democratic incumbents facing strong opposition. Because unions have a broad agenda, they clearly pursue a more partisan and ideological orientation in campaign giving, rather than the access or special-interest strategy more characteristic of corporate or trade PACs.[42] In 1987–1988, for example, 92 percent of union PAC contributions went to Democrats, and although 64 percent of union PAC money went to incumbents, 21 percent also went to challengers and 14.8 percent to open seat races.[43] This can be compared to corporate PACS, which gave only 53 percent of their contributions to the Democrats in 1987–1988 and gave 90 percent of their contributions to incumbents. Likewise, trade, membership, and health PACs granted 82 percent of their contributions to incumbents.[44] These patterns of giving meant that even in 1987–1988, Democratic House challengers received 64.3 percent of their PAC contributions from unions, and Senate challengers received 46.0 percent of their PAC dollars from unions. In addition, much of the union money for Democratic challengers came very early in the campaign, helping to bolster a candidate when they needed it most and thereby establishing a good relationship between labor and the candidate early on. On the whole, these investments ensured that a large number of members of Congress felt that they owed at least something to labor – which in turn guaranteed union lobbyists access, which could be utilized not only to promote their own issues, but also those supported by the party leadership. In short, labor donated its money in a strategically effective manner that ensured that unions

[40] See Charles R. Babcock, "Pumping Up PACs With Payroll Deductions," *Washington Post*, 7 November 1989.

[41] See Chuck Alston, "Republicans Seek To Reduce Labor's Clout at the Polls," *Congressional Quarterly*, 31 March 1990; James T. Bennett, "Private Sector Unions: The Myth of Decline," *Journal of Labor Research* 12 (Winter 1991); and Larry Sabato, *PAC Power: Inside the World of Political Action Committees* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1985), 14–15.

[42] Saltzman, "Congressional Voting on Labor Issues," 175.

[43] Masters, Atkin, and Delaney, "Unions, Political Action, and Public Policies: A Review of the Past Decade."

[44] M. Margaret Conway, "PACs in the Political Process" in Allan Cigler and Burdett Loomis, eds., *Interest Group Politics* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1991).

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remained important in congressional campaign finance, despite a relative decline in total union giving compared with business PACs.

Also of considerable importance, especially from the viewpoint of the party leadership, was the fact that union money flowed in large amounts to such Democratic party institutions as the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC), Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, and the Democratic National Committee (DNC).[45] Unions also provided major funding in the late 1980s for the DNC's Project 500, an effort to boost Democratic strength at the state level in order to control the state legislatures that would be engaged in congressional redistricting following the 1990 census. These union contributions to party institutions helped the party leadership as it tried to gain greater control over the rank-and-file member of Congress. As California Representative Tony Coelho demonstrated during his tenure as chair of the DCCC, accumulated funds can be usefully deployed to individual members to create political debts to the leadership that may be long remembered. Coelho, in turn, and despite his extensive ties to business, felt obligated to organized labor and strongly supported union efforts to secure plant closing legislation, trade protection, and legislation protecting construction unions from non-union competition.[46]

In addition to support in campaign finance and lobbying, unions also sought to deliver the votes of their members and their families in congressional elections. Although we cannot explore here all the complexities of measuring union electoral power, suffice it to say that there is abundant evidence that unions have not, contrary to the conventional wisdom, suffered a rupture in their influence at the polls.[47] Again, David Sousa's work on union voting behavior is especially instructive. Working with the American National Election Studies and using a probit model, Sousa shows that through the 1980s union members voted disproportionately for Democrats in House elections, that union voters were much less likely to split their tickets by voting for Democrats for Congress and Republicans for president and that unions were especially successful in keeping their white and middle-income members from defecting from the Democratic fold.[48] Sousa explicitly concludes: "The suggestion that there are droves of 'Reagan Democrats' in labor unions and labor union households is simply wrong."[49]

These findings for the 1980s are further supported by evidence showing the persistence of a major union voting effect into the 1990s. According to the AFL-

[45] David B. Magleby and Candice J. Nelson, *The Money Chase: Congressional Campaign Finance Reform* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1990), 85.

[46] Brooks Jackson, *Honest Graft* (Washington, DC: Farragut, 1990), 156–159.

[47] See John Thomas Delaney, Marick F. Masters, and Susan Schwochau, "Union Membership and Voting for COPE-Endorsed Candidates," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review* 43 (July 1990): 621–635; Michael H. LeRoy, "The 1988 Elections: Re-emergence of the Bloc Vote?" *Labor Studies Journal* 15 (Spring 1990): 5–32.

[48] Sousa, "Union Politics in an Era of Decline," 283.

[49] Ibid., and David J. Sousa, "Organized Labor in the Electorate, 1960–1988," *Political Research Quarterly* 46 (December 1993): 744–745.

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CIO, exit polls indicate that even in the critical 1994 congressional elections, as the Democratic party collapsed around the nation, union members voted for Democratic candidates by a 61 percent to a 39 percent margin.[50] With only 49 percent of the general public voting for the Democrats, the union differential was a full 12 percentage points. Figures such as these suggest that many Democratic members of Congress remain significantly dependent on union voters and that this dependence may grow as other constituencies move toward the GOP in congressional elections.

In summary, labor unions retained sufficient financial and organizational, and, to a more limited extent, electoral resources to be able to engage in effective bargaining with the Democratic leadership and many members of Congress. Union lobbyists were available to help the leadership in lobbying recalcitrant members, especially those members who felt loyal to unions and/or beholden to them for votes and money. Barry has described the resulting mentality of members of the House toward labor (and business): "Members did not like making enemies of either organized labor or the business community. *Those people would raise money against you. Hell, they'd even run somebody against you.*"[51] It is on the basis of considerations such as these that labor unions, like their business opponents, maintained access on a systematic basis to key congressional players.

Lastly, the labor movement's role was also enhanced by the slow process of the nationalization of the congressional Democratic party. By all accounts, those southern Democrats who have remained Democrats have faced increasing incentives since the 1960s to become more liberal, not more conservative. The key causal factor at work here has been the entry of African-American voters into the political arena and especially their role, along with teachers and other union members, in southern Democratic primaries. These developments have led to an increased homogenization of the Democratic party in Congress as southern conservative Democrats have been displaced by Republicans or by liberal Democrats. This realignment of the South along lines more in keeping with the national Democratic party at least partially diminished the role of anti-union southerners within the congressional party, especially in the House.[52] The party leadership could now act more forcefully on liberal issues and thus serve as a more reliable ally for organized labor.

What Did Labor Gain?

To what degree did unions actually advance any of their policy goals as a result of the alliance with the Democratic leadership, and what did those goals consist

[50] *Executive Council Report to the AFL-CIO Convention 1995* (Washington, DC: AFL-CIO, 1995), 47.

[51] Barry, *The Ambition and the Power*, 280. (Emphasis in original.)

[52] Macon Morehouse, "Conservative Coalition: Still Alive, but Barely," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 19 November 1988; and William J. Keefe, *Parties, Politics, and Public Policy in America* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1991), 258–263.

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of? Of course, labor's capacity to actually achieve enactment of its agenda was sharply limited by Republican control of the presidency. Still, we can identify several areas where the labor/leadership alliance succeeded in setting the terms of debate and even enacted legislation over presidential opposition.

During the 100th Congress, the most notable example of the labor movement securing valuable leadership support could be found in the evolution of the advance notification or plant closing, legislation passed into law in June 1988. This legislation required sixty-days advance notification to employees before a layoff or plant closing involving fifty or more workers. The bill was strongly opposed by business lobbyists, who viewed it as the first step toward a series of new labor standards mandating severance pay, health benefits, and family and medical leave. A spokesperson for the National Association of Manufacturers declared: "This is the biggest labor-management battle of the year, absolutely. This is the very beginning. If they get notice now, they'll come back with consultation and information disclosure. Instead of creating jobs, it's going to reduce the ability of companies to create jobs. What we're going to here is the Europeanization of our economy."[53] Although the final bill was not as far-reaching as the early proposals endorsed by union lobbyists (which had mandated that employers engage in "good-faith" consultation with union representatives), its passage was still a victory for the labor movement over business opposition. As one labor lawyer observed, the new law constituted "an initial encroachment into the manner and timing of management actions to make important business changes."[54]

Originally attached to the 1988 omnibus trade bill, the advance notice proposal was strongly opposed by President Reagan, who vetoed the entire trade bill on 24 May 1988 rather than allow the measure's enactment. The Democratic leadership then chose to promote a freestanding plant closing bill, which passed in both chambers by veto-proof margins and became law without the signature of President Reagan. Although many members of Congress originally viewed the bill as another example of an inside deal between the leadership and labor that had little resonance with the general public, opinion polls showed the provision for advance notice of plant closings to be quite popular, securing nearly 80 percent approval ratings. Union lobbyists also launched a major grassroots campaign in support of the bill, and they viewed its eventual passage as proof that unions could mobilize at the district level in order to influence the course of congressional action. But despite the bill's evident popularity and potential as a 1988 election issue, it is certainly questionable whether labor could have encouraged timid members to vote on the measure at all without the strong support of the House and Senate party leaderships.

[53] Quoted in Jonathan Rauch, "Plant Closing Law's Political Dynamics," *National Journal*, 15 August 1987.

[54] Peter A. Susser, "Election-Year Politics and the Enactment of Federal 'Plant-Closing' Legislation," *Employee Relations Law Journal* 14 (Winter 1988): 356.

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Union lobbyists also worked closely with the House and Senate leaderships on several other important issues during the 100th Congress. Early in 1987, when the House leadership sought to override President Reagan's veto of a highway construction reauthorization bill, union lobbyists were mobilized to help secure the necessary two-thirds majority. Speaker Wright hoped to secure an early veto override in order to establish the strength of the Democratic Congress vis-à-vis President Reagan. Wright met with the AFL-CIO's Robert McGlotten; Owen Bieber, president of the United Auto Workers; and Thomas Donahue, secretary-treasurer of the AFL-CIO. In return for his promise of support for their views on trade issues, Wright obtained the unionists' support for the highway bill override effort.[55] Based on his day-to-day access to Wright, Barry describes the Speaker's dialogue with the union leaders:

> Wright told them he did support their position [on trade], then added, "Now let me ask you something. This highway veto, it's a high-stakes roll of the dice. And auto people ought to be interested. The Building Trades. It's very important. The Republicans figure this will create a Reagan resurgence."
>
> The highway bill was not an AFL-CIO priority—at least it had not been—but McGlotten replied, "I'll get right on it."[56]

A better example of the symbiotic nature of the labor/leadership exchange, wherein each side traded support for their key issues, would be hard to find.

In return for such assistance, Wright not only promoted the plant-closing bill, but also supported labor's views on the 1988 Trade Act, including support for the so-called Gephardt amendment. The amendment was Missouri Representative Richard Gephardt's effort to impose tougher penalties for unfair trade practices by requiring countries with consistent trade surpluses with the United States to reduce those surpluses by 10 percent a year. The amendment was a key issue for the AFL-CIO and especially for the manufacturing unions suffering membership losses as their industries contracted in the face of foreign competition. Although the Gephardt amendment narrowly passed the House with the support of organized labor, the leadership apparatus, and some sectors of the business community, it did not win approval in the Senate. Despite this, union leaders were pleased to see the final trade bill contain a number of provisions that the AFL-CIO had specifically endorsed, including: a provision defining the abuse of workers' rights abroad as an unfair trade practice; the allocation of funds for a dislocated worker retraining program; and an extension of the existing trade adjustment program. Lane Kirkland said that the bill had "at long last targeted habitual unfair trade practices by our foreign competitors and set sanctions against them."[57]

Other bills where labor and the leadership worked together to achieve successful enactment during the 100th Congress included restrictions on the use of

[55] Barry, *The Ambition and the Power*, 190.
[56] Ibid., 190.
[57] Lane Kirkland, *Report on Congress, 1988* (Washington, DC: AFL-CIO, 1988).

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polygraphs by employers, overturning the Supreme Court's Grove City decision undermining civil rights laws, fair housing legislation, catastrophic health insurance, welfare reform, and reparations to Japanese Americans interred during World War II. Unions were also major forces in the battle against the confirmation of Judge Robert Bork as a Supreme Court justice, providing considerable financial resources and technical assistance to groups leading the anti-Bork campaign.[58] Evaluating this diverse record through an analysis of the AFL-CIO's designated "key congressional votes," Masters, Atkin, and Delaney have identified rising percentages of union success in the late 1980s, in keeping with the argument advanced here.[59] In 1988, the AFL-CIO won on 92.8 percent of its key votes in the House, compared to a low 46.7 percent victory rate in 1981. In the Senate, the AFL-CIO's rate of success rose from 21 percent in 1981 to 57.1 percent in 1988. Although an analysis based on AFL-CIO key votes is of limited value because the issues chosen from year-to-year reflect the vagaries of the congressional agenda more than organized labor's priorities, it is still suggestive of the more congenial environment that labor faced in the late 1980s.

The breadth of the labor agenda was reflected in the active support by the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees and the Service Employees International Union of an array of proposals sometimes grouped under the label "family issues." The two main pieces of legislation in this category were a bill providing increased federal support for child care, and the Family and Medical Leave Act, which would require that employers allows employees to take time off to care for family medical problems. Union lobbyists viewed these issues as well suited for use against the Republicans in forthcoming elections and as effective tools in improving the image of labor unions. "These bills will help bring us back into the mainstream," a top AFL-CIO official said.[60] Both bills were ultimately passed by Congress, but vetoed by President George Bush in 1990. The Family and Medical Leave Act was later enacted early in the Clinton administration.

Proposals such as the Family and Medical Leave Act, plant closing legislation, and mandated employer health benefits were all indicative of a trend toward increased union support for legislation requiring that employers provide certain kinds of benefits for their employees. This development suggests that unions are seeking to achieve through legislation benefits that might otherwise have been pursued through collective bargaining. Legislative initiatives of this type have the attraction of providing more in the way of welfare state benefits without

[58] Ethan A. Bronner, *Battle for Justice: How the Bork Nomination Shook America* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1989), 145–147, and 158.

[59] See Masters, Atkin, and Delaney, "Unions, Political Action, and Public Policies: A Review of the Past Decade," 478. The following figures were originally drawn from this source, but were reconfirmed by my own calculations based on AFL-CIO annual Reports on Congress (available from the AFL-CIO Department of Legislation).

[60] Quoted in Frank Swoboda, "Expecting Change of Fortune, Labor Recasts Agenda," *Washington Post*, 10 November 1987.

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requiring increased federal spending—a notable virtue in the context of huge federal budget deficits. At the same time, however, this approach poses the obvious danger that new mandated benefits and universal labor standards will only further reduce the demand among employees for union representation.

All this evidence shows that claims that the AFL-CIO has become unusually narrow and particularistic in its issue agenda are overstated.[61] One reason a wide agenda was maintained was the growth in the number of women and minorities among union members, which has increased pressures on union leaders to maintain traditional commitments on liberal issues. Also, labor's commitment to the Democratic party means that its agenda is set in a symbiotic interchange with the party leadership. This inevitably contributes to a broadening of labor's agenda, even as it commits the party leadership to many of labor's more specialized issues. Furthermore, the costs of lobbying on a wide range of issues are not high. Unions do, after all, already have a large lobbying apparatus in place, and it does not use up vast resources to add a few more issues to labor's already lengthy agenda. Although it is true that the breadth of labor's agenda means that some of labor's political capital is used up on issues that are not central to unions as institutions (such as family and medical leave), labor's visibility at the same time helps create political debts among members of Congress and other interest groups, which can in the long run contribute to the enhancement of the labor movement's goals.

One consequence of labor's maintenance of a broad agenda could be found in the revitalization of close ties with other liberal interest groups and social movements. The AFL-CIO and many national unions experienced protracted conflict with the liberal wing of the party starting in the late 1960s, over issues of war, race, gender, ideology, and political reform. By the mid-1980s most of these conflicts had been overcome, as unions cooperated regularly with women's groups (see labor support for child care and comparable worth legislation), environmentalists (see the alliance built against the free trade agreement with Mexico), African-American groups (see labor support for the Civil Rights Act in the 101st and 102nd Congresses), and even homosexuals (see union lobbying against amendments to the Americans with Disability Act that would have allowed employers to discriminate against food servers with AIDS). The animus and hostility that were so evident in the late 1960s and most of the 1970s diminished with changes in the leadership of the AFL-CIO and the rise of a new generation of national union leaders, especially in the growing public employee unions. In short, by the end of the decade, the liberal/labor coalition was probably as healthy as it had ever been in its rather checkered history.

These alliances in turn helped the labor movement as it sought to move forward once again on legislation intended to enhance the organizational status of unions in industrial relations. The AFL-CIO sought to achieve passage of

[61] For such claims, see David Brody, *Workers in Industrial America: Essays on the Twentieth Century Struggles* (New York: Oxford, 1980), 240; Edsall, *New Politics of Inequality*, 171; and Kim Moody, *An Injury to All: The Decline of American Unionism* (London: Verso, 1988), 161.

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legislation outlawing the permanent replacement of economic strikers. The latter was a tactic increasingly used during the 1980s by employers seeking to undermine the capacity of unions to strike effectively. With the strong support of Speaker Foley (now in power after Wright's 1989 resignation) and a major grassroots campaign led by the AFL-CIO, this legislation reached the floor of the House during the 102nd Congress, and was passed by a comfortable margin, 247-182, on 17 July 1991. However, as one might predict, given the fate of labor law reform efforts in the 1960s and 1970s, the bill fell victim to a filibuster in the Senate, losing by a vote of 57 to 42—three votes short of the supermajority needed to end debate.[62] The five Democrats who joined the Republicans in voting against cloture were all from the South: Terry Sanford (NC), Ernest Hollings (SC), Dale Bumpers and David Pryor (NC), and David Boren (OK). Conversely, the five Republicans who voted for cloture were all from the North: Robert Packwood and Mark Hatfield (Oregon), Ted Stevens (AK), Arlen Spector (PA), and Alfonse D'Amato (NY). Failure to bring about cloture indicated that despite the trends toward liberalization among Southern Democrats, the regional disparities in the strength of the labor movement still remained a potent obstacle for the realization of labor's legislative goals. This same problem would reappear during the Clinton administration, when a similar proposal would also fail because of a filibuster in the Senate.

Conclusion

Although the main purpose of this article has been to show how unions took advantage of political and institutional changes in Congress to develop improved ties with the Democrats in the late 1980s, it is also interesting to briefly compare the pattern of labor involvement at this time with that of the 1960s. There are three principal points that can be made. First, in many ways unions faced fewer obstacles in the House of the 1980s than they did in the 1960s, largely because committee chairs had become much more liberal. In the 1960s, an entrenched committee leadership disproportionately dominated by conservative Southern Democrats presented a potent obstacle to union demands. This blockage is now gone.[63] Second, the House leadership was stronger and could work more closely with labor because of the reforms of the 1970s and the greater homogenization of the Democratic membership. It is indisputable that this more centralized leadership redounded to labor's benefit. Third, despite all the discussions about the many changes in American politics over the last fifty years, the biggest problem for labor remained a distribution of power and set of rules (most notably, the filibuster) in the Senate, which favored the conservative coalition. This pattern

[62] For a discussion of the earlier battles over labor law reform, see Gilbert Gall, *The Politics of Right-to-Work* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988).

[63] For further evidence, see Kenneth Shepsle, "The Changing Textbook Congress" in John Chubb and Paul Peterson, eds., *Can the Government Govern?* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1989).

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of defeat on specifically pro-labor legislation almost exactly recapitulated that found in every effort to liberalize labor law since the 1940s.[64]

In summary, although unions remained largely on the defensive in the 1980s, they did forge a sufficiently good relationship with the Democratic congressional leadership to succeed in helping to set the congressional agenda in the latter half of the decade. Unions were, however, much more successful in helping to pass legislation of benefit to a widespread constituency of employees than in passing legislation that would enhance union organizing or otherwise redistribute power specifically to unions.[65] The latter kind of legislation was inevitably blocked in the Senate. The pattern was only reconfirmed during the Clinton administration, when such initiatives as family and medical leave and "motor voter" registration sailed to success with labor support, while the labor law reform proposal outlawing the permanent replacement of strikers was again killed in the Senate. In this double sense, institutional rules and procedures mattered. Labor benefited from the new possibilities for strong leadership and greater party discipline in the House, but was stymied by the persistence of the filibuster in the Senate.

With the massive defeat of the Democratic party in the 1994 congressional elections, union attitudes about institutional rules and procedures in Congress may undergo some interesting changes. Since the time of the New Deal, Democrats have usually held majorities in Congress, and it was either Democratic party indiscipline or minoritarian procedures which usually undermined the labor agenda. Now, the tables have been turned. If conservative Republicans appear to be settling in for a long reign of power in the House and Senate, union leaders may find the filibuster and other obstructive instruments that they once despised to have a whole new set of hidden virtues. Unionists who were once overjoyed with Speaker Wright's assertive concentration of power are now found denouncing the "dictatorial" and "undemocratic" maneuvers of Speaker Newt Gingrich in support of his party's program. And in the Senate, it would be ironic indeed if the filibuster were to become a useful defensive resource for the labor movement and its Democratic allies.

But in other respects, it is probable that the basic elements of the relationship between organized labor and the congressional Democrats will persist. The AFL-CIO has recommitted itself to defeating the Republican majority and reinstalling the Democratic party in Congress. The recent transfer of leadership within the AFL-CIO itself was in part a response to a widespread perception that President Lane Kirkland had failed to effectively lead the charge against the Republican juggernaut in the period leading up to the 1994 elections. Kirkland was forced to resign in August 1994, and his hand-chosen successor, former AFL-CIO Secretary-Treasurer Thomas Donahue, was defeated the following

[64] See Gall, *The Politics of Right-to-Work*; and Zieger, *American Workers, American Unions*, 108–136.

[65] Greenstone, of course, made the same point for the 1960s. See Greenstone, *Labor in American Politics*, chap. 10; and also Richard B. Freeman and James L. Medoff, *What Do Unions Do?* (New York: Basic Books, 1984), chap. 12.

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October by a liberal coalition headed up by Service Employees International Union President John J. Sweeney and Mineworkers President Richard Trumka. Although Sweeney and his allies have promised to bring a new air of militancy into the AFL-CIO, it seems inevitable that their main political goal will be a traditional one: that of supporting the Democrats in their quest to control Congress. For their part, the Democrats may yet grow more dependent on organized labor, as the business support (read dollars) once guaranteed by incumbency status now flows towards the new majority party. Thus, as the congressional Democrats and labor now both share the experience of minority status and a common enemy, their alliance will not only continue, but seems likely to deepen.*

* The author would like to thank the Brookings Institution and the Everett Dirksen Congressional Research Center for financial support for this study.

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The Unexpected Origins of Peace: Three Case Studies

JOHN ORME

One of the greatest ironies of the contemporary era is that Ronald Reagan, that most strident of cold warriors, succeeded where all his predecessors had failed in transforming United States relations with the Soviet Unon. The question of how and why history played this joke on the peace movement is surely too complex and controversial to be settled here, but I would like to suggest that Reagan's unexpected success may not have been entirely accidental. The historical record provides considerable evidence that the threat or use of force, far from being a hindrance to peacemaking, may in some circumstances provide an essential starting point for the resolution of conflict. To understand why, let us begin by asking not why conflicts end, but why they often continue.

Discussions of the dilemmas facing leaders typically have focused on the broad choice between a hard-line strategy emphasizing deterrence of potential enemies and a soft-line approach relying on concessions or gestures of conciliation to assuage or reassure the adversary.[1] What such discussions have overlooked is that leaders usually have a third alternative: neither to coerce nor to concede to the opponent, but simply to do nothing for the moment, hoping, like Charles Dickens's character Wilkins Micawber that "something will turn up." The psychological and cognitive underpinnings of Micawberism are hope and optimism, particularly the belief that trends or events foreseen or unforeseen may alter the bargaining situation to one's advantage, making possible the achievement of

[1] See Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), chap. 9; Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), chap. 3; Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Conflict among Nations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), chap. 3.

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maximum objectives with few concessions and the expectation that the burdens and dangers one is likely to encounter in awaiting these developments will not be intolerable.[2]

Though intellectually uninteresting, Micawberism is a very attractive option for leaders ensnared in protracted conflicts and probably a rather common response in these situations. This is not necessarily good news for would-be peacemakers, however. A leader pursuing this tactic, even if less threatening than a more aggressive adversary, can still be an exasperating opponent in negotiations. As long as such leaders can sustain the hope that the future will be better than the present, they will almost certainly be unwilling to settle on a basis acceptable to their opponent. Their optimism leads to delay—perhaps indefinitely—and so becomes the principle obstacle to an improvement in relations. Hence, the crucial step down the road to peace will be convincing the reluctant party or parties to abandon this outlook and to seek an accommodation promptly.

What would convince a reluctant statesmen to do so? In order to find out, I propose to review here how the process of rapprochement unfolded in three instances, two from the contemporary history and a third from the past century. Limitations of space will preclude a thorough discussion of the events; rather, I will concentrate on the key that unlocked the door to a settlement: how and why one or both powers were persuaded to drop maximalist negotiating positions and contemplate a compromise. Let us begin with an important and revealing example from the diplomatic history of Europe and then turn to more recent cases.

Austro-German Rapprochment

Although the origins of the Austro-Prussian rivalry can be traced as far back as Frederick the Great's seizure of Silesia in 1740, the more immediate causes of the war of 1866 were the Frankfurt parliament's reopening of the German question in 1848 and the issues that arose when the German inhabitants of Schleswig and Holstein rejected Danish rule in 1863. In 1850, Prince Felix zu Schwarzenberg threatened Prussia with war to prevent the creation of a "Small Germany" under Prussian leadership.[3] Over the next fifteen years, Prussia sought recognition of equal status with Austria and was consistently rebuffed. Shortly after becoming minister president of Prussia in 1862, Otto von Bismarck warned the Austrian ambassador quite directly that continued pursuit of Schwarzenberg's policy of predominance in Germany would lead to war. If, on the other hand, Austria would "shift her center of gravity to [Budapest]," granting Prussia hegemony in

[2] My emphasis here is inspired in part by Geoffrey Blainey, *The Causes of War* (New York: Free Press, 1973).

[3] Nicholas Der Bagdasarian, *The Austro-German Rapprochement, 1870-1879* (Rutherford, NJ: Farleigh Dickinson University Press, 1976), 28–30, 32–3; William Carr, *A History of Germany 1815–1945* (London: Edward Arnold, 1979), 64–8, 91–105.

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north Germany and leaving south Germany as a neutral buffer, Prussia would be prepared to offer "unconditional support" to Habsburg interests in Italy and the east.[4] Austria's Count Johann von Rechberg, an advocate of cooperation with Berlin, agreed to ally with Prussia in 1864 to wrest the Elbe duchies from Denmark, apparently in the hope that this would lay the groundwork for expanded cooperation along the lines Bismarck had suggested. But Emperor Franz Joseph rejected such an agreement after the defeat of Denmark, and the two powers then drifted into war over the disposition of the duchies. A key factor in the Habsburg emperor's inflexibility was his belief that Austria would almost certainly defeat Prussia if matters had to be resolved on the battlefield, even if Prussia were allied with Italy. Contrary to his expectations and those of most other observers, the Prussians inflicted a devastating defeat on Austria's forces at Sadowa (Koeniggraetz) on 3 July 1866, allowing them to advance to within nineteen kilometers of Vienna.[5]

Bismarck appears to have aimed at rapprochement with Austria from the outset.[6] The first barrier he had to surmount in pursuit of this lay not in Vienna but Berlin. After Sadowa, the king and his generals were eager to march on to Vienna, perhaps to destroy the empire once and for all and certainly to absorb Saxony. Later, Bismarck was to say that he was driven to the brink of suicide in the midst of the trial. In the end the crown prince persuaded King William to hold back, and the Peace of Prague was signed on 23 August 1866. The old German confederation was disbanded and replaced north of the Main by a new North German Confederation under Prussian hegemony. Prussia received some additional lands, but Austria was deprived of no territory in Germany apart from its portion of Schleswig-Holstein, and its south German allies survived as independent states, though they were bound to Prussia by defense treaties.

Bismarck's motive, he explained later, was to avoid "the weakening of an empire in which I saw our best and safest ally of the future."[7] The possibility of rapprochement was first broached in December 1866 and again in 1867 when a meeting was arranged between the two monarchs. Bismarck's primary motive at this stage was to forestall the development of a coalition against Prussia in the

[4] J. A. Underwood, *Bismarck: The White Revolutionary*, vol. 1, trans. Lothar Gall (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986), 214–18; A. J. P. Taylor, *Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman* (New York: Vintage, 1967), 56–57, 61–2, 88.

[5] James Sheehan, *German History: 1770–1866* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1989), 890–2, 901–2, 908; William Carr, *The Origins of the Wars of German Unification* (London: Longman, 1991), 137; Taylor, *Bismarck*, 72–7.

[6] My sources for the following account are Der Bagdasarian, *Austro-German Rapprochement*; F. R. Bridge, *From Sadowa to Sarajevo: The Foreign Policy of Austria-Hungary, 1866-1914* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972); Edward Crankshaw, *Bismarck* (Middlesex: Penguin, 1984); William Langer, *European Alliances and Alignments, 1871-1890* (New York: Knopf, 1956); C. A. Macartney, *The Habsburg Empire, 1790-1918* (New York: Macmillan, 1968); Gordon Craig, *Germany 1866-1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 3–7, 34, 215–20; Arthur May, *The Habsburg Monarchy, 1867-1914* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1951).

[7] Der Bagdasarian, *Austro-German Rapprochement*, 39.

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event of a war with France. Austria rebuffed these approaches on both occasions. Rapprochement, in F. R. Bridge's words, was "psychologically impossible" for the Austrian leadership at this point.[8] "From the highest commander down to the youngest lieutenant," states another scholar, "the army was filled with one idea: Revenge for Sadowa." Though more prudent, the emperor himself had by no means given up the hope that Austria could in time recover or even improve upon her pre-1866 position in Germany. Given the opportunity, he and his foreign minister would have been only too happy to recoup at the expense of Prussia.[9]

Austrian policy was placed in the hands of Friedrich Ferdinand Baron Beust, the former foreign minister of Saxony who had been dismissed by his king at Bismarck's insistence as a condition of peace. Beust's appointment in mid-August 1866 was widely assumed to mean that Austria would be committed to a policy of revenge against Prussia. Whatever Beust's ultimate motives, both domestic and international constraints prevented him from doing so openly and vigorously. Emperor Franz Joseph had been traumatized by the defeats of 1859 and 1866 and remained reluctant long after to contemplate the use of force. The Hungarians, who were granted dominance over the monarchy's territories southeast of the Leitha River in the constitutional reform of 1867, opposed a war with Prussia that, if successful, could endanger their hard-won privileges. International circumstances were equally unfavorable. With the recurrence of disorder inside the Ottoman empire in 1866 and the alarming growth of Panslavism's appeal inside Austria-Hungary, Russia was emerging as a serious long-range threat to the empire. The relationship with France, the obvious choice as an ally for Austria-Hungary, was also fraught with difficulty. If Vienna were perceived by nationalist opinion to be furthering French aims against Germany, the Habsburg's still considerable influence in south Germany would rapidly diminish. Consequently, Beust trod cautiously when French diplomats raised the possibility of an offensive alliance in 1867. Discussions proceeded further in 1868-1869, but Austria-Hungary continued to eschew a firm commitment. In a diplomatic note to Paris on the eve of the Franco-Prussian War, Beust informed the French government that Austria-Hungary would not enter the war until it was clearly in its interest to do so.

Despite his failure to secure firm support from Vienna, Louis Napolean of France committed his forces to battle against Prussia the following month. The south German states were soon caught up in a wave of nationalist enthusiasm, the very thing Beust had feared most. At a ministerial conference in Vienna on 18 July 1870 there was considerable support for immediate intervention on the side of France, but also determined opposition from the prime minister of Hungary. The emperor decided to begin minor military preparations but to stay out of the fighting for the time being. Notwithstanding this, Austrian officials remained for the most part strongly pro-French. They appear to have been hoping

[8] Bridge, *Sadowa to Sarajevo*, 33.

[9] Quotation in May, *Habsburg Monarchy*, 98.

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that France would fight well enough to allow Austria to join the war in a few months, when the winter would inhibit Russian operations against Austria and their own military preparations would be further advanced. "We consider the cause of France as our own," Beust wrote to his ambassador in Paris early in the war, "and shall contribute to her success as far as it possible."[10] Any opportunity to do so was eliminated on 2 September, however, when the German forces inflicted a crushing defeat on France at Sedan. This event marked a turning point not only in the war itself but in the course of modern history. In the short run, the battle had a "sobering" effect on Austria's military and led Beust to abandon any idea of intervention in the war. "The long range effect of Sedan," in the judgment of Nicholas Der Bagdasarian, "[was to] force Austria to seek accommodation with Prussia, for the simple reason that the revemped European balance of power no longer made it safe to remain an enemy of the country."[11]

Later in September, Bismarck observed to Prince Luitpold of Bavaria, assuming that his remarks would be repeated only to Franz Joseph, that Austria could best defend itself against revolutionary and republican agitation by making common cause with Germany and Russia, whose relations with Prussia had been damaged by the "ruinous policy of Count Beust." (Luitpold's account of the conversation fell into Beust's hands first, which, in view of the unflattering reference contained therein, did not make Bismarck's task any easier.) Beust ignored French pleas for military assistance but exerted such influence as he still possessed for the next two months to discourage Bavaria and Wuerttemberg from joining an enlarged Germany. In October, Bismarck reiterated his interest in an improvement in relations but warned Austria that if Beust forced him to conclude "a less advantageous peace" with France, he would attack Austria-Hungary with full force.

The south German states signed treaties of accession to the North German Confederation during the following month. When informed of this unofficially on 27 November, Beust promised the Prussian ambassador that he would not attempt to use Austria's rights under the Treaty of Prague "to oppose the logic of mighty events through which the leadership of Germany has fallen to the Prussian crown." To do otherwise, he feared, would be to invite a Prussian attack and the loss of the empire's German territories. On 8 December, Beust vigorously rebutted a proposal by some Czech officials that Austria avoid reconciliation with Germany and pursue close relations with France and Russia. Bismarck gave official notification to Austria-Hungary on 14 December of the pending reorganization of Germany in a note conciliatory in tone which, in the view of one Austrian observer, was "the first step on the road leading to the Austro-German alliance of 1879." The next day, Bismarck wrote again to assure Beust that he had no intention of trying to absorb Austria's German territories. Appeals for rapprochement were placed simultaneously in Prussian newspapers with close

[10] Quoted in Der Bagdasarian, *Austro-German Rapprochement*, 44.
[11] Quotation from ibid., 41–3, 67–8.

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government connections. Though Beust remained very skeptical of Bismarck's intentions, he advised the emperor to reply in kind, which he did on 26 December, so that "time will be granted us to complete our measures of defense for possible eventualities."[12]

In May of 1871 Beust presented a memorandum to the emperor proposing that Austria-Hungary bow to the inevitable and seek reconciliation with Prussia. There were no strong domestic political obstacles, since the two leading ethnic groups, the Germans and the Magyars, both supported this and the new course was adopted immediately. The most visible demonstration was Beust's speech in mid-summer in which he pronounced the Austro-Prussian rivalry for leadership in Germany at an end and suggested there was no reason why their previous cooperation could not be resumed. Privately, Beust promised Berlin that if France were to contemplate a war of revenge against Germany, he would issue Paris a stern warning. The détente was sealed in a meeting between the two emperors on 11 August at Ischl, Austria, accompanied by their foreign ministers. In November, Franz Joseph, mindful of Bismarck's suspicions regarding his foreign minister, dismissed Beust and installed in office Hungarian Count Gyula Andrassy. Under the Magyar's capable leadership, the improvement in relations deepened from détente to alliance by the end of the decade.

Although Andrassy's appointment solidified the rapprochement, the record shows indisputably that it was Beust who took the most important steps away from confrontation. What convinced this long-standing adversary of Prussia to alter his policy? Beust stated his reasoning clearly in the memorandum of 18 May 1871, laying particular emphasis on the lessons of the French defeat:

> Austria-Hungary was detrimentally affected by the catastrophe in a two-fold manner. First, by the loss of its hopes and expectations which it had been justified in cherishing, . . . but also in a much more dangerous way by the colossal swelling of Prussia to a leading nation-state which unfortunately can always expect to find and exploit various connecting links within our own borders. . . . It is not difficult to see that Prussia-Germany can interfere in Austria's destiny not only directly by use of its immense military power, but—and certainly not less dangerously—also indirectly, if it takes the occasion to interfere by the use of propaganda in our domestically confused conditions—which everywhere become so unpleasant as a result of nationality conflicts—as it did for so long in south Germany with such undeniable success.
>
> [Should Austria persist in hostile policy toward Germany:], Berlin would not fail to blow the inflammable material in Cisleithania into a bright flame, and I told myself that the only way of avoiding such a danger would be to erase in Prussia any interest in acting hostilely toward us in the indirect way, which could be attained only by the rapprochement recommended by me.[13]

[12] Ibid., 44–9, 69–74, with quotations on 69–70, 72 and 74, respectively; Bridge, *Sadowa to Sarajevo*, 54; May, *Habsburg Monarchy*, 111.

[13] Quoted in Der Bagdasarian, *Austro-German Rapprochement*, 85–6.

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The decision to improve relations with Berlin was clearly not the result of any great affection for Prussia, particularly on the part of Beust, as is evident from his characterization of the outcome of the Franco-Prussian War. Beust was concerned not just with the military power at Bismarck's disposal but also his ability to manipulate the force of nationalism, as he had done so successfully in unifying Germany against the French. Futile opposition to Germany thus ran the risk that the Austro-Germans could be driven into revolt at the urging of Berlin, an eventuality even more dangerous than another war. Bismarck's frequent appeals did little to mollify Beust's deep-rooted animosity. Rather, it was the threat of October 1870—made credible by the victories of the Prussian army and the force of German nationalism—that prompted the abandonment of a policy of revenge in Vienna and the movement toward rapprochement between the two German rivals.

Ostpolitik

The first chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Konrad Adenauer, concluded that it was vital for a variety of reasons to link his state to the West, even if this meant foregoing apparent opportunities to reunify Germany in the near term. As a result of Adenauer's policies the FRG recovered full sovereignty, rearmed, and became a member in good standing of NATO in 1955. In the meantime, however, Soviet offers to permit the unification of East and West Germany were rebuffed on three occasions in 1947, 1952, and 1955. Though some suspect that Adenauer was quite willing privately to sacrifice reunification in order to obtain integration with the West, the chancellor's policy was defended publicly on the grounds that the bargaining position of the FRG and its allies would improve over time, eventually making possible successful negotiation from strength, leading to reunification on the West's terms through free elections, with the united Germany linked to the West. Accordingly, Adenauer discouraged any efforts at negotiation of the German question until the Federal Republic's rearmament and accession to NATO were accomplished. He also adopted the Hallstein Doctrine, according to which the FRG refused to deal officially with the East German regime (GDR) and denied recognition to any government (other than the Soviet Union) that recognized the GDR. He withheld recognition of the Oder-Neisse border between Poland and Germany, not with the serious expectation of recovering the eastern territories but rather as a quid pro quo that could be exchanged for unification at the right moment.[14] In the treaties that incorporated

[14] My sources for this section include Wolfram Hanrieder, *Germany, America, Europe* (New Haven: Yale University press, 1989), 8–9, 147–48, 150–51, 158, 163–64; Karl Kaiser, *German Foreign Policy in Transition* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968); William Griffith, *The Ostpolitik of the Federal Republic of Germany* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1978); Lawrence Whetten, *Germany's Ostpolitik* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971); Lawrence Whetten, *Germany East and West* (New York: New York University Press, 1980); Laszlo Goergey, *Bonn's Eastern Policy, 1964-1971* (Hamden, CT: Archon, 1972); A. James McAdams, *East Germany and Detente* (Cambridge; England: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

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West Germany into NATO in 1954-1955, Bonn's allies pledged their support of German reunification and endorsed Adenauer's position that unification through free elections was a prerequisite for détente.

According to the research of Hans-Peter Schwarz, Adenauer believed in the early phase of the cold war that his policy of strength could actually reverse the division of Germany. He expected the post-war Soviet empire would collapse soon after Western rearmament was completed and the community of free nations had demonstrated its cohesion. This hope was not entirely groundless, as the rebellion in East Berlin in 1953 indicates. But by 1955 Adenauer had ceased to believe that a Soviet crash was imminent. Nonetheless, he remained committed to his basic course for a variety of reasons. The poverty of the Soviet Union and the inefficiency of its economic system, he reasoned, would make it difficult for the Communists to sustain an arms race with the West without precipitating economic crises at home; and once China became more active diplomatically, the possibility of trouble on their eastern border might force the Soviets to make concessions in the West. Above all else:

> During his long life Adenauer had seen many ups and downs in the international system, and he regarded it a basic fact of life that tensions between groups of states or between great powers would ease after a while. Sooner or later new enemies would enter the area, or other developments would render former disputes obsolete. . . . Being familiar with the ups and downs of German history, he did not see why it was necessary to surrender to the unpleasant realities so soon, after only a couple of decades of German division.[15]

From the perspective of 1989, these calculations not only appear reasonable, but even far-sighted.

After Moscow's failure to prevent the incorporation of West Germany into NATO, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev and his colleagues may have concluded that their interests would be best served by winning the West's acceptance of the territorial status quo and stabilizing the existing division of Germany, even if this meant accepting the Western orientation of the FRG. Pursuit of this defensive objective, of course, would not have precluded the achievement of offensive objectives such as alteration of the status of West Berlin. The Soviets faced two obstacles in consolidating the status quo, however: Adenauer's continued refusal to recognize the German Democratic Republic and the East German regime's chronic instability. In 1957 Poland's Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki proposed the creation of a nuclear free zone in central Europe. The underlying motives for the Russians were to forestall the deployment of U.S. intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) in West Germany and to achieve tacit recognition for their German client state. Adenauer would have none of this, and his allies concurred. After the failure of the Rapacki plan, Khrushchev began putting pressure on the isolated city of West Berlin, but three years of coercion and negotiation

[15] Hans-Peter Schwarz, "Adenauer's Ostpolitik" in Wolfram Hanrieder, ed., *West German Foreign Policy 1949-1979* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1980), 129–30, 135–6.

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brought no positive results for the Soviets. West Berlin remained a gaping hole in the iron curtain through which East Germans were fleeing at a pace that could soon cripple the GDR's economy. Khrushchev acted to arrest this alarming deterioration in August 1961 by blocking freedom of movement between the Eastern and Western sectors of the city with the construction of the infamous Berlin Wall. Mindful of the great risks of escalation, President John F. Kennedy refused to contest this violation of U.S. occupation rights and allowed the Soviets to complete the barrier unhindered, much to the consternation of the Germans. Khrushchev's action staved off disaster in the GDR, at least for a few decades, but further Soviet pressure (including Khrushchev's gamble in Cuba) eventually triggered staunch resistance from the United States and left the Soviets no closer to recognition of East Germany.

The effects of the crisis were unquestionably of the greatest importance in the evolution of the Federal Republic and its foreign policy. William Griffith calls the events of August 1961 "*the* decisive watershed in postwar West German policy," while Lawrence Whetten asserts that "no other single event was as significant in forcing the reappraisal of Bonn's general Eastern policy."[16] The prospects of a successful "negotiation from strength" of German reunification may have been remote from the beginning. The balance of power did not, as Adenauer had asserted, shift to the West in the first two decades after the war; if anything, the East appeared to have grown stronger through the expansion of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. No doubt the verbal commitment by some of the Federal Republic's allies to reunification was something less than enthusiastic from the beginning, but by the 1960s, France and the United States were increasingly inclined to view the Germans' insistence that reunification must be a precondition for détente as an obstacle to the relaxation of tensions and were growing impatient with the rigidity of their position.

These facts may, in the fullness of time, have convinced the Germans that Adenauer's policy no longer served their interests. But the evolution of their thinking received a powerful stimulus in the dramatic events of August 1961. The importance of the wall, at one level, is that it stabilized the illegitimate East German regime and sealed the division of Germany. Equally importantly, it demonstrated clearly to the West Germans the reluctance of their allies to press to the brink in support of German interests when facing an adversary armed with nuclear weapons. This discredited Adenauer's assertion that the consolidation of NATO would eventually compel the Soviets to negotiate unification on the West's terms. Willy Brandt, FRG chancellor from 1969 to 1974 and the architect of *Ostpolitik,* revealed later the decisive impact of these events on his own thinking:

> I said later that in August 1961 a curtain was drawn aside to reveal an empty stage. To put it more bluntly, we lost certain illusions that had outlived the hopes underlying them—illusions that clung to something which no longer existed in fact. [GDR leader

[16] Quotations from Griffith, *Ostpolitik*, 102; Whetten, *Germany East and West*, 55. (Emphasis in original.)

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> Walter] Ulbricht had been allowed to take a swipe at the Western superpower, and the United States merely winced with annoyance. My political deliberations in the years that followed were substantially influenced by this day's experience, and it was against this background that my so-called *Ostpolitik*—the beginning of détente—took shape. . . . My new and inescapable realization was that traditional patterns of Western policy had proved ineffective, if not downright unrealistic.[17]

The immediate consequence of this shock was dissatisfaction with Adenauer's policy: at the time of his retirement, only 34 per cent of the German public wanted his overall foreign policy continued by his successor. But it still took several years and another major shock for the public's unease with the hardening of the division to evolve into support for a policy of recognizing the status quo in the hope of ameliorating its consequences. Even after Adenauer's departure the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) was deterred from a more daring response by the strength of conservative domestic opinion. As late as June 1967 only 19 percent favored recognition of the Oder-Neisse border; 51 percent opposed it.[18] With the opposition Social Democratic party (SPD), however, the adjustment came much faster. At their 1966 conference, the Social Democrats proposed that the emphasis be shifted from reunification, which appeared increasingly infeasible, to alleviation of the situation in the East and the relaxation of tensions between the blocs. To this end, they suggested revision of the Hallstein Doctrine, renunciation of nuclear weapons, and a compromise on the Oder-Neisse border. In defense of these changes, another future chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, elucidated the implications of the Berlin crisis:

> [Our allies] depend on a public opinion which at present is only mildly interested in Germany's reunification. They depend on a public opinion in which for a long time, to say the least, fear of the risks involved in changing the status quo in Europe has been greater than a desire to see Germany reunified. In other words, the policy of strength has definitely and unequivocally failed.[19]

After the construction of the wall, Adenauer's foreign minister, Gerhard Schroeder, introduced some mobility in German policy for the first time through the policy of small steps, which continued after the chancellor's resignation and replacement in October 1963 by Ludwig Erhard. The thrust of a new approach was to establish trade missions in Eastern Europe in order to expand German influence, to foster a more sympathetic attitude among those countries on the German question, and gradually to isolate East Germany. Though this implied a weakening of the Hallstein Doctrine, Schroeder was not willing at this point to repudiate it explicitly. By 1965, trade had increased rapidly but had brought little discernible improvement in the political atmosphere. On 25 March 1966,

[17] Willy Brandt, *People and Politics: The Years 1960-1975*, trans. Maxwell Brownjohn (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976), 20.

[18] These data are from Gorgey, *Bonn's Eastern Policy*, 30; Hanrieder, *Germany, America, Europe*, 178; Whetten, *Germany East and West*, 54, respectively.

[19] Quoted in Kaiser, *German Foreign Policy*, 17, 101.

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the West Germans circulated a peace note which proposed an agreement to reduce nuclear weapons in Europe and prohibit the transfer of nuclear warheads to non-nuclear powers, as well as a pact between the countries of the region banning the use of force in the settlement of international disputes. The effectiveness of the appeal was blunted by the Christian Democrats' reluctance to drop their insistence that the 1937 frontiers remained legally valid. But in view of the suspicious attitude of Moscow and the Polish government's petulant reaction to the dialogue between the Evangelical Church of Germany and the Catholic Church of Poland, it is doubtful that a more flexible position would have brought better results at this stage.

The Erhard cabinet fell in October 1966 and was succeeded in December by a coalition government including the Christian Democrats and, for the first time since 1949, the SPD. The Great Coalition's first statement of its program on 13 December repeated the offer in the peace note to sign a mutual renunciation of force, this time including East Germany. It expressed for the first time a willingness to accept the existing border with Poland pending a final settlement. At the insistence of the CDU, however, the coalition remained firm on one key point: the sovereignty of the GDR was not to be acknowledged. In January, the FRG gave clear evidence of its new flexibility by establishing diplomatic relations with Romania, thereby departing overtly from the Hallstein Doctrine for the first time. These initiatives aroused considerable interest in Eastern Europe, even in Moscow, but gave rise to acute concern in East Berlin, where it was feared that the GDR could be gradually isolated as Bonn improved relations with its neighbors. After some initial hesitation, the Soviet Union swung behind the rigid GDR leader, Walter Ulbricht, and in Warsaw Pact (WTO) meetings in February and April 1967 imposed on its satellites acceptance of the Ulbricht Doctrine, according to which no member of the WTO would establish diplomatic relations until Bonn had met all of the Communists' preconditions, including recognition of East Germany. The Soviets did agree to enter into a diplomatic exchange with West Germany in early 1967, but their negotiating position remained unyielding. These discussions continued until July 1968, at which time the Soviets terminated them by publishing several of the documents submitted by Germany.

The Soviets' caution and solicitude for Ulbricht owed much to their fear that Bonn's flexible *Ostpolitik* would not confirm the status quo but erode it. This concern was not without foundation. Both parties in the Great Coalition hoped to utilize the FRG's economic power gradually to foster internal liberalization and external independence throughout the East bloc. The dangers this posed to the East bloc became evident when the orthodox Czechoslovak regime was replaced in January 1968 by the liberalizing government led by Alexander Dubcek. The diplomatic impasse between West Germany and the Soviet bloc was broken, though in a most unlikely manner, when the Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia on 21 August 1968 to crush the Dubcek government. The immediate effect of the invasion was a considerable cooling of the diplomatic atmosphere, but in the longer term it consolidated and clarified the existing balance of forces in East

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Central Europe, rendering both the West Germans and the Soviets more receptive to the idea of détente.

With this brutal reassertion of Soviet hegemony, the hopes the Germans had harbored of preparing the way for unification by fostering liberalization and increased independence in the East bloc now seemed illusory. "If the Red Army had destroyed liberalization in Czechoslovakia," explains William Griffith, "how much more it would prevent German unification."[20] If change were to come, in other words, it would have to come through direct negotiation with Moscow, which meant acceptance of the Soviets' basic demand for recognition of the status quo in Eastern Europe. Furthermore, the suppression of freedom in Prague not only diminished the optimism of the Germans but also increased the Soviets' confidence that their hold on the satellites was secure, making it easier for supporters of détente in the Kremlin to proceed with Germany. For these reasons, one scholar goes so far as to say that "the greatest factor contributing to Moscow's interest in pursuing East-West détente was probably the Soviets' realization that they could now bargain from a position of strength with their adversaries.[21]

The SPD took power in September 1969 in a coalition with the Free Democratic party (FDP) after an election campaign in which they had appealed successfully to the public's desire for a change in policy, while the CDU had adhered to a more conservative stance. The new Prime Minister Willy Brandt laid out his approach in an important address to the Bundestag on 28 October 1969. He suggested the possibility of recognizing "two German states within one German nation," which seemed to imply a normalization and intensification of relations between the two Germanys leading to a form of de facto but not de jure recognition. The SPD-FDP government attempted in the following weeks to satisfy the Soviets' numerous preconditions for improved relations, among other things signing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty on 28 November. In December, NATO forged the linkage that was the basis of Western strategy over the next three years, accepting the Soviets' demand for a European security conference in principle but making it contingent upon the conclusion of an agreement on Berlin.[22] Brandt then proposed negotiations on a renunciation of force treaty with the USSR on 22 January 1970, and discussions began in Moscow between Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and the German ambassador, which led to the completion of the treaty on 12 August. West Germany agreed to drop the Hallstein Doctrine and opposition to the GDR's' entry into the UN, but insisted on a "special relationship" with East Germany short of de jure recognition. Europe's existing boundaries were declared to be "inviolable" but not, as the Soviets had wished, "unalterable." At the Germans' insistence, a statement was appended noting the right of the Germans to self-determination and reserving the establishment of permanent

[20] Griffith, *Ostpolitik*, 161.

[21] McAdams, *East Germany and Detente*, 96.

[22] Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), 412, Whetten, *Germany East and West*, 55.

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borders for a final peace treaty to be negotiated in the context of an intra-German or overall European settlement.[23]

Though deeply unsettling to Moscow's East German allies, the renunciation of force treaty was undoubtedly a better bargain for Moscow than Bonn. In the end, *Ostpolitik* produced an overall settlement that offered compensating advantages to the West. The Soviets were convinced through the linkage strategy pursued by Brandt and his allies to meet the West's demands for guarantees of access to West Berlin and travel rights into East Berlin in order to achieve ratification of Bonn's tacit recognition of the postwar borders. The details of these negotiations need not concern us here. Suffice it to say that the Western powers' bargaining leverage proved adequate to obtain this package for two reasons: the deterioration of relations between the Soviet Union and China, which reached an alarming state in March 1969 with the outbreak of violence on the Ussuri river border; and the increased flexibility in the position of the Federal Republic, which reached its culmination in the initiatives of the Social Democratic-led coalition in 1969. The catalysts of this evolution of German policy, as the record clearly shows, were two brutal but powerfully persuasive uses of force by Moscow—the construction of the Wall in Berlin and the destruction of liberty in Prague.

Egypt and Israel

On 28 September 1970, the charismatic President of Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser, suffered a fatal heart attack and was succeeded by a seemingly unprepossessing loyalist given little chance by the pundits of surviving in power. The country over which Anwar Sadat took command had suffered dual defeats at the hands of Israel, first losing the Sinai peninsula in the humiliating six-day rout of 1967 and more recently taking 10,000 casualties in Nasser's disastrous war of attrition in mid-1970.[24] Sadat presented the world with the first of many surprises on 4 February 1971, when he offered to commit to a cease fire of limited duration and to begin clearing the Suez canal if Israel would agree to pull her forces back several miles from the canal. Four days after Sadat's announcement, the UN's representative, Gunnar Jarring, sent notes to Jerusalem and Cairo inquiring not about a partial agreement, as Sadat had suggested, but rather seeking a simultaneous commitment from both for a solution along the lines of UN Resolution

[23] Griffith, *Ostpolitik*, 191–92.

[24] My main sources for this case were Bernard Reich, *Quest for Peace: United States-Israel Relations and the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1977); William Quandt, *Decade of Decisions: American Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1967-76* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 115–118; Howard Sachar, *A History of Israel* (New York: Knopf, 1979), 690–4; Nadav Safran, *Israel: The Embattled Ally* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1981); Shlomo Aronson, *Conflict and Bargaining in the Middle East* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978); Anwar Sadat, *In Search of Identity: An Autobiography* (New York: Harper & Row, 1977); Fred Khouri, *The Arab-Israeli Dilemma*, 3rd ed. (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1985).

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242, which would provide for the exchange of all of the Sinai in return for an end to the state of belligerency and recognition of Israel. Sadat was willing to work with Jarring, but Israel was not prepared to withdraw to the pre-1967 borders, and the UN's initiative soon collapsed.

Sadat then appealed to President Richard Nixon to begin a new round of negotiations building on his partial withdrawal proposal of 4 February, 1971. Nixon agreed, and a response was solicited from Israel. The answer, delivered on 19 April, called for a reduction of Egyptian forces on the West Bank, Israel's retention of the Bar-Lev defense line on the East Bank, a cease fire of indefinite length, and immediate passage for Israeli ships once the canal was open. Sadat's position, reiterated four days later, not only called for Egyptian military forces on the East Bank but cession by Israel of the strategic Mitla and Giddi passes in the Sinai and some linkage between the proposed partial disengagement and further negotiations aiming at complete withdrawal. Sadat remained interested in an interim agreement, but Washington was unwilling to bring pressure to bear on Israel to narrow the gap, and the talks dragged on fruitlessly until early August.

On 23 July, Sadat, impatient with the stalemate in negotiations, announced that 1971 would be the "year of decision" in which the conflict with Israel would be resolved, whether by peace or war. During his October visit to Moscow, however, Sadat was reproached for committing himself in this way without consultation and was denied the weapons necessary to give his threat effect. The year then passed without incident, in his view "making a laughing stock of the 'year of decision'" and certainly strengthening the belief in Jerusalem and Washington that firm U.S. support of Israel had kept the peace.[25]

Nearly a year later, on 18 July 1972, Sadat took a second gamble in requesting publicly the departure of 10,000 Soviet experts and advisers from Egypt, according to his own account, to make it possible to wage war, but no doubt also in the hope that this step would convince the United States to put greater pressure on Israel. President Richard Nixon was understandably reluctant to assume the political risks of promoting a settlement during an election year, but even after his landslide victory in November 1972, the administration refused to depart from its policy of strong support for Israel in order to improve the prospects for negotiations. In February of the next year, Sadat made one last effort to convince the Americans, sending General Hafez Fahmi to meet privately with Kissinger. The American secretary of State left Fahmi with the impression that an acceptable agreement would not be possible as long as Israel remained so confident in her strength. With the United States also associating closely with Israel's position, Sadat refused to enter the proposed "proximity talks." Golda Meir visited the U.S. capital shortly thereafter and secured a promise to provide her country with forty-eight additional planes. Upon her return, the Israeli prime minister stated that she saw "no basis" for a change in policy. In July, Meir announced that it was her intention to "hold on to every inch of occupied territory until the Arabs

[25] Sadat, *In Search of Identity*, 286–7.

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[are] ready to negotiate—on Israel's terms."[26] During the following month the Labor party leadership adopted the Galili plan for the occupied territories. It envisioned, among other things, substantial public expenditures to foster Jewish settlement and investment in the West Bank and Gaza. After this trend became apparent, Sadat began to line up diplomatic and military support in the Arab world for another attack on Israel.

The accession of Sadat had been preceded by the appointment of a woman as prime minister of Israel. Golda Meir was, in Howard Sachar's estimation, "incapable either by temperament or by age of modifying her views of the Arabs."[27] Circumstances gave her little incentive to do so in any case. Israel's leadership remained supremely confident in the capabilities of their armed forces after the victory of 1967. If anything, the gap between Israel and its enemies appeared to have grown since the last war. Moshe Dayan, Israel's minister of Defense, had concluded that the Arabs did not have a "reasonable military option" in 1972-1973 and were not likely to achieve one for several years. "The total balance of forces is in our favor," he told the graduates at the Military Staff and Command College in August 1973, "and this outweighs all other Arab considerations and motives and puts a brake on any renewal of hostilities." Israeli intelligence had concluded that Sadat and Assad understood that an effective offensive could not be sustained without an advantage in the air, something the Arabs could not achieve for some time. The foundation of the prime minister's confidence, however, is said to have been the Bar-Lev line, the imposing array of fortifications erected along the East Bank of the canal by Israel's chief of staff after the last war, which were thought to be impenetrable to Arab armies and understood as such in Cairo.[28]

Neither domestic nor international politics provided Meir any incentive to alter her course. Polls indicated that no less than 75 percent of the Israeli public approved of her performance in office.[29] The United States, after experimenting with a more even-handed policy early in the Nixon administration, had committed itself to strong and seemingly unconditional support for Israel. After mid-1971, the administration not only refused to put pressure on Israel but also supported the Meir government's contention that Israel had a right to "secure" (more than the pre-1967) borders. This policy continued even after Sadat's expulsion of the Soviets, because that development was taken as confirmation of the wisdom of the current approach. If the account of Israeli journalist Matti Golan is to be credited, this policy had its roots not just in the complacency of Israel but also that of the United States. Kissinger, he reports, in reminiscing a few weeks after the war with some Israeli officials, expressed considerable chagrin at their mutual misjudgment of Egypt:

[26] Quoted in Khouri, *Arab-Israeli Dilemma*, 372.
[27] Sachar, *History of Israel I*, 711.
[28] Quotation in Reich, *Quest for Peace*, 239–40.
[29] Sachar, *History of Israel I*, 743–4.

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> Do you remember what we all thought before the war?—that we never had it better, and therefore there was no hurry? We and you were both convinced that the Arabs had no military option which required serious diplomatic action. Instead of doing something we joked about the shoes the Egyptans left behind in 1967. . . . I remember now that Ismail [Egypt's foreign minister] told me several times that the present situation could not continue. . . . There wasn't even a slight smile on my face, but in my heart I laughed and laughed. A war? Egypt? I regarded it as empty talk, a boast empty of content. . . . Who is Sadat? We all thought he was a fool, a clown. A buffoon who goes on stage every other day to declare a war.[30]

Sadat drew conclusions from Ismail's conversations with Kissinger, but not the ones that the secretary of State had expected. Perceiving what he termed "total and complete agreement between the U.S. and Israel on Middle Eastern policy," Sadat came to believe that "the time has come for a shock. . . ."[31] Realistically, Sadat and his Syrian ally Hafez al-Assad could not expect to liberate the occupied territories by force, let alone all of Palestine. Given the state of the military balance, success on this scale could not be reasonably expected. Israel's nuclear bomb in the basement would have made an offensive beyond the 1967 borders very risky in any case. Sadat's objectives, as he explained to the Soviet ambassador, were more limited: to "break the deadlock" in negotiations, to "shatter Israel's 'theory of security' [that military deterrence and the territorial buffers would prevent war and ensure Israel's security]," and to "restore our self-confidence."[32] For these purposes, a limited offensive across the canal utilizing ground-to-air missiles to offset Israel's air superiority might be sufficient, provided that the Egyptian forces advanced cautiously and did not expose their flanks to counterattack by Israel's tanks. As always, the Egyptian president was expecially attentive to the symbolic, psychological implications of his actions. "I used to tell Nasser," he states in his memoirs, "that if we could recapture even four inches of Sinai territory . . . and establish ourselves there so firmly that no power on earth could dislodge us, then the whole situation would change—east, west, all over."[33] History has fully vindicated Sadat's intuition.

Favored by damaging failures of Israeli intelligence and strategy, Egyptian forces crossed the Suez canal and penetrated the lightly-manned Bar-Lev line before the tank force of Israel's Southern Command could reinforce it. Israel eventually staged a bold counterattack that surrounded the Egyptian Third Army, but when the battle was finally halted through diplomatic intervention by the superpowers, Egyptian forces still maintained a tenuous hold on the East Bank of the canal. Sadat had for the moment gained at the cost of much blood the critical foothold for which he had gone to war.

[30] Matti Golan, *The Secret Conversations of Henry Kissinger*, trans. Ruth Geyra Stern and Sol Stern (New York: Bantam, 1976), 144–5. Golan is not a source friendly to Kissinger, but the substance of his account is corroborated by Sadat. See, Sadat, *In Search of Identity*, 238, 288.

[31] Quoted in Reich, *Quest for Peace*, 201.

[32] Sadat, *In Search of Identity*, 244, 246, 254.

[33] Ibid., 244.

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The consequences of the war were manifold and somewhat contradictory, but on balance strongly conducive to the success of negotiation, as can be seen from the perspective of each of the three major actors. Arab pride was restored by the courage exhibited by some units and the Egyptians' impressive execution of the canal crossing. "The war has retrieved Arab honor," exclaimed Egypt's chief of staff. "Even if we are defeated now, no one can say that the Egyptian soldier is not a superior fighter."[34] But the outcome also forced the Arabs to come to grips with reality. Even under the most favorable circumstances, Israel, acting with American support, could not be dislodged from the occupied territories by military force alone. Though the PLO's moderate factions began adjusting their position, the Arabs as a whole evinced few signs of greater flexibility, a result one observer attributed to their euphoria over the immediate effectiveness of their oil embargo. The Algiers summit in late November 1973, for example, saw no easing of their demands for total withdrawal (including Jerusalem) and the establishment of a Palestinian state. Egypt's capture of the Bar-Lev line had greatly enhanced the prestige of Sadat, however, making it possible for him to act independently of the Arab consensus and freeing him to explore compromise with the enemy. Yet his status as Arab hero was rendered precarious by the plight of the Third Army, which left him highly vulnerable to Israeli pressure.

The effects on Israel were even more complex. Israel again emerged victorious and retained possession of most of the occupied territory. Unlike 1967, however, the Israelis found little cause for rejoicing, for this result had been achieved at an alarming cost: $7 billion (the equivalent of one year's GNP) expended; 804 tanks and 114 planes destroyed; 3,000 wounded and 2,552 dead. "The victory," observes Sachar, "had left the Israelis with ashes in their mouths. The cost in blood and treasure had been too high."[35] Prior to the war, the Israelis remained confident that the Bar-Lev line would deter any effort by the Egyptians to take the Sinai by force and would eventually compel them to negotiate on Israel's terms. The outbreak of fighting shattered the confidence and complacency evinced by many Israelis prior to October 1973, particularly those in the government. But this shift of mood led them to completely divergent conclusions. For some, the course of events only reaffirmed the value of the occupied territories as a buffer against attack and thus reinforced their inflexibility; for others (probably the majority), the war demonstrated the necessity for a renewed search for a negotiated solution. Polls in November 1973, for example, showed that three-fourths of the Israeli public would be willing to vacate all or nearly all of the occupied territories in exchange for peace.[36] The political impact was eventually clarified to some degree by developments in Israel's domestic politics. Immediately after the war the ruling Labor alignment was internally divided about what

[34] Quotation from Sachar, *History of Israel I*, 763; see also Sadat, *In Search of Identity*, 249, 255; Reich, *Quest for Peace*, 244–45.

[35] Quotation from Sachar, *History of Israel I*, 788–89.

[36] Ibid., 801.

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course to follow; but once the opposition Likud bloc adopted an unyielding stance in the campaign for the upcoming elections (postponed from October to 31 December because of the war), Labor decided after heated debate to promulgate a platform advocating a settlement based on territorial compromise.

Regardless of what else they inferred from the course of the war, one implication was clear to all thoughtful Israelis: the Americans' financial assistance, weapons, and, ultimately, deterrence of Soviet interference were now "indispensable" to their country's security.[37] Hence, the reaction of the United States to the event of October was crucial. Prior to the war, in Nadav Safran's words, "the United States had believed that the Arab-Israeli conflict had been effectively defused, contained, and insulated by a combination of diplomacy and balance of power."[38] Instead, quite unexpectedly the Americans had found themselves first in a potentially dangerous confrontation with the Soviet Union and afterward subject to damaging economic warfare waged primarily by the pro-Western regimes of the region. A continuation of the status quo now seemed to risk a repetition of either or both these dangers. At the same time, the situation also afforded an inviting opportunity to increase U.S. influence at Soviet expense. The effect of the war in Washington was to discredit the preexisting policy of reliance on Israel's strength and firm U.S. backing to prevent another war and all the untoward consequences that would accompany it. U.S. interests now appeared to be best served by an active effort to promote some progress in negotiations, even at the risk of some conflict with Israel.

The change in Washington's outlook was soon evident. When Israel and Egypt began direct military talks at Kilometer 101 in late October, the Israelis initially appeared to use the Third Army's exposed position as a lever to free the 250 Israeli prisoners held by Egypt, end the blockade of the strait of Bab-el-Mandeb, and compel Egypt to withdraw from east of the canal. Nixon thwarted this strategy by pressuring Meir to permit a supply corridor to the exposed Egyptian troops in return for Egypt's agreement to enter into broader discussions for an interim agreement that would aim at a partial Israeli withdrawal into the Sinai.

In discussions with Kissinger in mid-December, Sadat suggested a variant of the partial settlement he had put forward in 1971, though it was cast narrowly as a military disengagement agreement. In return for an Israeli withdrawal to the east of the Mitla and Giddi passes, Sadat offered to begin clearing the canal and hinted that the passage of Israeli cargoes might be permitted later. With these concessions in hand, Kissinger was soon able to persuade the Israeli cabinet to abandon its demand for Egyptian evacuation of the East Bank and to propose a retreat by their own forces of ten kilometers. Golda Meir and her colleagues thus accepted in principle a partial agreement of the sort that Sadat had proposed and that they had refused prior to the October war. After Labor's victory in the

[37] The term "indispensible" is used both by Safran, *Israel*, 504–5; and Reich, "Change and Continuity in Israel," *Current History* 68 (February 1975): 60, 84.

[38] Safran, *Israel*, 503.

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Israeli elections, Kissinger returned to the region on 10 January and succeeded in brokering an agreement in little more than a week. Israel agreed to withdraw its forces approximately twenty kilometers back from the canal and to accept the presence of Egyptian forces on the East Bank, though in reduced numbers. In return, Sadat offered private assurances that he would open the canal and rebuild the cities on its West Bank. At Kissinger's insistence, however, Israel's demand for a declaration of nonbelligerency was dropped.

At the Rabat, Morocco summit in October 1974, Arab leaders dealt a serious blow to Kissinger's step-by-step approach to peacemaking, designating the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians. Thus they denied a diplomatic role to the only interlocutor on the West Bank acceptable to Israel, King Hussein of Jordan. Sadat, however, indicated his willingness to negotiate a second disengagement agreement provided that Israel would yield enough to allow him to defend the agreement before the Arab public. In his estimation, this would require cession of the Mitla and Giddi passes and the Abu Rudeis oil field. Kissinger arrived again in the Middle East in something less than auspicious circumstances on 8 March 1975. Initially, the Israelis were ready to meet Sadat's territorial conditions in the Sinai but only in return for an explicit statement of nonbelligerency and additional concrete concessions, such as the cessation of hostile propaganda and the passage of Israeli cargoes through the canal. Sadat responded that such a declaration would be possible only after Israel had withdrawn from the occupied lands on all three fronts.

This gap between the parties was bridged by a combination of American pressure and inducements and timely gestures by Sadat. President Gerald Ford's willingness to interrupt the shipment of arms and reconvene negotiations at Geneva were met at first by defiance by Israel, but eventually wore down their resistance. Sadat complemented the U.S. coercion by announcing on 26 March, one week after the collapse of the talks, that he would renew the mandate of the UN buffer force, which was to expire in a month, and reopen the canal for shipping by 5 June. By early June, the Israeli leadership had accepted as inevitable an agreement with Egypt that would fall short of nonbelligerency and had redirected their demands from Cairo to Washington. Discussions followed regarding the details of what Israel could expect from the United States in return for this concession and the cession of the oil fields and passes. By the time Kissinger resumed his shuttle on 20 August, the success of his mission was more or less guaranteed.

The second Sinai disengagement treaty was signed on 4 September 1975 in Geneva. Though a number of provisions were included to reduce the impact of the loss of territory on Israel's security, the treaty appeared nevertheless to be a somewhat better bargain for the Egyptians than Israelis, who had yielded tangible security assets and received intangible and reversible quid pro quos in return. In order to persuade Israel, the United States offered generous compensation, including a promise of $2-3 billion of aid per year for the next five years, uninterrupted arms sales (especially the F-15 fighter), access to oil in the event of another

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war, and an agreement not to ask Israel to withdraw unilaterally from territory again. Most important of all, Ford pledged to protect Israel in the event of a Soviet intervention in the area. In effect, the gap between the positions of the two parties had been closed, not primarily as result of compromise by Egypt but rather by means of the increased commitment of the United States.

Sadat's unilateral gestures of the spring of 1975 helped overcome Israel's hesitations at a key moment and prepare the way for the Sinai II agreement. But this was not the first time the Egyptian leader had taken a "risk for peace;" his signs of flexibility in 1971 and 1972, after all, had not been reciprocated. Moreover, despite these gestures, Sadat was still not prepared to offer Israel peace and normalization of relations, at least on terms acceptable to his adversary. The effectiveness of his conciliatory diplomacy in this case can be attributed to the chastened and sober state of mind of the Israelis brought about by the 1973 war as well as to the new eagerness of Washington—also a result of the October conflict—to secure an agreement, even at considerable cost. In the view of some observers it was the Americans, not the Egyptians, who had made the concessions.[39]

Conclusion

Having reviewed the unfolding of détente in these three cases, the time has now come to return to the original questions. Why was progress toward peace possible between these three pairs of international antagonists? What led the reluctant parties to adjust their negotiating positions in such a way as to make possible a compromise settlement? Unilateral concessions or gestures of conciliation were often made by statesmen in an effort to soften the enemy's hostility, and they may well have had some beneficial effect. But none of these—not Bismarck's restraint in victory in 1866, not Sadat's risks for peace in 1971-1972, and not Brandt's tacit recognition of the status quo—was sufficient in itself to alter the other's policy and end the conflict. In each instance, it was only after the adversary had threatened or actually employed military force convincingly that the reluctant party reached the decision to move toward compromise. Even the Prussians' impressive display of military might at Sedan was not enough to persuade Beust to make peace with Berlin; not until Bismarck threatened Austria directly did Franz Joseph's able but Prussophobic minister turn toward rapprochement with the north Germans. The Soviets' acquisition of a large nuclear arsenal might in time have convinced the Germans to accept the postwar status quo, but two hammer blows delivered by Soviet military forces accelerated this process and may have been indispensable for its completion. Finally, Sadat's daring risks for peace in 1971 and 1972 did not persuade the obdurate Golda Meir to accept a partial territorial agreement for the Sinai peninsula, nor did they convince the Nixon administration to intervene to stimulate the peace process; only the Egyp-

[39] Safran, *Israel*, 554–60.

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tians' successful landing on the East Bank of the canal could achieve this, as Sadat had foreseen. The path to peace was opened in three very different circumstances, not so much by gestures of accommodation as by the threat or use of violence.

Why should one expect success from means so incongruous with the ends they are intended to pursue? The answer, I believe, is that the greatest obstacle to accommodation between international adversaries is often not hatred or hostility but rather Micawberism, a disposition and policy based on two sorts of optimism. First, when a conflict drags on endlessly, there is usually an expectation on one or both sides that developments perhaps unforeseen will transform the bargaining situation and make it possible to achieve one's maximum objectives with few concessions. If this expectation cannot be discredited by proponents of accommodation, it may be impossible for them ever to make a convincing case for compromise. Second, optimists also believe that as they wait for a more favorable time to negotiate, the costs and risks of delay are going to be bearable. Nothing the opponent can do or nothing that is likely to happen, they imagine, is sufficient cause to alter their policy of waiting on events.

If it is indeed optimism and hope that block the path to a settlement and if, as seems probable, such propensities are deeply rooted in human nature, then it will take more than assurances of good will and flexibility to break through this barrier and clear the way toward accommodation. Demonstrations of strength can be effective and perhaps even indispensable, because only they can destroy the assumptions on which Micawberism rests. If successful, they convince optimists on the other side either that a more favorable negotiating situation is not likely to develop at any point in the future or that even if it does, the hazards and pain of waiting will be unendurable.

Pessimism is thus the most fundamental cause of peace. Because of this, efforts to acquire, demonstrate, or even directly to employ military force, far from hindering the process of reconciliation, can create precisely the cognitive and emotional state of mind that convinces statesmen to yield aspirations to which they are profoundly attached, thereby making possible the transformation of a relationship of hostile antagonism into one of lasting peace.

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The Politics of the Anti-Apartheid Movement in the United States, 1969–1986

DONALD R. CULVERSON

In October 1984 the United States abstained from voting on a UN Security Council resolution condemning South Africa's apartheid policies. Later that month, Democratic presidential candidate Walter Mondale charged the Reagan administration with disregarding human rights and allying itself to reactionary rather than reformist forces. The U.S. electorate, apparently insufficiently persuaded to question Reagan's policy toward South Africa or any other country, reelected him in a landslide. Yet less than two years later the anti-apartheid movement emerged as a leading force for mobilizing domestic opposition to U.S. policy toward South Africa. Growing grassroots activism convinced state and local governments, colleges and universities, and corporations to reassess their ties to the apartheid state. Congress, spurred by these actions and by renewed unrest in black townships, approved limited sanctions against South Africa in November 1986 over Reagan's veto. This accelerated the withdrawal of millions of dollars in U.S. investments. How did anti-apartheid activism, after decades of apparent ineffectiveness, begin to influence U.S.–South Africa relations?

Two central objectives motivate this article. The first is the examination of anti-apartheid activism from 1969, when Nixon administration sought to maintain American interest in Southern Africa by promoting cooperation instead of confrontation with the settler governments in the region,[1] to 1986 when Congress began to effectively challenge similar Reagan administration efforts.[2] Policy

[1] Anthony Lake, *The "Tar Baby" Option: American Policy Toward Southern Rhodesia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976); Roger Morris, *Uncertain Greatness: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1977).

[2] Robert Fatton, Jr., "The Reagan Policy Toward South Africa: Ideology and the New Cold War," *African Studies Review* 27 (March 1984): 57–82.

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makers historically viewed Africa as marginal to American national interests, but the proliferation and intensification of anti-apartheid activism demonstrated how citizen initiative could significantly alter the placement of issues on the foreign policy agenda.The article's second aim is to assist the development of a theoretical framework for understanding social movements that challenge specific aspects of U.S. foreign policy. During the 1980s social movements created new political space and provided fresh perspectives on foreign, as well as domestic issues. The scope of movement strategies and tactics, the relations between ad hoc and established groups, and the mobilization of new resources compel us toward more comprehensive modes of analyzing this phenomenon.

The Research Problem

Scholars have long recognized the role that social movements play in organizing and mobilizing challenges to political institutions. Yet they seldom adequately examine how challenging groups gain entrance into the foreign policy-making process. The emergence of new policy problems, the breakdown of consensus on issues, as well as changes in the global environment, may introduce previously unrepresented constituencies into the foreign policy arena.[3] Many of these, unable to utilize interest-group politics, have found it necessary to resort to extra-institutional means to express their concerns. Despite numerous foreign policy studies of U.S.–South African relations,[4] social scientists have only recently begun to look at anti-apartheid activism. The case studies of local anti-apartheid campaigns or organizations that dominate the literature offer little theoretical guidance for a comprehensive analysis of the anti-apartheid movement.[5] Recent advances in the analysis of social movements can move scholarly inquiry forward here. This article seeks to use the political process model to study the development of anti-apartheid activism from 1969 to 1986.[6] The aim is to explore the intensifi-

[3] Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, eds., *The Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence* (New York: St. Martin's, 1988), 1–10.

[4] *South Africa: Time Running Out: The Report of the Study Commission on U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986); Kevin Danaher, *The Political Economy of U.S. Policy Toward South Africa* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985): Richard W. Hull, *American Enterprise in South Africa: Historical Dimensions of Engagement and Disengagement* (New York: New York University Press, 1990).

[5] Francis A. Kornegay, Jr., "Black Americans and U.S. – Southern African Relations" in Mohamed El-Khawas and Francis A. Kornegay, Jr., eds., *American-South African Relations: Bibliographic Essays* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975); "Free South Africa! New Life in an Old Movement: A Freedomways Report," *Freedomways* 25 (Summer 1985): 69–73; "U.S. Anti-Apartheid Upsurge," *Black Scholar* 16 (Nov.-Dec. 1985): 2–52; Janice Love, *The U.S. Anti-Apartheid Movement: Local Activism in Global Politics* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1985); Steven Metz, "The Anti-Apartheid Movement and the Populist Instinct in American Politics," *Political Science Quarterly* 101 (No 3–1986): 379–395.

[6] Doug McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency. 1930-1970* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).

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cation of social movement activism in an issue area traditionally dominated by elite institutions. The phenomenon occured in a climate of national and global change that rendered established institutions more receptive to grassroots activism, while affording citizens greater resources and opportunities for launching meaningful challenges.

The proliferation of activism during the 1960s reinvigorated the study of social movements. Traditionally, social-psychological theories that examined individual motives for participation in collective behavior dominated the field.[7] These classical models assumed a strong correlation between the levels of discomfort experienced by aggrieved segments of society and the emergence of collective action. Scholars treated activism as detached from regular institutionalized political processes and viewed social movements as unusual moments when social tensions felt by participants found cathartic expression.

The resource mobilization approach emerged as a reaction to the deficiencies of classical models of activism. Drawing from elite theories of the American social and political system,[8] resource mobilization theorists focus on the closed character of established political institutions and how excluded groups mobilize their resources to gain access.[9] In sharp contrast to classical theorists, resource mobilization proponents view social movements as politically motivated actions, rather than psychological outbursts, and as composed of the rational actions of movement participants. Resource mobilization theory furthermore bridged the gap between formal and informal groups by targeting the crucial roles that both play in channeling diverse energies and resources toward change. It focuses on how groups such as churches, foundations, labor unions, and even agencies of government, outside of regular policy-making channels, act as major catalysts for movement growth and development.

The political process approach developed as a response to the inadequacies of resource mobilization theory. It directs attention to how social movements emerge as a function of changes within the established political system, as well as within the aggrieved population. Scholars emphasize this interaction as a crucial determinant in shaping conditions and resources that affect the direction and intensity of insurgent efforts. This approach shares several features with resource mobilization. Advocates of both view social movements as politically oriented behavior and not simply as social-psychological means for reducing individual and group tensions. Both closely examine the linkages between movement organizations and those groups external to them. There are nevertheless some important distinctions. While resource mobilization accords a significant role to elites in the social movement, the political process model more strongly privileges the insurgency of groups without formal or recognized power. Proponents question

[7] Neil J. Smeiser, *Theory of Collective Behavior* (New York: The Free Press, 1962).

[8] G. William Domhoff, *Who Rules America?* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1967).

[9] J. Craig Jenkins, "Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements," *Annual Review of Sociology* 9 (1983): 527–553.

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the likelihood that established elites would sponsor group activities that pose threats to their entrenched interests.

The political process model examines the transformation in movement participants' consciousness, based on the assumption that as the movement evolves, so too do participants' assessments of their prospects for sucessfully implementing change. An appreciation for continuity is perhaps the model's most enduring feature. Doug McAdam contends:

> ". . . a movement represents a continuous process from generation to decline, rather than a discrete series of development stages. Accordingly, any complete model of social insurgency should offer the researcher a framework for analyzing the entire process of movement development rather than a particular phase of the same process."[10]

McAdam, studying the development of the black protest movement from 1930 to 1970, demonstrates the political process model's strength. He identifies three sets of factors crucial to the generation of social movement activity: the structure of political opportunity; organizational readiness; and the level of insurgent consciousness within the movement. Other recent works also view protests as a function of the political opportunity structure that launches them.[11] Disruptive processes and events include large-scale demographic changes, industrialization, electoral realignments, prolonged unemployment, and wars. Sidney Tarrow examined three areas of opportunity structure that appear closely related to protest outcomes.[12] They are the openness or closure of formal political access, the stability of instability of alignments within the political system, and the availability and strategic posture of potential alliance partners.

The second element crucial to the success of a social movement is an organizational structure that transforms fragmented energies into concrete weapons for change. Unlike traditional theories that focus on charismatic leadership, the political process model attaches greater weight to how the social movement articulates its goals, whether it espouses single or multiple objectives, and the quality and availability of resources. Indicators of organization type include the degree of bureaucratization, centralization, and factionalism; the mobilization strategies used; and members' class origins, particularly the ratio between potential direct beneficiaries of movement goals and "conscience constituents."[13] These are indi-

[10] McAdam, *Political Process*, 36.

[11] Robert L. Allen, *Reluctant Reformers: Racism and Social Reform Movements in the United States* (Washington, DC: Howard University Press, 1983); J. Craig Jenkins, *The Politics of Insurgency: The Farm Worker Movement and the Politics of the 1960s* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985); Aldon D. Morris, *The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement: Black Communities Organizing for Change* (New York: The Free Press, 1984); Peter K. Eisinger, "The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities," *American Political Science Review* 67 (March 1973): 11–28.

[12] Sidney Tarrow, *Struggling to Reform: Social Movements and Policy Change During Cycles of Protest* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Studies in International Affairs, 1983).

[13] Anthony Oberschall, "The Decline of the 1960s Social Movements" in Louis Kriesberg, ed., *Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change* (Greenwich, CT: JAY Press, 1978), vol. 1, 257–260.

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viduals and groups who are part of the organization but do not benefit directly or materially from the accomplishment of its aims.[14]

The third essential element in the political process model is an insurgent consciousness or cognitive liberation.[15] This concept relates to how social movement activists, organizations, and participants interpret favorable shifts in political opportunity in ways that mobilize broader communities of supporters to engage in collective action. The subjective meanings that people attach to day-to-day events and processes convey information about how they assess the prospects for successful collective protest.[16] Stark events, like elections, court decisions, or wars may communicate this information, but so do less dramatic occurrences, such as provision of new administrative resources, formation of advisory groups, or opening new channels of access by potential allies. Still the onus falls upon movement participants to recognize when established institutions are becoming more receptive to challenges.

This article tests the ability of the political process model to account for the development of the anti-apartheid movement. As a prelude to this examination, we need to address several critical questions. The first concerns the definition of a social movement and highlights a long-standing difference between how the disciplines of sociology and political science deal with the concept. Does anti-apartheid activism constitute a social movement? Traditionally, sociologists dominated the study of social movements, while political scientists devoted more attention to interest groups. The distinction between the two forms of political activity, however, are seldom clear. Sociologists John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald define a social movement as "a set of opinions and beliefs in the population which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of society."[17] David B. Truman's widely accepted definition of an interest group is "any group that, on the basis of one or more shared attitudes, makes certain claims upon other groups in the society for the establishment, maintenance, or enhancement of forms of behaviour that are implied by the shared attitudes."[18] Definitions of social movements imply that groups lacking routine access to governmental power play a critical role in the mobilization process, and that these groups tend to use unconventional forms of behavior, influence, and organization. By comparison, interest groups rely primarily upon institutionalized forms of collective action.

The anti-apartheid movement presents a dilemma in that it appears to contain elements of both a social movement and an interest group. Similar to many reform efforts in recent decades, its organizations and connections with established polity

[14] John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory," *American Journal of Sociology* 82 (May 1977): 1212–1239.

[15] McAdam, *Political Process*, 48–51.

[16] Murray Edelman, *Politics as Symbolic Action* (Chicago: Markham Press, 1971).

[17] McCarthy and Zald, "Resource Mobilization," 1217–1218.

[18] David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962).

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members have expanded. Movement representatives nevertheless lack routine access to a range of foreign-policy decision makers.[19] This suggests a need for closer examination of where interest groups find themselves on the continuum from nascent and spontaneous entities to organized and structured pressure groups. Consequently, the location of a group depends on the overall political climate and how successfully the group mobilizes its resources to achieve its objectives.[20] Tarrow offers somewhat of a compromise for both disciplines by suggesting that social protest movements are:

> Groups possessing a purposive organization, whose leaders identify their goals with the preferences of an unmobilized constituency, which they attempt to mobilize in direct action in relation to a target of influence in the political system. This definition ought to be broad enough to include a variety of organized protest movements but not so broad as to merge with collective behavior in general or to spill over into the study of interest groups.[21]

The shift away from explanations emphasizing sudden increases in the discomfort level experienced by aggrieved communities, to a focus on long-term changes and conditions that structure their ability to engage in collective action, represents a particularly important advance for the study of anti-apartheid activism. Some of the major movement catalysts occurred outside the United States in South Africa and in other parts of southern Africa.[22] American anti-apartheid activists thus represented a conscience constituency, as they did not benefit immediately or directly from ending the apartheid system. Participants nevertheless derived benefits when the movement developed a stronger sense of efficacy and began to play a viable role in shaping public opinion and influencing the policy-making process. Anti-apartheid organizations did not draw heavily from the elite social classes in American society or from the politically alienated and isolated.[23] In short, the political process model rejects the major assumptions of classical and resource mobilization approaches, offering instead a broad framework for examining how changes in political opportunity, organizational resources, and collective perception gave rise and direction to anti-apartheid activism.

Since the political process model intrinsically involves long-term trends that condition the likelihood of activist development, it requires a set of time frames to delineate stages of movement evolution. American group opposition to apartheid began early in this century,[24] but we will not attempt to recount its complete

[19] Martin Staniland, "Africa, the American Intelligentsia, and the Shadow of Vietnam," *Political Science Quarterly* 98 (Winter 1983-84): 595-616.

[20] Bert Useem and Mayer N. Zald, "From Pressure Group to Social Movement: Organizational Dilemmas of the Effort to Promote Nuclear Power," *Social Problems* 30 (December 1982): 144-156.

[21] Tarrow, *Struggling to Reform*, 7.

[22] For a study of external influences on social movements, see Edmund Burke III, *Global Crises and Social Movements: Artisans, Peasants, Populists, and the World Economy* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988).

[23] Love, *The U. S. Anti-Apartheid Movement*, 99-160.

[24] Milfred C. Fierce, "Selected Black American Leaders and Organizations and South Africa, 1900-1977," *Journal of Black Studies* 17 (March 1987): 305-326.

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history. Three distinct periods, 1969–1976, 1977–1984, and 1984–1986, mark the evolution of a small dissident Africanist community to an increasingly influential mass movement.

The anti-apartheid movement's fortunes inversely corresponded to the rise and decline of the Nixon and Ford administrations from 1969 to 1976. Nixon's conservative orientation challenged the aspirations of the civil rights and antiwar movements, while containment of political change remained the cornerstone of its Third World policy. Corruption eventually led to Nixon's 1974 resignation and fostered widespread negative reaction to his foreign and domestic programs. The diminution of civil rights and antiwar activism in the mid-1970s encouraged redirection of substantial energy and resources into anti-apartheid activity.[25] A large array of groups capitalized on European and African crises by demonstrating their connections to U.S. foreign policy. They thus mobilized a broader reform constituency.

The Anti-Apartheid Movement, 1969–1976

The Structure of Political Opportunity

Nixon's 1969 inauguration did little to bolster the confidence of Americans who advocated putting pressure on South Africa to dismantle its racist, repressive institutions. Nixon interpreted his close victory over Democratic challenger Hubert H. Humphrey as a mandate for "law and order" at home as well as abroad. He also promised to bring "peace with honor" to the Southeast Asian conflict. In less than eighteen months, however, the Nixon administration extended the powers of domestic law enforcement agencies and expanded the Vietnam War. The administration simultaneously and secretly formulated a new African containment policy.[26] Prepared by the staff of National Security Adviser Henry A. Kissinger as a comprehensive review of U. S. policy toward Southern Africa, National Security Study Memorandum #39 (NSSM), recommended closer ties with the white governments in Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia, and South Africa. The new guidelines enabled the United States to sell South Africa aircraft and other equipment prohibited under the terms of the United Nations arms embargo. These revisions also encouraged U.S. businesses to increase South African transactions. After a decade of rhetorical support for continued decolonization in southern Africa,[27] NSSM#39 tilted U.S. policy in a direction that "selectively relaxed" restrictions on the minority-ruled states.[28]

[25] Henry F. Jackson, *From the Congo to Soweto: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Africa Since 1960* (New York: William Morrow, 1982), 123–126.

[26] Mohamed El-Khawas and Barry Cohen, eds., *The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa* (Westport, CT: Lawrence Hill, 1976).

[27] Jackson, *From the Congo to Soweto*, 59–60.

[28] Robert M. Price, *The Apartheid State in Crisis: Political Transformation in South Africa, 1975–1990.* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 24–25.

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The policy revisions that Nixon and Kissinger set in motion represented a significant setback for the Africanist community, but other changes in the domestic political arena proved more encouraging. Among them was the rise of Michigan Representative Charles C. Diggs as the chair of the House Subcommittee on Africa. Diggs, the first black to chair that subcommittee, held hearings on southern Africa on such issues as UN sanctions against Rhodesia, U.S. business involvement in South Africa, and political repression in both states. The subcommittee regularly invited testimony from Africanist scholars, activists, and anti-apartheid organizations, and from representatives of African liberation movements.[29] In an arena long dominated by corporate and government officials, the subcommittee gradually expanded the scope of policy discourse.

The subcommittee provided an established forum for debating alternatives to Nixon's Africa policy and became a vehicle for conveying the Africanist concerns of black Americans.[30] Expanding black electoral participation increased black congressional representation from four in 1960 to thirteen in 1971, the year that the Congressional Black Caucus was founded. Domestic concerns dominated the caucus's agenda, but its aggressive participation in the growing Africanist constituency further legitimized Afro-Americans' foreign policy interests.

Portugal and southern Africa emerged as the major external catalysts that improved the political climate for anti-apartheid activism from 1974 to 1976. The overthrow of the forty-year dictatorship in Lisbon in April 1974 precipitated the collapse of the Portuguese African empire and provoked a hasty reevaluation of U.S. policy toward the region. Within a year the United States had to deal with a new Marxist government in Mozambique and the prospect of another one establishing itself in Angola. As the civil war in Angola intensified, the policy debate over southern Africa commanded unprecedented domestic attention.[31]

The political crises in southern Africa in 1975-1976 mobilized a pattern of official responses shaped by events and issues not confined to Africa.[32] Nixon's 1974 resignation and Gerald R. Ford's inexperience left Secretary of State Kissinger as the dominant force shaping the new administration's foreign policy. However, Congress and the U.S. public, on the heels of Watergate and the Vietnam War, proved unreceptive to Kissinger's recommendations for maintaining U.S. interests in the region.[33] Congressional attempts to reassert itself on foreign policy matters continued as the Senate's committee chaired by Frank

[29] Amilcar Cabral, testimony on 26 February 1970, U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Africa, *Report on Portuguese Guinea and the Liberation Movement*, 91st Cong., 2d sess., 1970.

[30] Benjamin P. Bowser, "Race and U.S. Foreign Policy," *Sage Race Relations Abstracts* 12 (February 1987): 4–20; Donald R. Culverson and Brenda Gayle Plummer, "Black Americans and Foreign Affairs: A Reassessment," *Sage Race Relations Abstracts* 12 (February 1987): 21–31.

[31] Danaher, *The Political Economy of U.S. Policy*, 118–140.

[32] Crawford Young, "United States Policy Toward Africa: Silver Reflections," *African Studies Review* 27 (September 1984): 1–17.

[33] Staniland, "Africa, the American Intelligentsia," 595.

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Church (D–ID) began investigating allegations of CIA abuses throughout the world.[34] It was thus not surprising that Kissinger's request for additional funds to support CIA involvement in the Angolan civil war would fall upon deaf ears.[35]

Growing southern African crises coincided with the U.S. presidential primaries in 1976 and further complicated matters for Kissinger and Ford. The Angolan civil war wound down in early spring, but the liberation struggle against white-ruled Rhodesia escalated, and in June, the Soweto uprising began. Kissinger spent much of his last year in office trying to resolve the conflicts in southern Africa, but his efforts produced no tangible assets for an incumbent president facing a major reelection battle. The southern Africa situation offered only limited prospects for an immediate solution, diverted attention from Ford's campaign, and enhanced the perception that the administration was on the wrong side of a race war.[36] During the fall campaign the Democratic and Republican presidential candidates, as in 1960, sought to enhance their appeal to an enlarged black electorate and white liberals with a "new" African policy.[37]

The improved political opportunity structure for anti-apartheid activity from 1969 to 1976 partly derived from Nixon and Kissinger's shared illusions about the permanence of political power—both in the United States and in southern Africa.[38] Nixon's overconfidence led him to take risks that led to the Watergate scandal and his 1974 resignation. Similarly, Kissinger's 1976 attempts at shuttle diplomacy in southern Africa and the "new realism" that had earlier motivated NSSM #39 provided little more than short respites from reality as the regional conflicts escalated to global dimensons. Complex external support for various factions in the Angolan civil war invalidated Kissinger's simplistic cold war objective of trying to prevent Soviet gains at all costs. This weak approach, set against southern Africa's turmoil, provided an opening for anti-apartheid activists. They could now more readily exploit greater public awareness and furnish a broader platform to present alternative versions of U.S. interests in the region.

Organizational Strength and Readiness

Until proliferating activism in the 1960s encouraged social scientists to reevaluate existing theories, they viewed social movements largely as phenomena intermediate between spontaneous outbursts of collective behavior and formal structured

[34] Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, 94th Cong., 2d sess., 1976.

[35] U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on African Affairs, Angola, 94th Cong., 2d sess., 1976.

[36] Jackson, *From the Congo to Soweto*, 274–276.

[37] Richard D. Mahoney, *JFK: Ordeal in Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983).

[38] Seymour Hersh, *The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House* (New York: Summit Books, 1983), 110–111; John Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story* (New York: Norton, 1978).

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organizations.[39] Scholars assumed that with time social movements would take on the characteristics of associations. They would develop extensive organization, rules and traditions would emerge, and stability and continuity would ensue. Luther Gerlach and Virginia Hine challenged these assumptions in their study of Pentecostalism and black protests. They concluded that movement organization structure could be "decentralized, segmentary, and reticulate," rather than rely upon strong centralized control. They could consist of many small units—each with a considerable degree of autonomy—and they could rely upon a network of personal and other intergroup linkages.[40]

Gerlach's and Hine's approach is quite compatible with the experiences of the anti-apartheid movement. While some organizations achieved greater visibility in the national media, no group dominated the movement. Indeed, it appears that movement participants, rather than concentrating their energies in one highly centralized organization, instead cultivated the movement's segmentary and reticulate character. Activists pursued anti-apartheid concerns within a variety of groups and arenas. These include civil rights organizations, peace movements, labor unions, financial management groups, local and state legislatures, churches, and colleges.[41] Group segmentation might also inhibit the development of the movement. Arguably, this is a major reason why anti-apartheid activism developed slowly. Yet, gradual but significant increases in the movement's organizational resources that accompany an expanding political opportunity structure suggest that leaders capitalized on long-term changes within the larger political system. We will now examine some organizational dimensions of the anti-apartheid movement between 1969 and 1976, along with some of the factors that enhanced its effectiveness.

The American Committee on Africa (ACOA), the oldest anti-apartheid organization in the United States, was founded in 1953 by black and white civil rights activists. During its early years ACOA played a major role in the international effort to encourage United Nations intervention in South Africa. During the 1960s it expanded its range of activities to include education and information provision, demonstrations, lobbying, conferences, publishing, and fund raising for relief projects in South Africa.[42] In 1969 ACOA opened a Washington DC office. The level of information provision and lobbying expanded rapidly. ACOA joined with the Methodist, Presbyterian, United Church of Christ, and Episcopalian

[39] Ralph H. Turner and Louis M. Killian, *Collective Behavior* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1972)

[40] Luther P. Gerlach and Virginia Hine, *People, Power, Change: Movements of Social Transformation* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970), 67.

[41] Love, *The U.S. Anti-Apartheid Movement*, 25–35.

[42] George W. Shepherd, Jr., *Anti-Apartheid: Transnational Conflict and Western Policy in the Liberation of Southern Africa* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1977), 33–35; George Houser, "Meeting Africa's Challenge: The Story of the American Committee on Africa," *Issue* 6 (Summer-Fall 1976): 16.

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churches in 1972 to create the Washington Office on Africa (WOA) as a permanent lobbying arm in the nation's capital.

Increasing Afro-American interest in foreign affairs during this period led to the formation of several organizations. Black employees at the Polaroid Corporation's Cambridge, MA headquarters founded the Polaroid Revolutionary Workers' Movement (PRWM) in 1970 in response to Polaroid's production and processing of film for South Africa's passbook system.[43] PRWM briefly stimulated widespread public discussion and debate on the American corporate role in South Africa. Another group, the National African Liberation Support Committee (ALSC), grew out of the uneasy coalition between black elected officials in the Congressional Black Caucus and community-based black activist groups. ALSC is best remembered for coordinating African Liberation Day marches in Washington, DC in 1972 and in thirty cities around the nation in 1973. The formation of ALSC, the African-American National Conference on Africa at Howard University in May 1972, and the African Liberation Day marches represented a major turning point in mobilizing a black American constituency for Africa. Other black organizations focused on southern Africa included the Congress of African People, the Africa Information Service, the African-American Scholars Council, the African Heritage Studies Association, and the Pan-African Liberation Committee.[44] However, as the coalitions that produced the organizations were short-lived, they failed to create a more substantial Afro-American grassroots base within the larger anti-apartheid movement.[45]

A third element of the inchoate anti-apartheid community consisted of Africanist scholars and research groups. Academics, though not as visible as elected officals and activists, proved crucial in expanding the resources available to the movement. Research, travel, publication, and teaching allowed scholars to observe the human costs of the system of apartheid, to establish and illuminate its connections to U.S. prosperity, and to disseminate this information. Ironically, the training of American Africanists in the postwar era had been a project largely underwritten by major foundations such as Ford and Carnegie.[46] It would be fitting that some scholars whose formation derived from the need for an expanded U.S. presence in Africa would rank among its most adamant critics.[47]

Church groups and professional and union-affiliated activists comprised a fourth component of the movement's network. The Episcopal Church, the United Church Council for Christian Social Action, the Congregation for Reconciliation,

[43] Christopher Coker, "Collective Bargaining as International Sanction: The Role of U.S. Corporations in South Africa," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 19 (No. 4, 1981): 653–654.

[44] Fierce, "Selected Black American Leaders," 305–326.

[45] Kornegay, "Black Americans and U.S.-Southern African Relations," 149–161.

[46] For a fuller development of this idea, see Edward H. Berman, *The Influence of the Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller Foundations on Americn Foreign Policy: The Ideology of Philanthropy* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1983), 177–179.

[47] For an example, see U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. Business Involvement in Southern Africa, Part III, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., 27 March, 3,5,6 April, 13 July 1973.

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and the Unitarian Universalist Association of Churches have all opposed apartheid. Similarly, the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, the international units of the AFL-CIO, and the United Steelworkers of America assisted in education and mobilization at the local level. They also provided testimony for key congressional hearings.[48]

Level of Insurgent Consciousness

A widely shared perception that successful collective action is possible accompanies expanding political opportunity and organizational strength. That is, people experience a change in consciousness before altering their political behavior. This change involves an assessment of the political and social atmosphere and the prospects for further movement development.[49]

Few developments during Nixon's first term indicated a favorable shift in the climate for anti-apartheid activism. The Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy team displayed no special concern for elevating Southern Africa as a policy priority, although the emergence of the House Subcommittee on Africa as a forum for investigating Southern Africa and the increased visibility of an Africanist constituency in Washington seemed promising. Movement growth nevertheless had to await fundamental alterations in domestic political alignments, as well as major shifts in the balance of power in Southern Africa. The recessional in Southeast Asia and expanded federal attempts at controlling dissent dominated the national political scene. Initially, this appeared to have left little collective energy for another potentially divisive, externally-induced social movement.[50]

A major turning point in the development of anti-apartheid movement consciousness occured from 1974 to 1976 when several crises illustrated the vulnerability of apartheid and its external support systems. The Caetano regime in Portugal, which had earlier received assurances of continued support from Nixon,[51] was overthrown in April 1974, and Nixon himself had resigned by August. The acceleration of the liberation wars in Mozambique and Angola in 1974-1975, and in Rhodesia and South Africa in 1976, overwhelmed Ford and Kissinger's crisis management capability. Congress, instrumental in forcing Nixon out and in effecting the U.S. withdrawal from Southeast Asia, refused to permit application of the containment policies embodied in NSSM#39 to southern Africa. The 1976 presidential election resembled that of 1960 in that the incumbent's failure to deal effectively with an African crisis became a significant issue. The symbolic benefits of elevating Southern Africa to center stage far outweighed the limited substantive policy benefits that flowed from it, but increased public discussion

[48] For an example, see U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. Business Involvement in Southern Africa, Part I, 92nd Cong., 1st sess., May, June, July 1971.

[49] Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, *Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail* (New York: Vintage Books, 1977), 3–4.

[50] Hersh, *The Price of Power*, 111; Morris, *Uncertain Greatness*, 131–132.

[51] Mahoney, *JFK: Ordeal in Africa*, 243.

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on the issue contributed to heightened feelings of efficacy among Africanists, especially within the black community.[52]

THE ANTI-APARTHEID MOVEMENT, 1977–1984

The Structure of Political Opportunity

The anti-apartheid movement emerged as a legitimate contender in the larger policy arena during the 1977-1984 period. Several factors account for this: more consistent international attention to the conflicts in Southern Africa; the development of movement allies in Congress and in the foreign policy bureaucracy; the gradual expansion of anti-apartheid activism at the state and local level;[53] and the establishment of TransAfrica, a Black American foreign policy organization. The anti-apartheid movement still had no guaranteed, regular access to the foreign policy decision-making process. The conservative shift of the U.S. political climate in the late 1970s and early 1980s dislodged key congressional and administrative allies and contributed to rapid erosion of the movement's ability to translate political access into meaningful policy changes.

The Carter administration capitalized on Kissinger's efforts in southern Africa during the 1976 presidential campaign and made Africa a higher priority. It influenced the development of a more favorable climate for anti-apartheid activism. Carter's appointment of several top officials who were especially sensitive to the issue of majority rule illustrated this new posture. These included Ruth Schacter Morgenthau, Goler T. Butcher, Anthony Lake, and Andrew Young, who was named U.S. ambassador the United Nations. Young felt that the civil rights battles gave the new administration special expertise on racial strife.

> I think our country has established through our own experience in race relationships, and particularly in the South, an understanding of this very sensitive issue of black and white people within the same community . . . with the special knowledge in our country, I think we might be a help in Africa.[54]

Young and other members of the Carter team who desired changes in Africa policy clashed with administration globalists who retained an East-West view of the developing world, particularly National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski. Until mid-1978 the pro-Africa regionalists expanded their influence within the administration. The globalists, however, soon began quietly reasserting themselves by linking Angolan and Ethiopian developments to Cuban and/or Soviet strategies.[55]

[52] Richard J. Payne, "Black Americans and the Demise of Constructive Engagement," *Africa Today* 33 (Nos 2 & 3 1986): 71–89.

[53] Love, *The U.S. Anti-Apartheid Movement*, 99–224.

[54] "Carter Eyes U.S. Investments, Race Experience in Africa Policy," *Washington Post*, 30 July 1976.

[55] Jackson, *From the Congo to Soweto*, 79–81.

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Congressional action during 1977 and 1978 reflected the high priority that the regionalists attached to Africa. Dick Clark, for example, who chaired the Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs from 1975 to 1978, played a major role in policy liberalization. The House Subcommittee on Africa reconvened in 1977 and resumed its role of addressing the southern Africa conflict. The pinnacle of cooperation between the executive and legislative branches on African affairs occurred that year, when the administration sponsored Congress's repeal of the Byrd Amendment, which had allowed American companies to import Rhodesian chromium in violation of United Nations sanctions.

Activists at the state and local level raised questions about U.S. involvement with South Africa. Beginning in the late 1970s, state legislatures and city councils began to consider, and later pass, divestment legislation. The threat to withdraw nearly $200 billion of invested public-employee pension funds and other public funds from companies conducting business in South Africa constituted one of the major weapons in this effort.[56]

The first eighteen months of the Carter administration provided a crucial stage for expanding the political opportunity structure for anti-apartheid activism. This trend began to reverse itself during late 1978. The loss of key congressional allies paralleled the declining influence of the regionalists in the Carter administration. Clark was one of several liberal senators who lost in the midterm elections. Charles C. Diggs, chair of the House Subcommittee on Africa, resigned from office in early 1979 because of a financial scandal. Prospects for a reformed policy toward southern Africa were further undermined with Andrew Young's departure later that year.

In contrast, the decolonization process in southern Africa rapidly accelerated as the American electorate moved toward the right in 1980. The United States focused on the hostage crisis in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, while internationally supervised elections in Zimbabwe put Marxist Robert Mugabe into the prime minister's office. Ronald Reagan defeated Carter in November, and the Republican party gained control of the Senate for the first time in nearly thirty years. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker articulated the new administration's tilt toward South Africa. He argued that the United States should abandon the idealism of the Carter era and thereby "constructively engage" the South African government toward moderating apartheid.[57] Constructive engagement appeared to diminish the likelihood of improving the political climate for anti-apartheid activism.

The forces that would contribute to broadening of the political opportunity structure nevertheless began to gradually emerge. As it had done in 1969, the House Subcommittee on Africa again became a focal point for challenging admin-

[56] John M. Kline, *State Government Influence in U.S. International Economic Policy* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1983), 196–199.

[57] Chester Crocker, "South Africa: Strategy for Change," *Foreign Affairs* 59 (Winter 1980): 323–351.

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istration policy toward South Africa. Representative Stephen Solarz (D–NY), who succeeded Diggs as chair of the subcommittee, played a major role in keeping the focus on southern Africa long after the Carter administration's policy had lost its urgency. In addition to leading several study missions to the region, Solarz conducted hearings on Rhodesia, South Africa, and Namibia. This trend continued with Michigan Representative Howard Wolpe, who replaced Solarz in 1981. Wolpe and key subcommittee staff members, Anne Forrester Holloway and Stephen F. Weissman, brought impressive Africanist credentials.[58] The subcommittee under Wolpe's leadership aggressively pursued its oversight of administration policies. Other subcommittees such as International Economic Policy and Trade; Fiscal Affairs and Public Health; Human Rights and International Organization; and Financial Institution Supervision, Regulation and Insurance intensified their efforts to examine key aspects of South Africa policy.[59] The Reagan administration embarked upon constructive engagement as the South African police and army stepped up the repression of dissent. Congress, meanwhile, through the subcommittees, emerged as one of the most vital forums for contesting the administration's position.

Organizational Strength and Readiness

Perhaps the most significant organizational development in the anti-apartheid movement during this period was the formation of TransAfrica in 1977. It was a product of increased black American interest in foreign affairs and became one of the most vocal and consistent critics of apartheid. Like the House subcommittee on Africa, its leadership is a cadre of professional activists, most of whom are veterans of earlier efforts to establish a permanent Afro-American foreign policy organization. TransAfrica's most visible representative, executive director Randall Robinson, formerly worked on Representative Diggs's staff.[60] Consistent with Gerlach's and Hine's analysis of social movement organization, TransAfrica extended the anti-apartheid network without displacing other groups.

While TransAfrica, ACOA, and WOA did not dominate the anti-apartheid movement, they capitalized on the enlargement of a social conscience constituency.[61] Church-sponsored groups, which formed an important element in the early years of anti-apartheid activism, continued to mobilize their following. Diverse groups such as public employee associations, university faculty and

[58] Anne Forrester Holloway, "Congressional Initiatives on South Africa" in Gerald J. Bender, James S. Coleman, and Richard L. Sklar, eds., *African Crisis Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1986), chap. 4; Stephen F. Weissman, *American Foreign Policy in the Congo, 1960-1964* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1974).

[59] Hearings focused on U.S. corporate activities in South Africa, controls on exports to South Africa, human rights in South Africa, and the impact of divestment from South Africa on the U.S. economy.

[60] Devid Remnick, "Randall Robinson: From Boyhood Pain to a Crusade Against Apartheid," *Washington Post*, 5 February 1985.

[61] McCarthy and Zald, "Resource Mobilizaton," 1217–1218.

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students, socially responsible investment associations, sports and cultural activists formed new movement organizations. Several anti-apartheid groups began a series of statewide and national campaigns in early 1981 to increase public awareness of apartheid, and to develop more effective coordination. The Campaign Against Investment in South Africa, composed of the American Committee on Africa, the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), the Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility, TransAfrica, the Washington Office on Africa, and several other anti-apartheid organizations began a twelve-state effort to prohibit investment of public monies in companies profiting from apartheid. In 1982 the AFSC published a citizens' guide on how to pass local legislation to remove public funds from banks and corporations involved in South Africa. In October 1983 three-hundred persons convened at the National Student Conference in New York to plan a fortnight of coordinated anti-apartheid action for the following March and April.[62] Increased coordination of activities, the sharing of research and information, and the expansion in linkages to policy makers, as well as to a variety of human rights and social justice groups, indicated that anti-apartheid activists were overcoming the political isolation that undermined their influence and effectiveness a decade earlier.[63]

Level of Insurgent Consciousness

Anti-apartheid activists found hope in the appointment of Africanists to key Carter administration positions, and in Carter's emphasis on human rights as a guideline for conducting foreign policy. Carter's commitment to human rights was selective, but it admitted new criteria for assessing American foreign relations. For a while it seemed that Andrew Young and other regionalists were winning the battle against the globalists in the effort to construct a new U.S. policy toward southern Africa. Yet the continued primacy of the globalist orientation within the executive branch, the eventual departure of Young and others, and growing conservatism did not bode well for apartheid's enemies.

Despite these setbacks, the formation of the lobby TransAfrica in 1977 reflected the institutionalization of the black community's interest in foreign affairs. The House Subcommittee on Africa's leadership and the increasing professionalization of movement organizations and congressional staff provided a formal and visible presence in Washington.[64] Growing church and socially responsible investment activism, and the expansion of the divestment movement at the state and local level and on college campuses slowly revitalized the movement at the

[62] Kevin Danaher, *In Whose Interest? A Guide to U.S.-South Africa Relations* (Washington, DC: Institute for Policy Studies, 1984), 182–220.

[63] F. Chidozie Ogene, *Interest Groups and the Shaping of Foreign Policy* (New York: St. Martin's, 1986), 130–134.

[64] J. Craig Jenkins and Craig M. Eckert, "Channeling Black Insurgency: Elite Patronage and Professional Social Movement Organizations in the Development of the Black Movement," *American Sociological Review* 51 (December 1986): 812–829.

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grassroots. Ronald Reagan's 1980 election effectively prevented anti-apartheid activists from regaining direct influence with the executive branch. As a result, movement organizations began to channel energy and resources into coordinating the activities of local networks and influencing public opinion.

The anti-apartheid movement claimed a few small but significant victories. These included extensive participation in the anti-nuclear march in New York City in June 1982 and in the 1983 March on Washington; the 1983 successful defense of exiled South African poet Dennis Brutus, threatened with deportation by the Immigration and Naturalization Service; benefit from the increased Afro-American politicization attendant on the progressive mayoral compaigns of Harold Washington in Chicago and Mel King in Boston in 1983;[65] and the aggressive foreign policy advocacy of the "Jesse Jackson for President" campaign in 1984.[66] While these efforts provided limited direct impact, each presented an opportunity to enlarge the stage on which the apartheid issue could gain public visibility. Results of public opinion polls taken in 1977 and 1978 indicated that while South Africa remained low in public salience, themes involving human rights, avoiding another Vietnam, and containing communism and racial violence could potentially enlarge the attentive foreign policy audience.[67]

Political turmoil in southern Africa between 1977 and 1984 directed world attention to the region. Marxist-led independent Zimbabwe joined Marxist governments in Angola and Mozambique in 1980. Inside South Africa, black and white opposition to apartheid intensified. The U.S. anti-apartheid movement grew, surviving the initial loss of key allies in the executive branch and in Congress, and increased its network of alliances by 1981. Despite these favorable developments, major challenges confronted Reagan-era activists. Constructive engagement permitted closer ties with the South African government and temporarily shifted public perceptions of the regional crisis to a global framework that interpreted America's primary interest as containing Soviet and Cuban expansionism.[68]

The Burst of Anti-Apartheid Activism, 1984–1986

Anti-apartheid protest activities from late 1984 through 1986 commanded more public attention than any other time in the movement's history.[69] (See Figure 1.)

[65] James Jennings, "America's New Urban Politics: Black Electoralism, Black Activism." *Radical America* 17 (Nov. 1983–Dec. 1984): 34–39.

[66] Curtina Moreland-Young, "A View From the Bottom: A Descriptive Analysis of the Jackson Platform Efforts" in Lucius J. Barker and Ronald W. Walters, eds., *Jesse Jackson's 1984 Presidential Campaign: Challenge and Change in American Politics* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1989), 149.

[67] Deborah Durfee Barron and John Immerwahr, "The Public Views South Africa: Pathways Through a Gathering Storm," *Public Opinion* 2 (January-February 1979): 54–59; for poll results on this subject see, Louis Harris, "U.S. Public Opposes Apartheid," *Chicago Tribune*, 31 July 1977; Louis Harris, "Limit Options on Africa," *Chicago Tribune*, 31 July 1978; John M. Goshko, "Equal Rights for Black Majority, No U.S. Involvement," *Washington Post*, 13 May 1979.

[68] Fatton, "The Reagan Policy," 64–70.

[69] Danny Schecter, "South Africa: Where Did the Story Go?" *Africa Report* 33 (1988): 27.

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FIGURE 1

Television Network News Reports on South Africa, 1973–1987



Source: *Television News Index and Abstracts*, 1972–1987.

This period of heightened activism, spurred by continuing violence in South Africa, culminated in congressional passage of the 1986 Anti-Apartheid Act. Movement activity emanated from the three sets of factors consistent with a political process interpretation.

First, a supportive domestic climate for challenging Reagan's constructive engagement policy derived from reactions to worsening repression in South Africa. Congress, especially the House Subcommittee on Africa and the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC), took the initiative in response to mounting criticism of constructive engagement. The CBC since its founding in 1971 had consistently made apartheid one of its major policy concerns. Many of its members by 1985 had gained seniority and leadership positions on powerful committees, thus acquiring the potential for leverage. The Subcommittee on Africa conducted hearings on U.S. policy in Southern Africa, provided information to members of Congress, and demonstrated skills in coalition-building. Rising public concern over apartheid as an issue that could trigger domestic racial conflict even led many Republicans and conservative Democrats to distance themselves from and

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openly criticize the president's policy. For instance, in December 1984, twenty-five conservative Republican House members wrote an open letter to the South African ambassador, threatening his government with sanctions unless it began dismantling apartheid.

The momentum of the sanctions drive reflected the tendency of some groups and institutions to respond to race conflicts in southern Africa as surrogates for U.S. racial issues. Black Americans historically viewed policy toward South Africa as a symbol of an administration's commitment to achieving racial justice at home.[70] As the crises in southern Africa intensified, other groups exhibited this tendency. Republican Senator Robert Dole illustrated this perception of a linkage between foreign and domestic issues when in 1986 he acknowledged that the sanctions debate "has now become a civil rights issue."[71] By that time, the Reagan administration's inability to respond adequately to the intensifying crises, combined with extensive daily media coverage on domestic protest activities, gave the South African freedom struggle an international legitimacy that energized its supporters and weakened its critics.

Second, throughout this period activists maintained sufficient organizational strength to sustain a protest drive. This strength derived from profitable linkages that movement groups had established with external support organizaitions. The launching of the Free South Africa Movement (FSAM) on 21 November 1984 clearly illustrates this aspect of movement growth. The FSAM was not one organization but a broad coalition of anti-apartheid organizations, elected officials, labor unions, and student, civil rights, and church groups that successfully orchestrated a series of publicized arrests outside the South African embassy and at other sites around the country. Over a five-month period, more than 3,000 Americans, including members of Congress, were arrested at these demonstrations.[72] Nationwide collegiate divestment drives meanwhile provided a substantive focus that allowed the movement to capitalize on the public concern that violent repression in South Africa had aroused.[73]

Anti-apartheid activists still experienced the tactical dilemma of whether to concentrate on assimilative or confrontational strategies. The decentralized character of the movement in part resolved this dilemma. Media-attention activities at the South African embassy in Washington added a sense of urgency to the lobbying efforts of such groups as the Washington Office on Africa and TransAfrica, and exerted pressure on Congress and the White House. Concurrently, the sit-ins, demonstrations, shanty town constructions, and acts of civil disobedience

[70] William J. Foltz, "United States Policy Toward South Africa: Is One Possible?" in Gerald J. Bender, James S. Coleman, and Richard L. Sklar; eds., *African Crisis Areas and U. S. Foreign Policy* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1986), 40–42.

[71] Quoted in Pauline Baker, "The Sanctions Vote," *New York Times*, 26 August 1986.

[72] Stephen Engleberg, "Thousands Join in Protest in Washington," *New York Times*, 21 April 1985.

[73] For an examination of the student divestment movement at Columbia University, see Eric Hirsch, "Sacrifice for the Cause: Group Processes, Recruitment, and Committment in a Student Social Movement," *American Sociological Review* 55 (April 1990): 243–254.

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expanded opportunities for mass mobilization. Surges in public interest and support facilitated the complementarity of these two sometimes contradictory dimensions of movement activity.

Substantial growth in public support for movement objectives occurred from 1977 to 1985 and 1986. A 1977 Harris Poll asked if the United States and other Western nations should pressure South Africa to give blacks greater freedom and political participation. Forty-six percent responded yes, while 26 percent responded no. However, as the follow-up question indicates, Americans expected the initiative to come primarily from the corporate sector. Forty-six percent of those surveyed felt that the U.S. government should encourage U.S. companies in South Africa to pressure the South African government, and 28 percent opposed this measure.[74] A similar Gallup Poll conducted in September 1985 revealed that 47 percent of respondents favored the U.S. placing more pressure on the South African government. Fifteen percent favored less, and 37 percent said that no change in the amount of pressure was necessary.[75] Asked the same question a year later, 55 percent felt that the U.S. should apply more pressure on Pretoria, 14 percent said less, and 24 percent approved of the current level.[76]

Activists, along with having contributed to mobilizing higher levels of public support, could identify victories in several areas. Foremost among them was the enactment of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986. The law's major provisions were: prohibition of the importation of South African coal, steel, textiles, uranium, agricultural products, and products produced by South African parastatals; application of these sanctions to South African-controlled Namibia; prohibition of the landing of South African airlines in the U.S. and of American airlines in South Africa; prevention of U.S. corporations from deducting South African taxes from their income; prohibition of new corporate investments in South Africa; and prohibition of American bank deposits from South African governmental agencies.[77] By the end of 1986, twenty-one states, sixty-eight cities, and ten of the nations's largest counties had adopted divestment policies. Over 100 educational institutions had withdrawn nearly a half-billion dollars from companies profiting from apartheid.[78] U.S. corporations also responded to domestic and international political changes. U.S. investments in South Africa totaled $2.8 billion in 1983, but by 1985 amounted only to $1.3 billion. Some 350 American corporations operated in South Africa in 1984. Eighty of them, including GM, IBM, Coca Cola, Xerox, Eastman Kodak, Honeywell, Exxon, and McGraw-Hill, had pulled out by 1987.[79] Dramatic increases in external

[74] Harris, *Chicago Tribune*, 12 December 1977.

[75] *The Gallup Report* (October 1985), 20.

[76] *The Gallup Report* (November 1986), 19.

[77] For a description of the bill, see Senate Bill 2701, Calendar No. 775, 99th Congress, 2nd sess.

[78] Paul Lansing and Sarosh Kuruvilla, "Business Divestment in South Africa: In Whose Best Interest?" *Journal of Business Ethics* 7 (August 1988): 564.

[79] Janice Love, "The Potential Impact of Sanctions Against South Africa," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 26 (March 1988): 103.

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support, combined with improved internal resources, propelled the anti-apartheid movement toward the center of the American political stage.[80]

Conclusions

An understanding of these developments must acknowledge the significance of long-term changes in structuring a social movement. This article has assessed the adequacy for the political process model for guiding an analysis of the American anti-apartheid movement. Political process represents a major advance over two other perspectives—classical theory and resource mobilization theory.

Classical theory has been particularly important in the development of social movement theory, but it cannot adequately explain how anti-apartheid activism in the United States evolved during the era outlined above. Its major weakness stems from the assumption that there is a direct correspondence between levels of social tension and the appearance of aggrieved people's collective response. To classical theorists who see activism as alienated and isolated from mainstream institutions, social movements represent psychological rather than political responses. This study has demonstrated that anti-apartheid activists form a conscience constituency that did not benefit directly or immediately from ending apartheid. It has also shown that movement participants' political involvement included a range of mainstream social and political activities, and was not limited to anti-apartheid protests. This invalidates the distinction that classical theorists make between ordinary political behavior and collective movement behavior.

Resource mobilization emerged as a corrective to the classical model and has revitalized the study of social movements. It claims that collective movements emerge when aggrieved groups receive increased external social resources, making it possible for them to launch more effective organized demands for change. By focusing on the contributions of external groups, however, proponents of this model discount the significance of nonelite organizational resources as factors that facilitate movement growth and development. The most obvious deficiency in applying this perspective to the anti-apartheid movement is that it unduly emphasizes mainstream allies and institutions. It overlooks the roles played by popular organizations. The resource mobilization perspective would also devalue ordinary staff work in favor or more visible leadership initiatives.

Three factors accounted for the growth of anti-apartheid activism. First, a gradual expansion in the structure of political opportunity since the early 1970s derived from the chastening Vietnam experience. The intensification of the liberation struggles in Southern Africa broadened the context for discussing U.S. foreign policy and multiplied the arenas where anti-apartheid concerns were expressed. Community organizations, labor unions, churches, colleges, financial institutions, and legislative bodies regularly discussed an area traditionally dominated by the National Security Council, the State Department, congressional

[80] Hirsch, "Sacrifice for the Cause," 246–252.

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leaders, and transnational corporations. Second, anti-apartheid organizations grew substantially. They ranged from such permanent groups as the Washington Office on Africa and TransAfrica, to ad hoc coalitions mobilizing around the core issues of political repression and denial of human rights in South Africa, socially responsible investment, and divestment. Third, the sense of efficacy grew dramatically within the anti-apartheid community, which undoubtedly contributed to the decision to launch the Free South Africa Movement.[81]

Despite the wave of anti-apartheid activism that contributed to congressional enactment of sanctions legislation, the enthusiasm generated by the release of Nelson Mandela from prison, and his election as the first president of post-apartheid South Africa, the direction of American involvement with that nation remains unclear. Reforms initiated by Mandela's government created an international atmosphere of both optimism and uncertainty, and demonstrated the need for continued external monitoring and support for South Africa's evolution toward democratic institution building and economic redistribution.[82] The transition process also raises important questions about American group mobilization as a potential vehicle for exerting pressure on U.S. government and corporate relations with multiracial South Africa. Which targets, strategies, and action repertoires will redirect activists' concerns and energies?[83] Will future movements draw from ongoing racial conflicts in American society or rely upon past triumphant moments of unity? Will Pan-Africanist ideas enable or constrain the movement's redevelopment?

The results of a 1990 nationwide survey of nearly 1,000 organizations conducted by the Washington Office on Africa may offer some answers and identify opportunities facing the construction of American group relations with post-apartheid South Africa. The most common areas of concern included the lack of direction in the aftermath of the Mandela tour; tensions between local and national groups regarding appropriate protest strategies; and declining membership, time, and funds to sustain activism. The survey also indicated that 379 organizations listed apartheid or southern Africa as their primary focus, while nearly 600 others devoted considerable efforts to problems in the region. Many of these organizations were short-lived, but the responses suggest that mid-1980s activism succeeded in augmenting the network of groups capable of interacting with southern African. Respondents also indicated a preference for national campaigns that incorporate state and local issues into the mobilization process.[84] There remains a wealth of issues surrounding South Africa—foreign aid, corporate reinvestment, education and infrastructure development, humanitarian relief, and

[81] Metz, "The Anti-Apartheid Movement," 390–392.

[82] Price, *The Apartheid State in Crisis*, 220–248.

[83] Christopher Madison, "Sanctions Scramble," *The National Journal*, 30 July 1988, 1965–1967; Kevin Danaher, "Confronting Southern Africa Solidarity Work," *Issue: A Journal of Opinion* 18 (Summer 1990): 39–43.

[84] Washington Office on Africa, *Education Fund Survey* (Washington, DC, 1990).

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economic restructuring—attractive to Americans interested in the promotion of democratization at home and abroad. Although the survey highlights major challenges confronting group mobilization, it also suggests that the 1980s activist surge laid the foundations for the emergence of more sustained mutually beneficial relationships between Americans and South Africans.[85]

The rise of anti-apartheid activism and other popular efforts to influence foreign affairs opened an exciting area for political science research. The creative approaches of grassroots organizations merit the same consideration granted to subjects of more traditional concern—interest groups, congress, and the foreign policy bureaucracy. Unconventional popular participation presents an array of difficult questions and challenges us to move beyond subfield and disciplinary boundaries. In addressing those questions, we can begin to understand how activists mobilize the forces demanding progress and affect the contours of change in institutions that lie beyond their reach.*

[85] Washington Office on Africa, *Education Fund Survey* (Washington, DC, 1990).

* The author would like to thank John E. Turner and Doug McAdam for their helpful comments and suggestions.

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

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McNamara's War—Against the Truth: A Review Essay

ROGER HILSMAN

For several weeks in the spring and summer of 1995, Robert S. McNamara, secretary of Defense in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, traveled the lecture and television circuits promoting his book, *In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam*.[1] Pointing at himself, McNamara would moan, "Mea culpa." But like a Hindu god, McNamara has not two but several arms, and he used all of them to point a finger of blame at many others—often unfairly, usually inaccurately, and sometimes in direct contradiction to the facts. To put it bluntly, McNamara twists the truth, falsely accuses others, and soils the historical record.

On the first page of the preface of the book, McNamara says that he hesitated to write the book "for fear that I might appear self-serving, defensive, or vindictive." In my opinion, he has managed to be all three. Inevitably the reader is drawn to speculate about McNamara's motive in writing this very peculiar book. At first the reader assumes that it was an act of contrition to ease his feelings of guilt, and that may indeed be one of his basic motives. Then somewhat deeper into the book, the reader begins to suspect that writing the book may also have been an ego trip. McNamara takes full credit for so many policy decisions that were in fact joint decisions and brags so much about them that one is reminded of Peter Pan—"Oh, the wonderfulness of me!"

For example, McNamara notes that during the 1960 presidential campaign, the Air Force leaked to the press its belief that there was a missile gap in the Soviets' favor (p. 20). The CIA did not agree with the Air Force, McNamara

[1] Robert McNamara with Brian VanDeMark, *In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam* (New York: Times Books, 1995).

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says; and so as soon as he entered the Pentagon, he spent several days going over the photos himself. He writes that he decided that the missile gap was actually in favor of the United States. He said as much in a background news conference, which caused a storm in the newspapers. The Senate minority leader, Everett Dirksen, Republican of Illinois, called for McNamara's resignation. McNamara says that he went to John Kennedy and offered to resign, but Kennedy said that "we all put our foot in our mouth once in a while. Just forget it. It'll blow over."

McNamara may have had a gut feeling that there was no missile gap, but there was no hard evidence to support that view. Even as late as June 1961, after Kennedy had been in office for five months, the evidence about the so-called missile gap was contradictory. In its June National Intelligence Estimate, the intelligence community was badly split. The Air Force was estimating that the Soviets had as many as 300 ICBMs deployed, while the Navy was estimating less than a dozen. The evidence was not adequate to make a definitive judgment, so the CIA and the State Department intelligence people split the difference with an estimate of 150.

But in his book, McNamara still does not get the point that you don't make vital policy decisions on gut feelings. The so-called roles and missions of the three services were what the argument over the missile gap was really all about, and the services saw themselves in a battle for their very existence. They found it difficult to accept even the hardest kind of evidence that went against their parochial interests. Gut feelings, no matter how prescient, did nothing but enrage them.

The idea that the book is an ego trip gains support by the way that McNamara takes full credit for decisions that were not his alone. An example was the idea of "flexible response"—to meet different kinds of aggression with a range of different responses (p. 25). While it is true that McNamara adopted and developed the idea, it had originated in academia and on Capitol Hill (where Kennedy had a lot to do with it) while McNamara was still making Ford automobiles and had little if any knowledge of military strategy.

On the other hand, it could be argued that the book is not really an ego trip, but just the opposite: what drives McNamara is a feeling of inadequacy, and his lifelong habit of brusquely brushing aside the opinions of others is really compensating for such feelings. Still another possibility comes from Deborah Shapley, who wrote a biography of McNamara.[2] Detailing inconsistencies from one interview to another that McNamara gave her, she lamented the difficulties of writing the biography of a man who doesn't really know himself (personal communication).

Still deeper in the book, one begins to suspect that admitting that the war was a mistake might actually be a clever ploy to disarm his audience and set them up for the argument that if it hadn't been for all the other people he accuses,

[2] Deborah Shapley, *The Life and Times of Robert McNamara* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1992).

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the United States could still have won the war in Vietnam. In the end one suspects that each of these various motives is partly true, but that McNamara had a still broader motive—to try by himself to make sure of his place in history.

What follows will examine the allegations and accusations that McNamara makes about the Vietnam decisions and compare them with what actually happened. It should also be said that the accounts given below of what actually happened are fully supported by recently declassified documents in the Kennedy and Johnson libraries.

Lack of Experts

McNamara argues that one fundamental cause of the American failure in Vietnam was the lack of experts on both Vietnam and China and the lack of knowledge of the two countries among the top officials. McNamara reminds us that in the Cuban missile crisis the United States had Charles "Chip" Bohlen and Llewellyn "Tommy" Thompson, two senior foreign service officers who had spent their careers on the Soviet Union. But when it came to China and Vietnam, McNamara asserts, it had none.

But in fact the United States government had a large number of such experts. The State Department alone had at least a dozen. Of these I had the privilege of working closely with three on China and three on Vietnam. One of the China experts was Allen Whiting, author of *China Crosses the Yalu*, and he is one of the top half-dozen China experts in the United States. He served as head of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research and as deputy consul general in Hong Kong heading up the staff of China watchers. Another was Edward Rice, a career foreign service officer who spent many years on China. He was in the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State, deputy assistant secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, and consul general in Hong Kong with the specific job of watching China. Still another was Marshall Green, who also served as both deputy assistant secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs and as consul general in Hong Kong. All three spoke Chinese. Bohlen and Thompson are well known to the general public, because they were at one time ambassadors in Moscow. Whiting, Rice, and Green are less well known for the simple reason that the United States did not recognize China in their day, and so they never became the ambassador in Beijing.

One of the Vietnam experts was Louis Sarris, who spent most of his working life on the Vietnam desk in the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, visiting Vietnam regularly and reading every cable, report, and dispatch. Another was Paul Kattenberg, a Yale Ph.D. specializing in Southeast Asia, who served both in the Intelligence Bureau and as the policy planning officer for the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs. Still another was Dorothy Avery, who also spent most of her working life on the Vietnam desk in the Intelligence Bureau.

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From the very beginning of the Kennedy administration, these experts piled up memo after memo that were consistently pessimistic about the chances of winning the war. One memo, written by Edward Rice while he was in the Policy Planning Staff, was specifically skeptical of using American troops in a counter-guerrilla role in Vietnam. His view was so widely shared in the State Department that a familiar aphorism at the time was that foreign troops would so alienate the nationalistic Vietnamese that the American troops would create more communists than they could possibly kill.

The memos that specifically considered escalation by either bombing or by the introduction of American troops concluded that neither action would change the result unless the United States invaded and occupied North Vietnam. And they also concluded that if the United States did invade North Vietnam, China would very probably intervene, as it had done in Korea.

When I was head of the Intelligence Bureau, we sent McNamara every one of these memos, and my successor, Thomas L. Hughes, continued the practice. All of the reasons that McNamara now gives that the United States should not have made Vietnam an American war were repeated to him again and again—not only by these experts with their memos, but in person over and over by Robert Kennedy, Averell Harriman, George Ball, and me. So the problem was not that McNamara got no expert advice, as he now claims. The problem was that he would not listen to it.

Kennedy and Vietnam

As for the lack of knowledge of China and Vietnam among the top officials, McNamara says that he had never visited Vietnam and that he knew nothing about it (p. 32). "The same must be said, to varying degrees," he goes on to say "about President Kennedy, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy, military adviser Maxwell Taylor, and many others."

But both Rusk and Kennedy did have personal knowledge of Vietnam. Rusk had been G-3, that is head of war plans in World War II in the China-Burma-India theater headquarters in New Delhi. At the end of the war, he was assigned to the War Plans Division in the Pentagon, where he worked on occupation policies for Germany and Japan and for the United Nations. In 1946, he joined the State Department as assistant chief of what later became the Bureau of United Nations Affairs; later he rose to head that bureau, and then he served as assistant secretary for Far Eastern Affairs. It was not until the end of the Truman administration in 1953 that he left to become president of the Rockefeller Foundation.

In all of his government posts, Rusk learned a lot about China and more about Vietnam than all but a few specialists in the American government. In 1944, in the G-3 job in New Delhi, as Rusk relates in his autobiography, he ordered on his own authority an airdrop of weapons and supplies to Ho Chi Minh and his guerrillas (p. 113). During this time in the State Department, as he also relates in the book, he not only dealt with events in that part of the world, but

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he also "became convinced of the strategic, political, and economic importance of Southeast Asia. . . . and I argued for continuing American economic and military assistance to the region".[3]

Kennedy himself had a rather impressive knowledge of Vietnam, and decidedly more than McNamara suggests. He had visited Vietnam as a young congressman, and while he was there he talked at great length with Edmund Gullion, the minister and political affairs officer in the American embassy. They became great friends, and Gullion was later one of the attendants at Kennedy's wedding. As a Catholic, Kennedy had been very pro-Diem when Diem first came to power. But during the Buddhist crisis in 1963, Kennedy told me that Gullion had caused him to have grave doubts. Gullion had come to believe that the Catholic Diem did not represent his people and could not possibly win, and he had at least half persuaded Kennedy. As a consequence, Kennedy was from the beginning extremely skeptical of the possibility of South Vietnam winning the war and was unwilling to send American troops to Vietnam or to bomb North Vietnam. Kennedy greatly increased both the amount of supplies sent to South Vietnam and the number of advisers over what the Eisenhower administration had sent. But United States policy toward Vietnam remained within the Eisenhower ballpark—to help with military and economic aid and advisers, but not with troops or bombing.

McNamara says that President Kennedy would probably not have made Vietnam an American war (pp. 95-96). But Kennedy's view was much stronger than McNamara suggests. As assistant secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs at the time, I was the action officer on Vietnam, and Kennedy told me over and over again that my job was to keep American involvement at a minimum, so that we could withdraw as soon as an opportunity presented itself.

The Coup Overthrowing Diem

The second cause of the United States failure in Vietnam, according to McNamara, was that while he and several other high officials were out of town, "several of the officials we had left behind" saw an opportunity and "set in motion a military coup, which I believe was one of the truly pivotal decisions concerning Vietnam made during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations" (page 52).

The officials McNamara accuses are W. Averell Harriman, Henry Cabot Lodge, George Ball, Michael V. Forrestal, and me. And he singles me out for particular blame, because I was the one, he says, who "took the initiative." Since the other four are dead, I write on behalf of all of us to correct McNamara's errors, omissions, and—to be blunt—self-serving untruths.

The true story is as follows. South Vietnam was about 90 percent Buddhist, while President Ngo Dinh Diem, his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, and most of his cabinet ministers were Catholic. Beginning in 1962, the Diem regime began to

[3] Dean Rusk, *As I Saw It* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1990), 424.

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disintegrate, and in desperation Diem issued a number of repressive decrees. Among these were orders against flying any flag but that of South Vietnam. On 8 May 1963, the Buddhists celebrated the 2527th anniversary of the birth of Gautama Buddha with a parade that was also intended to protest the order against flying the Buddhist flag. What happened next is confusing, but the troops opened fire, killing nine of the demonstrators. In the weeks that followed, several Buddhist monks protested by immolating themselves in towering flames of gasoline.

In the midst of the crisis, Louis Sarris, the State Department's principal expert on Vietnam, wrote a memo that was distributed throughout the government saying that the crisis was turning many of the Vietnamese people against their government. The memo also analyzed the military situation since the start of the crisis and concluded that the Vietnamese government's treatment of the Buddhists was having an adverse effect on the morale of the Vietnamese troops—that they were losing significantly more engagements to the Viet Cong. The Joint Chiefs of Staff complained to Secretary McNamara, and McNamara complained to Rusk, demanding that Rusk forbid anyone in the State Department from making any judgments on the "military" question of how the war was going. Rusk ordered Thomas L. Hughes, the head of the intelligence bureau at that time, not to permit the intelligence analysts to write about military matters. By this act, McNamara deliberately cut himself and the rest of the government off from seeing the assessments on the progress of the war by the State Department's experts on Vietnam.

Rumors began to circulate that Diem and Nhu were planning some sort of attack on the pagodas where the Buddhist leaders lived. Acting on instructions from Washington, Ambassador Frederick "Fritz" Nolting warned Diem: "If you attack the pagodas, the United States government will have no choice but to condemn both the attacks and you in public. This will encourage coup plotters. So if you attack the pagodas and a coup occurs, it will be your own doing."

Nolting, having ended his tour, left Vietnam a few days later. As soon as he did, troops under the direct command of Diem and Nhu attacked the main pagoda, killing several priests and nuns. McNamara says that the troops "roughed up monks who resisted," but the truth is that several monks and nuns were killed, all of whom were unarmed and none of whom "resisted" (p. 51).

Nolting, Henry Cabot Lodge, who was Nolting's replacement as ambassador, and I were in Hawaii when this attack occurred, and so had nothing to do with the response from the United States government. But the government did just what we would have recommended. In fact, it had no choice. In a public announcement the United States government condemned the action and also condemned President Ngo Dinh Diem for ordering it.

Lodge proceeded to Vietnam, and shortly after he arrived, the senior Vietnamese generals contacted him, saying that they had learned that Diem and Nhu were plotting to have them killed and that they were going to attempt a coup, which was their only chance to save their lives. They wanted to know how the United States would view a new government that, if the coup were successful, they would head.

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Ambassador Lodge's cable containing the generals' request arrived in Washington on Saturday, 24 August. Just back from Hawaii, I wrote the first draft of a reply, and Harriman, George Ball, Mike Forrestal, and I rewrote it several times. The United States government receives similar requests fairly often, and the proposed cable was pretty standard for such things, careful not to commit the United States to much of anything. But it did say that Lodge should go to Diem, tell him that the generals were fearful, tell him that the focus of their fears was his brother Nhu, and urge him to send Nhu as ambassador to Paris to get him out of the country.

Copies of the proposed cable were sent to President Kennedy, who was in Hyannisport, and to Dean Rusk, who was at the UN mission in New York. McNamara was on vacation and unreachable. So was John McCone, the head of the CIA. Thus the proposed cable was hand-carried to Roswell Gilpatric, McNamara's deputy, and to Richard Helms, McCone's deputy.

McNamara says that Dean Rusk was "unenthusiastic." But the truth is that Rusk reworked the cable himself—actually making it much stronger by adding a sentence saying that the United States would give the appropriate military commanders "direct support in any interim period of breakdown of central government mechanism."[4]

McNamara says that Richard Helms was "reluctant." But the truth is that Helms phoned me immediately after signing the cable to say that it was about time the United States tried to do something about the situation caused by Brother Nhu.

McNamara says that Maxwell Taylor, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), was "shocked" by the cable, especially "since it had already been approved and sent." It is true that through a White House mistake, the cable had already been sent. But the whole truth is that Taylor signed it before he knew that. I have a xerox of the original cable, and Maxwell Taylor's signature is on it, releasing it on behalf of the JCS. The officer who took the cable to Taylor for signature said nothing to any of us about any reaction that Taylor might have had.

McNamara says little about the events that followed. What happened was that Lodge cabled back saying that if he talked to Diem, as our cable instructed, it would be a death warrant for the generals and that he would do nothing until we acted on his recommendation that he *not* see Diem.

McNamara skips lightly over the National Security Council (NSC) meeting on Monday, 26 August. Kennedy was angry when he opened the meeting—not at any particular person, but because the government was so divided, with the opposition headed by McCone and McNamara. Kennedy began by repeating Lodge's statement that he would do nothing until he heard from us. This left the United States, Kennedy said, with three choices: go with the original cable, including the instruction for Lodge to see Diem; go with Lodge's recommendation

[4] Cable from Dean Rusk to Henry Cabot Lodge, 24 August 1963. A copy of the final outgoing cable is in the personal papers of Roger Hilsman in the JFK Library. This cable is now declassified.

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not to see Diem but to tell the generals we would back any new government that deserved our backing, including the sentence Rusk suggested; send no cable at all.

President Kennedy then went around the room and asked each person—including McNamara—which cable he preferred. Everyone—including McNamara—voted for the second choice, Lodge's recommendation with Rusk's addition, even though it obviously did more to encourage a coup than the one telling Lodge to see Diem.

As it happened, one of the Vietnamese generals balked, and they decided not to try a coup. So the coup planned for late August never happened. But McNamara fails to mention both the fact that he signed the final cable and the fact that that particular coup never happened.

The coup that did happen, on 1 November, was different, with some of the same generals but without others. The coup was carried out by several battalions of Vietnamese-troops stationed in and around Saigon, and they began marching on the presidential palace from different directions some time in the morning so as to reach the palace at noon.

But this time, the generals did not tell the Americans that a coup was planned. Several of the Vietnam experts in the State Department and the CIA believed that sooner or later the generals would move. But they had no concrete information about who was planning a coup or when it might occur. At an NSC meeting shortly before 1 November 1963, most of the participants were skeptical that a coup would ever be mounted. Someone suggested that if South Vietnam could not defeat the communists with Diem as president, perhaps some way ought to be found to put some pressure on the generals. George Ball responded that nothing could be done, that putting pressure on the generals would be "like trying to *push* a piece of cooked spaghetti."

To give another example, Admiral Don Felt, the commander of all American forces in the Pacific, had a sometimes annoying habit of popping in for a visit to Vietnam with little notice or none at all. 1 November was one of those occasions, and Felt was in Saigon. Even if it was only a twenty-four hour visit, protocol demanded that Felt pay a courtesy call on President Ngo Dinh Diem, and Admiral Felt and Ambassador Lodge duly called. They were sitting with Diem in his office shortly after 11:00 A.M.

President Diem also had a habit that was sometimes annoying. He was a talker, and fairly often he would stretch a fifteen-minute courtesy call into a two or three hour monologue. The American embassy had a rule that even before a pro-forma call on Diem, American officials must refrain from drinking any liquids for at least three hours and go to the bathroom immediately before the call.

On this particular day, Diem seemed preoccupied, and the call lasted only a few minutes. When Admiral Felt got to the airport, General Tran Van Don, acting chief of the Vietnamese armed forces, was there to see him off. General Don kept nervously looking at his watch. After he boarded the plane, Felt commented on General Don's nervousness and remarked that he had never seen General Don chew gum before. The point is that given Diem's habit of stretching

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a fifteen-minute courtesy call into a two or three hour monologue, if the United States government had thought there was any chance at all of a coup attempt, it would never have permitted its ambassador and the commanding officer of its forces in the Pacific to go anywhere near Diem's office.

The fact of the matter is that the first hard information about the coup came when the generals telephoned Lucien Conein, the CIA liaison officer, on the morning of 1 November and asked him to come to their headquarters. When he arrived, the generals told him the troops were already on the march.

Numbers and Body Counts

McNamara says that his mathematics professors at Berkeley taught him to see math as "a process of thought" (p. 6). "It was a revelation. To this day, I see quantification as a language to add precision to reasoning about the world."

McNamara's skill with numbers did have its good side. Before McNamara, the different services competed before Congress for funds for their programs with little coordination and less planning. In a war with the Soviet Union, for example, the air force and navy would have ended up attacking the same targets and getting dangerously in each other's way. The purpose of most studies made in the Pentagon in those days was to show that the weapons systems of the other services were inferior.

McNamara introduced both a five-year, rather than one-year, budget cycle and what was called the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) that he had used with great success at Ford. This procedure forced the services to look at missions across service lines. Planning was based on the mission to be performed, rather than the service, and this permitted a much more rational approach to a task. If the mission was to attack Soviet industry, for example, the role of each service could be specified, eliminating overlap and duplication.

Eventually the military saw that PPBS was a very useful tool in making procurement decisions and in assigning roles and missions. Their complaint was that McNamara relied almost entirely on the corps of "whiz kids" he brought into the Pentagon from industry and think tanks like the RAND corporation. He ignored the generals who had been working on defense problems all their lives. (See, for example, Brig. Gen. Geoffrey Cheadle, USAF (ret.), "Not Understanding Military Was McNamara's Big Error," *National Defense* [July/August 1995], 52).

The trouble was that McNamara insisted on using this kind of numbers approach not just for procurement and assigning roles and missions but for every other kind of problem as well. And a numbers approach was decidedly wrong in trying to find a sophisticated response to the complicated national security and foreign policy problems in Vietnam.

One of the practices that came under the most criticism during the Vietnam war was that of measuring progress by body counts—the number of dead Viet Cong counted on the field. McNamara blames the military for the idea for body

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counts, but in fact it was one more example of McNamara's foible of trying to quantify every aspect of life (p. 48). In short order, the policy was transformed into quotas: each unit was given a target of Viet Cong that they had to kill. The trouble was that the policy encouraged both the American and the Vietnamese troops to count as Viet Cong the bodies of innocent villagers killed accidentally. The practice also encouraged the more unscrupulous officers, both American and Vietnamese, to invent the figures. On one occasion the State Department intelligence people went back over the body count for one particular district and found that it had exceeded the total population.

Only occasionally was McNamara's skill with numbers relevant to the real problem in Vietnam. Probably the most important of these occasions was his testimony on 25 August 1967 before the Senate's Armed Services Preparedness Subcommittee chaired by Senator John Stennis—an occasion that also marked McNamara's own reversal on the Vietnam war (pp. 284–287).

The hearings were intended to force the Johnson administration to launch more massive air attacks on North Vietnam. But McNamara's numbers showed that the very low-tech war the communists were fighting needed only fifteen tons of supplies a day other than food, and they easily obtained food locally. The communist supply system was crude, relying heavily on reinforced bicycles carrying about 500 pounds each, but McNamara showed that the supply system was easily capable of carrying many times the fifteen tons a day that was needed. The obvious conclusion was that even extraordinarily massive air attacks would make little difference.

The "Suicide" of Diem and Nhu

McNamara writes that Kennedy doubted the report that Diem and Nhu, both Catholics, had committed suicide (p. 84). He then asserts that I intervened to say that it was not difficult to conceive of two Catholics committing suicide in the face of Armageddon. I was particularly startled to read this statement, since I believe exactly the opposite. I then checked my calendars and discovered that I was not even at this particular meeting.

The Withdrawal Plan

McNamara says that when the American commanding general reported "continued progress" on 6 May 1963, "I therefore directed the military to prepare a plan for phasing out U. S. forces beginning with the withdrawal of 1,000 advisers by year's end" (p. 49). Again, the facts are quite different. Earlier that year, President Kennedy had instructed McNamara to order the JCS to develop a plan for a complete withdrawal of the American forces. Days, weeks, and months passed and no plan was forthcoming. It was probably the military who were stalling, but Kennedy kept pushing McNamara, and McNamara no doubt kept pushing the JCS. Eventually the JCS did develop a plan, and Kennedy approved

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it. Implementation began shortly before Kennedy's death, with the withdrawal of 1,000 advisers.

McNamara says he now believes that we should have taken the opportunity provided by Diem's death to withdraw (p. 320). But at the time when that exact suggestion was made, McNamara vehemently opposed it. Shortly after the coup, several of us in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs did discuss the idea that the time may have come for the United States to withdraw from Vietnam entirely. But we decided it would be too soon to raise the idea in an interdepartmental or NSC meeting. However, shortly after the coup, at an NSC meeting held at the State Department in the absence of President Kennedy, I put forward the State Department view, with Paul Kattenberg's support, that the war was going very badly. During the discussion, Kattenberg suddenly came out with the suggestion that perhaps the time had come for the United States to withdraw completely. McNamara reacted with such passion that Kattenberg later told me that he thought his career as a foreign service officer was in jeopardy.

The Monkey on McNamara's Back

Although McNamara falsely accuses W. Averell Harriman, Henry Cabot Lodge, George Ball, Michael V. Forrestal, and me of setting in motion a coup against Diem, he never mentions that Harriman, Lodge, Forrestal, and I (as well as Robert Kennedy) were opposed to making Vietnam an American war, either by bombing North Vietnam or by sending American troops rather than just advisers. We were, in other words, doves. It is no accident that the only dove that McNamara has a good word for, or even acknowledges as a dove, is George Ball. Ball was also the only dove that President Johnson permitted to stay on after Kennedy's assassination, and President Johnson used Ball shamelessly to try to show that he had listened to the doves' arguments against making Vietnam an American war but decided against them.

McNamara's first reaction to every disagreement on policy toward Vietnam was to insist on going to Vietnam to "see for himself." He would fly to Vietnam, talk to the same people who were writing the cables, and then he would change his mind and come back and endorse our original view. But in the case of making Vietnam an American war, it took McNamara over two years to come around, from the time of the start of the bombing in February 1965, for which he was the principal architect, until late 1967, when he told President Johnson of his doubts about both the bombing and the war.

Because of this, Johnson decided to get McNamara out of the way in early 1968. To do so, and to induce him to keep quiet, Johnson appointed McNamara to the presidency of the World Bank, where he spent many years keeping silent while the war went on and on. Not once did McNamara speak out against the war, although if he had done so, he might well have helped end it years sooner.

McNamara's excuse was that he was loyal to President Johnson and that challenging Johnson's Vietnam policy "would have been a violation of my responsibility to the president and my oath to uphold the Constitution" (p. 314).

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But what kind of morality is it to be loyal to a wrong-headed president by keeping silent while over 25,000 more Americans and several hundred thousand Vietnamese are killed when your speaking out might well have stopped the war?

And it is simply incorrect to suggest that it is unconstitutional for a cabinet minister to oppose a president's policies. If so, an extraordinary number of the best cabinet ministers in American history have violated the Constitution, beginning with Thomas Jefferson who spent much of his time as secretary of state launching attacks on the foreign policy of his president, George Washington.

Johnson replaced McNamara with a trusted friend and a confirmed hawk, Clark Clifford. Within a few months, Clifford saw that the war could not be won. But instead of being content with merely telling the president his opinion, as McNamara and George Ball had done, and justifying silence by a specious reference to the Constitution, Clifford proceeded to organize an opposition inside the United States government and persuaded Johnson to agree to the opening of peace negotiations in Paris.

The people McNamara attacks most vehemently have one thing in common: they were doves who actively opposed the war. But McNamara himself has become a dove, so why is he so vindictive? The answer seems to be that what was most galling to McNamara was that the doves had been right and he had been wrong.

Consider the following incident. On the day that McNamara left office, I got a telephone call from Peter Lisagor, Washington correspondent for the *Chicago Daily News*. He said that he had just finished interviewing McNamara and that he had a strange story to tell me. All of McNamara's books were already packed in boxes except two, of which one was my *To Move a Nation: The Politics of Policy Making in the Administration of John F. Kennedy*. Lisagor said that after the interview was finished, he pointed to my book and remarked that Dean Rusk was angry at me for having written a book at all, and what did McNamara think? Lisagor said that McNamara replied, "I won't criticize Roger. It turns out he was right all along."

Some time later, on 20 January 1969, the day that Lyndon Johnson left office, I wrote Johnson saying that as someone who had caused him some annoyance about Vietnam I wanted to say that his accomplishments in domestic affairs would in the long run outweigh Vietnam and that his place in history was secure. I wrote similar, but not nearly so praiseful letters to Dean Rusk and to Robert McNamara.

In March I got a letter from Johnson saying that he had just now gotten around to reading the mail received when he left office and that he could not let a day pass without writing me. In a typical Lyndon Johnson bear hug, he made it clear that all was forgiven. It is not surprising that Dean Rusk never answered me at all. Rusk went to his grave defending the decisions to make Vietnam an American war and never gave any hint of regret. But what did McNamara do—especially in the light of what he had said to Lisagor? He had his wife write me a very nice and friendly letter.

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What, then, can be said about McNamara's motives in writing this very strange book? He is an extraordinarily complicated man. It would not be surprising if all the hypotheses about his motives given at the beginning of this article have some element of truth, in spite of being contradictory. But it is doubtful if any one of these hypotheses is the whole explanation.

But two conclusions do seem justified. The first is that McNamara was bright enough to see—eventually—both that the war was wrong and that it could not be won. The second is that he lacked the courage or humility or whatever other quality was needed to speak out while the war was going on to try to stop it. For this, certainly, history will not forgive him.

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Book Reviews

Contemporary Politics in Japan *by Junnosuke Masumi, translated by Lonny E. Carlile. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1995. 514 pp. Cloth, $65.00; paper, $25.00.*

Japanese voters went to the polls fourteen times between 1955 and 1993, each time to give to the Liberal Democrats enough seats to form a government. Thirty-eight years is an uncommonly long stretch for a party to remain in power. What accounts for the Liberal Democrats' success? Junnosuke Masumi's book deals with this era. He gives three reasons.

The alternative of voting for a Liberal Democrat was to vote for a Socialist, whose party preached neutrality as a foreign policy and revolution as a domestic policy. The Socialists had their followers—never more than a third of the electorate but a firm third. Only a few followers drifted off to join new parties which eventually emerged. The socialists were the key. They never had enough votes to put themselves in office, always had enough votes to block new parties from coming to power, and were either too radical or too idealistic to consider coalitions. By default, the Liberal Democrats ruled. Masumi gives over 103 pages of text to a discussion of the Socialists, the labor movement that backed them, and the emerging parties that challenged them.

The second reason the Liberal Democrats remained in power for thirty-eight years was that they solved the problems of the day. One problem was to guarantee Japan's security without rebuilding a Japanese army in an era of cold war, with a hot war next door in Korea. They did that by entering into a treaty with the United States: it would defend Japan in return for the use of bases in Japan for the defense of the Far East. Not long after signing this treaty, the Japanese learned that three of the seven U-2's the Americans used to spy on the Soviet Union flew from Japan. A little later, the Japanese came to suspect that the Americans had nuclear missiles directed at China housed on Okinawa. Masumi uses these and other incidents to describe how the treaty worked out in practice. Another problem facing the Liberal Democrats was bettering the livelihood of the Japanese citizens. Masumi explains in detail how Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda maneuvered to fulfill his public promise to double every citizen's income in ten years. Some scholars argue that the bureaucrats should be given credit for Japan's extraordinary economic growth. Masumi gives credit to the politicians.

The third reason the Liberal Democrats remained in power for thirty-eight years was that their party did not split. It should have. The electoral system, for example, encouraged division. From 130 districts, 256 Liberal Democrats had to emerge as winners to maintain a majority in the Diet. Liberal Democrats had to fight one another. Eight factions comprised the Liberal Democratic Party in Tokyo. These factions were constantly at each other, battling for posts, perquisites, and the greatest prize of all—the prime minister's chair. Masumi is at his best while writing about the factions.

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Though Masumi writes mostly in Japanese, he has an English language *ouvre*. Berkeley professor, Robert Scalapino, collaborated with him to write about the emerging political system in the 1960s. Lonny Carlile, then a Berkeley graduate student, translated his study of Japanese politics during and some years after the American occupation. Carlile, now a professor, helped distill and translate into English the two Japanese volumes that make up the volume under review. The adaption is superb.

Masumi has given us over a thousand pages on postwar politics. Although he regards himself as an historian and writes to record, much of what he has to say adds depth to today's political developments. His grasp of materials—mostly diaries, memoirs, and speeches—is all-encompassing. His quotes from them add immediacy. His voice never wavers: explanations are simple; conclusions are bold. He deserves to be read. *Contemporary Politics* is a good place to start.

NATHANIEL B. THAYER
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International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War *edited by Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen. New York, Columbia University Press, 1995. 292 pp. Cloth $45.00; paper, $17.50.*

This volume is organized around three themes: the utility of neorealism for understanding the end of the cold war, the nature and timing of the cold war, and the sources and motives of Soviet foreign policy. The nine chapters, which follow the introduction of the editors, fall into two theoretical categories. The first few chapters emphasize the influence of structural or systemic factors on domestic politics and choices. The second part of the book emphasizes the nonstructural determinants of foreign policy and examines closely the ideas and concepts behind the decisions of the Soviet leadership to seek East-West reconciliation.

Adopting the first approach, Kenneth A. Oye argues that the bipolar world required enormous military and security commitments that eventually undermined the Soviet economy. The burdens imposed by the international environment conditioned Mikhail Gorbachev's reform agenda. Therefore, realism, according to Oye, is still a useful framework for understanding the end of the cold war. Michael W. Doyle is less convinced about the utility of neorealism and argues that the pressures from below for democratic reform and openness convinced the post-Brezhnev leadership to join the international political economy. The Soviet Union could then enjoy the fruits of international commerce, which could offer a solution to the economic strains arising from cold war competition. Jack Synder believes that the Gorbachev leadership accepted the collapse of the empire because the political and economic institutions of the Soviet Union could no longer compete with the West and deliver a standard of living that would satisfy the aspirations of the Soviet middle class. The Soviet Union changed its foreign policy to seek greater international economic integration, while the international system, dominated by liberal states, ensured that the collapse of the Soviet Union did not provoke intense conflict among strong nations.

The second set of essays highlights particular domestic, ideological, and psychological developments. These chapters stress the role played by ideas and the receptiveness of leaders in recognizing new concepts. Rey Koslowski and Friedrich V. Kratochwil argue that the

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changes in Eastern Europe had an impact on Soviet thinking and convinced Gorbachev to reputiate the Brezhnev doctrine in the hope of saving Soviet society. Lebow has two essays in this volume. In the first, he criticizes the realist paradigm for missing a critical piece in the end of the cold war puzzle, namely the changed relationship between the Soviet Union and its satellite states, and its willingness to renounce an imperialist foreign policy. In the second essay, Lebow claims that mounting international and domestic pressures encouraged Gorbachev to take the dramatic step of seeking a conciliatory foreign policy. He believes that leaders are more likely to resolve long-standing international conflicts when they expect their peaceful approach to be reciprocated by their adversaries.

Risse-Kappen suggests that the Soviet leadership was influenced by new ideas coming from think-tanks and foreign policy analysts in the West. The reform coalition around Gorbachev used the new ideas to legitimize its own changed perceptions of the international environment and domestic needs. In a similar vein, Janice Gross Stein argues that Gorbachev had few ideas about foreign policy, but was open to suggestions and proposals from high-level, reform-minded officials who propagated ideas that ultimately fit Gorbachev's own perceptions of the situation. Richard K. Herrman, in the conclusion, synthesizes the main findings of the chapters and urges scholars of international relations to pay more attention to the motivations, perceptions, and goals of foreign policy leaders. This will help us understand the constraints faced by countries, the nature of their environment, and the interests and aims of their elites.

All in all, this volume is a useful addition to the growing theoretical and empirical literature on the sea-change in world politics. The chapters explore a range of factors to account for the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of bipolarity. The authors make a good case for combining different theoretical approaches and levels of analysis in order to anticipate momentous changes in the world system and to gain a better understanding of the end of the cold war puzzle.

PAULETTE KURZER
University of Arizona

The State, Society, and Limited Nuclear War *by Eric Mlyn. Albany, State University of New York Press, 1995. 241 pp. Paper, $19.95.*

This is an interesting, thoroughly researched, well thought out contribution to our understanding of the relationship between the state and society in reference to three levels of nuclear policy: declaratory policy, force development policy, and action policy or targeting. Its only problem is that it should have been published in 1988 or 1989.

Mlyn begins with a critique of the bureaucratic model of decision making, which has become the dominant paradigm for studying weapons procurement decisions. He suggests that "bureaucratic approaches have been useful for explaining some parts of nuclear weapons policymaking" (p. ix), but they are not particularly helpful for describing the relationship between the various levels of policy mentioned above. One of their primary shortcomings is that they leave very little role for society or for the influence of Congress.

He offers what he considers a much more useful "statist" approach, which will show that the state has gradually been losing its autonomy to the society in the formulation of nuclear weapons policy. By widening his definition of the state to include Congress, which he sees as the entrance point for society into the state, the author offers an approach that he uses to present his three case studies. The case studies cover the periods 1960–1968,

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1969–1975, and 1976–1985, and are defined by the major declaratory announcements of three respective secretaries of Defense: Robert McNamara, James Schlesinger, and Harold Brown.

The outcome of these studies suggests that while Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) was often our declaratory policy, it never was the basis for our action policy, which was always oriented toward counterforce targeting. As long as we had significant nuclear superiority, this condition did not present any problems. Policy makers had enough weapons to carry out the necessary targeting, while the public remained largely indifferent to nuclear problems, because MAD seem to make the use of nuclear weapons incredible. However, as we moved toward nuclear parity, officials began to employ rhetoric closer to Nuclear Utilization Theory (NUTS) to justify the greater commitment to counterforce weapons required by the targeting policy. This rhetoric seemed to suggest that we were actually planning on fighting a nuclear war and thus raised the saliency of nuclear weapons in the popular consciousness and brought about the enormous public outcry that characterized the early 1980s. This public outburst in both the press and Congress, according to the author, severely curtailed the state's autonomy in this crucial area.

While his story is well told and his points well argued, the author seems to be caught in a time warp. All of this talk about MAD and NUTs in 1996 seems oddly out of place. One can well sympathize with the author's opening statement in the Acknowledgments: "This book has been long in the making." In fact, with the exception of five pages in the text, two pages in the conclusion, and less than 5 percent of the sources, everything in this book could have been said eight years ago. Those eight years have created a world so different from what came before that a book like this has only limited value today.

PHILIP W. DYER
University of Nebraska–Lincoln

Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939–1956 *by David Holloway. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1994. 480 pp. $30.00.*

Until recently, it would have been impossible to write a lengthy history of the early Soviet nuclear weapons program. Any Western scholar who might have attempted such a feat would have had to rely almost exclusively on guesswork. But now, with the end of the cold war and the collapse of the Soviet Union, David Holloway has been able to consult once-secret archival materials and to interview former officials who played key roles in the Soviet bomb program. The result is a splendid, well-documented analysis of how the Soviet Union managed to build nuclear and thermonuclear weapons.

Holloway's book, however, is far more than just a history of the Soviet nuclear program. The author raises important questions about the relationship between science and politics, the nature of Soviet society during the Stalin era, the impact of nuclear weapons on international politics, and the origins and early turning points of the cold war. Holloway is particularly astute in discussing how U.S. and Soviet deployments of nuclear weapons affected Soviet foreign policy under Joseph Stalin and his immediate successors. Contrary to "revisionist" historians who claim that the United States was responsible for the cold war, Holloway convincingly argues that Stalin's postwar goals precluded a genuine accommodation with the West and that Stalin would have done whatever was necessary to obtain nuclear weapons

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irrespective of any gestures the United States might have made. Once the technical feasibility and military utility of nuclear bombs had been demonstrated at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Soviet dictator was committed to acquiring such weapons for himself. No expense—financial or otherwise—was spared to achieve that goal, despite the ravages that the war had inflicted on the Soviet economy and population.

Holloway deftly weaves these points into his book without losing sight of the dramatic story he has set out to tell. And tell it he does with great skill. His lively sketches of individuals enrich a narrative replete with tales of nuclear espionage, environmental depredation, technical ingenuity, and systematic human cruelty. All these elements culminated in the first Soviet nuclear bomb test in August 1949. Holloway rightly argues that the Soviet Union's success in building fission weapons within four years—the same length of time needed earlier for the Manhattan Project in the United States—was a remarkable achievement.

Perhaps even more remarkable was the construction of Soviet thermonuclear weapons within another four years, just months after the United States had tested its own first thermonuclear device. The Soviet fission-bomb program, as Holloway shows, had been greatly expedited by secrets stolen from the West, whereas the hydrogen bomb effort was based primarily on indigenous research and designs. Although the initial Soviet hydrogen bomb test in August 1953 involved a crude, "layer-cake" device, Soviet scientists were able to adopt the radiation-implosion concept by 1955. A few minor inaccuracies crop up in Holloway's account, but overall he displays an impressive grasp of nuclear weapons technology as well as of the interactions among scientists, politicians, and organizations involved in the Soviet program.

Holloway's book will not be the final word on the Soviet bomb project; nor is it intended to be. Since 1994, additional documents have emerged form Moscow, which fill in some of the gaps and necessitate slight modifications in Holloway's account. Other such documents are likely to be released in the future. Moreover, the ongoing declassification of U.S. intelligence reports from the 1940s and 1950s should yield crucial technical data that may not be available in Moscow for many years (or decades) to come.

Despite these new disclosures, *Stalin and the Bomb* will remain a superb overview of the early Soviet nuclear weapons program, providing a reference point for all future work on the subject. What is more, Holloway's analysis of cold war politics and of Stalin's foreign policy is of immense, lasting value in itself. His book is essential reading for historians, political scientists, and all others interested in the domestic and international consequences of Soviet (and post-Soviet) nuclear weapons.

Mark Kramer
Harvard University

Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities *by Mitchell Reiss. Washington, DC, Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995. 346 pp. Cloth, $45.00; paper, $16.95.*

Sometimes a policy analyst will write a book rich enough to merit the attention of even those political scientists who want all their reading material to be theory-laden. Mitchell Reiss, a guest scholar at the Wilson Center and a former staff member on the Reagan and Bush National Security Councils, has written such a book.

Reiss turns the familiar proliferation question on its head: why have many countries recently given up their nuclear weapons after working so hard to get them? Reiss examines

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nine such cases—South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, India, Pakistan, and North Korea—and in so doing challenges, without directly attacking their work, the predictions of Kenneth Waltz, John Mearsheimer, and others who claim that security imperatives will lead would-be regional great powers inexorably to develop nuclear arsenals. Based on detailed case studies, he suggests factors for constraint: the nuclear taboo, appreciation for the hidden costs of nuclear competition, and dollar diplomacy. He lays particular weight on "good leadership" (p. 329), a factor which Reiss recognizes skirts the edge of a tautology: nuclear ambitions are restrained by good leadership, because good leaders are those who see that nuclear weapons are unneeded.

One might quibble that Reiss should have included out-and-out "failures" to see whether his factors for constraint were in fact absent there, even as they were present in the successes—in political science jargon, avoiding selection on the dependent variable. But in general, the book should not be niggled in this way. Reiss does not pretend to write political science theory. He aims for diplomatic history and hits that mark. Reiss wins over the reader with brisk writing, pithy quotes (he must have swallowed Bartlett's *Quotations*), and meticulous historical narrative.

All the empirical chapters are strong, but the best is the case study on North Korea. With remarkable access to U.S. policy makers and dogged detective work, Reiss sketches the best existing unclassified account of U.S.–North Korean nuclear relations. If there is a flaw on his terms, it is that Reiss relies too much on U.S. sources (as he does in his other case studies). We can expect Reiss to add more North Korean sources to subsequent editions of the book, because he recently left the Wilson Center to work for the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, the newly crated international organization established to implement the framework agreements.

Because the book is so fertile, it is perhaps disappointing that Reiss chose not to engage theoretical debates in political science. Reiss takes as given that nuclear proliferation is bad, and so those countries who successfully stopped their nuclear proliferation program in fact succeeded in the broadest sense of the term (see his approval of Ukraine's ultimate decision to give up its nuclear weapons, p. 129). Like most policy makers, he dismisses as beneath mention the academic controversy over whether nuclear proliferation is good or bad.

Reiss is likewise content to recognize patterns rather than test theories about nuclear policy making. Ultimately, this failure weakens the policy recommendations, for policy recommendations are prophetic statements of theory; if you do X then good thing Y will happen because Y is a function of X. Reiss perforce has theories, but they remain implicit and untested.

All this may be unfair outside-the-beltway criticisms for what is a quintessentially an inside-the-beltway book. Although Reiss saw fit to ignore political scientists in writing his book, they will not be able to neglect him. His case studies are simply too lavishly detailed and important to be ignored.

PETER D. FEAVER
Duke University

The Italian Revolution: The End of Politics Italian Style? *by Mark Gilbert. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1995. 204 pp. Cloth, $44.95; paper, $14.95.*

The Italian political system has undergone deep changes during the past decade. All the major parties have disappeared, with the partial exception of the PCI's (Italian Communist

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party) metamorphosis. This once most stable political class has been swept away by a judiciary storm, with several ministers and prime ministers jailed or under investigation. Two new antiparty parties have erupted out of political chaos: one threatens to transform north-based social unrest into secession; the other makes the Orwellian nightmare come true, with a TV mogul as its leader quickly becoming Italy's prime minister. Events of such scope and complexity are by all means difficult to squeeze into 200 pages, the more so if the author does not intend to confine his analysis to the more recent upheavals. He attempts to cover the roots of the Italian revolution, thus encompassing a whole decade of corrupt politics. Gilbert's book deserves recognition as a very accurate chronicle of a dense and controversial political era. Facts and characters are carefully recorded, and all the relevant features find an orderly and timely place in the ten chapters reconstructing the end of politics Italian style. For those who have little or no acquaintance with recent Italian history, this book is a useful introduction.

However, little if any interpretation is offered nor is any effort made to place the Italian so-called revolution in a wider comparative context. The author self-admittedly writes that "there is no chapter that attempts to explain why the Italian party system collapsed so comprehensively" (p. 1), but then puzzles the reader by adding that "my provisional answer to this question is clear from the narrative itself. Italy's seemingly perennial political system fell apart largely because of the hubris, excess and venality of its leaders." Indeed, the narrative is clearly intended as a surrogate for the lack of an analytical framework. Events and personalities are phrased and represented in a very participatory vein, with moral overtones reminiscent of the best muckraker's tradition. The relationship between Mafia and politics in the 1980s is one where "the ruling parties sold the family silver to appease a child whose murderous tendencies had become all too evident" (p. 3). And overall judgments may include such peremptory statements as "Since 1992, it has in fact become clear that Italy was really a cleptocracy" (p. 5).

The author makes no effort to conceal his sympathies toward the movement for institutional reform, which through several referendum campaigns strongly contributed to the collapse of the old party system. This book is a progressive's reconstruction of the Italian revolution, hailing the advent of new politics and new leaders eventually kicking out the corrupt political machines that had been running the country for the previous fifty years. The reader is left with two caveats. The first one is that the Italian revolution is still in the making, and—as the back cover reads—"the Italian transition may end as a paradoxical restoration." The second caveat concerns the ambivalence of progressivism, the gap between the spirit of reform and its social and political outcome. In the United States, progressive reforms have been often stifled by unintended consequences, with the aim of participatory democracy being eventually turned upside down. In Italy, one may find some irony in the fact that Silvio Berlusconi was the one who profited most from the downfall of the old regime. As Joseph LaPalombara would put it, perhaps Italians only staged their revolution on TV.

MAURO CALISE
Università di Napoli "Federico II"

The Puzzle of Strikes: Class and State Strategies in Postwar Italy *by Roberto Franzosi. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1995. 502 pp. $54.95.*

For students of West European politics and comparative and historical methods, Roberto Franzosi has written an extremely interesting and provocative book. As the title suggests,

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Franzosi tries to disentangle the pattern of Italian strikes between 1950 and the late 1970s. In light of the high rate of Italian industrial unrest, the unparalleled strength of the Italian Communist party, and the tumultuous strikes of the Hot Autumn in 1969, this empirical question is of clear interest to a wide audience. But more than this, the book is also driven by a methodological agenda that tackles conventional wisdoms in quantitative and qualitative research. Using a narrative style of presentation, Franzosi presents his research like a story, following leads that take the reader through a succession of theories and analyses.

The starting point in this narrative is the business cycle theory of strikes, which forms the foundation for most econometric work in the field. A blend of inferential and exploratory statistics finds reasonable support for the theory—strike frequency declines with high unemployment—but his account is hard to reconcile with labor passivity through the 1950s booms and militancy during the recessionary 1970s. These exceptions to the business cycle logic motivate political and organizational theories. Industrial unrest is linked to repressive systems of labor control after the war and the reinforcement of labor relations following the factory uprisings of the late 1960s. Franzosi then pushes this story further, exploring how strikes themselves, and strike waves in particular, can shape labor market institutions and business cycle fluctuations. Thus there is evidence that the independent variables for much of the analysis are endogenous to the original dependent variable, strike activity.

These ideas are explored in the final two chapters, which for me were the most interesting. Here, Franzosi abandons the econometric analysis of time series, preferring instead a more disaggregated examination of a wealth of survey data and ethnographic evidence culled from secondary sources. While the effects of strikes on institutions and economic conditions point to the larger conclusion that conflict is the key motor of social change, the book ends rather unexpectedly by withdrawing this claim. Instead, the exclamation points of intense social upheaval are placed within the longer ebb and flow of capitalist development.

This conclusion underlines the essentially methodological motivation for Franzosi's project. The main methodological point has objective and subjective dimensions: the clean punchlines highly valued in social scientific research depend strongly on both the broader historical context of the research site and the research process itself. While we researchers prefer such punchlines, Franzosi argues that research conclusions should not overgeneralize from one historical context or, indeed, a few well chosen regression runs. Furthermore, to capture the long waves of macrohistorical change, or the more rapid fluctuations of industrial conflict from year-to-year or decade-to-decade, a variety of theories and evidence are needed.

For some, the book's brassy authorial voice and unorthodox style of presentation may be more irritating than engaging. Admittedly, this was my reaction through the early chapters. Many specifics of the substantive and methodological argument may also elicit objections. For instance, "high-powered statistics" came in for rather undeserved criticism when inappropriate application of such methods is probably the real villain. Still, the general task of challenging traditional modes of social scientific explanation largely succeeds I think, not so much through the methodological platitudes that are abundant in comparative and historical research, but through a thorough and thoughtful piece of empirical work.

BRUCE WESTERN
Princeton University

The National Front and French Politics: The Resistible Rise of Jean-Marie Le Pen *by Jonathan Marcus. New York, New York University Press, 1995. 212 pp. $45.00.*

In the 1995 presidential election, Jean-Marie Le Pen, the leader of the French far right-wing Front National, garnered more than 15 percent of the popular vote. A few weeks later, in

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municipal elections, three of his party's candidates were elected mayors of major cities in the south of France. The outcome of both elections clearly showed that despite being one of the most extremist right-wing parties in Western Europe, the Front National has managed to firmly establish itself in the French party system.

Jonathan Marcus's portrait of the Front National is the first book in English that offers a systematic and comprehensive survey of a party whose significance reaches far beyond the French borders. Drawing on a wealth of French sources and personal interviews with Le Pen and major party leaders, the author traces the party's organizational, ideological, and electoral history; discusses the role immigration has played in the party's success; and examines the response of the established parties to the far-right challenge. In the conclusion, the author places the Front National in the larger context of the recent upsurge of far right-wing parties in Western Europe. In the process, Marcus provides a number of insights that help explain how this party has managed to gain a measure of respectability.

The most important reason lies with the personality of the Front National leader. Le Pen's vital importance for his party's fortunes derives from several sources: his rhetorical abilities, his undeniable charisma, his considerable personal financial resources, and perhaps most importantly, his tactical ability to unite the different and often far from compatible traditions of the French far right into one organization. Ironically, despite Le Pen's pronounced anticommunism, the party he built is organized along strict Leninist principles, which leave little room for dissent or initiatives from below. A second reason has been the ambiguous response of the established parties whose opportunistic adoption of the immigration issue and tactical maneuvering (as in 1986 when François Mitterrand changed the electoral laws) gained the Front National legitimacy.

The Front National has derived much of its success from its ruthless political exploitation of the immigration question. However, the Front National is far from a single-issue party. Its program covers almost all important areas of political concern. Not surprisingly, given its ideological heterogeneity, the party's proposals are not always consistent. Thus in economics, the party oscillates between support for free markets and support for "national preference." Recently, the party has come out strongly against international trade.

This raises the question of the connection between party program and electoral support. In the last presidential election, Le Pen received a disproportionate amount of support from blue-collar workers. Surveys show that his supporters were particularly worried about their future. Space considerations prevent Marcus from discussing in depth what motivates Front National voters. This is unfortunate, since Marcus rightly emphasizes to what degree the Front National has been handicapped by the French electoral system. And yet, in national election after election, a growing number of French voters "waste" their vote in support of a party that consistently (except in 1986) fails to gain a significant representation in parliament.

Despite its successes, the party remains an outsider in French politics and, ironically, increasingly also on the West European far-right scene. As Marcus points out, as far-right parties in Italy and Australia have gained popular support, they have moderated their positions, distancing themselves from the Front National's scarcely concealed antisemitism and racism. Whether or not a new generation of party leaders will be able to follow suit, once Le Pen is gone, might very well determine the party's future.

HANS-GEORG BETZ
The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies,
The Johns Hopkins University

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The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War *by Alan Brinkley. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1995. 371 pp. $27.50.*

Writing at a time when, he believes, liberalism is in "defeat and disarray," Alan Brinkley here attempts to explain what went wrong, when, and why. His focus is on crucial changes in the liberal agenda which, he maintains, occurred between 1937 and 1945. Before 1937, and even briefly thereafter, he argues, many liberals proposed a thorough-going critique of capitalism. Confident that the power of the state would be used responsibly and humanely, they favored centralized planning, "an ordered economic world" (p. 31), and supported a frontal assault on monopoly power. But then things abruptly changed. Shaken by the impact of the 1937-1938 recession, sobered by a public mood increasingly skeptical of big government, and seduced by the success of deficit spending in stimulating the wartime boom, liberals beat an unfortunate if understandable retreat.

They settled for a more faint-hearted approach, Brinkley claims, which was "less statist than its earlier counterparts, less concerned with issues of class, less hostile to existing patterns of economic power, committed above all to a new vision of a consumer-driven economy" (p. 174). Where New Dealers had once denounced plutocrats and economic royalists, postwar liberals, beguiled by a Keynesian emphasis on fiscal policy, committed themselves "to providing a healthy environment in which the corporate world could flourish" (p. 7).

To support his argument, Brinkley offers a thoughtful analysis of what liberals were saying (and, to a lesser extent, doing) about "questions of political economy." These questions, he notes, were debated "largely within a world of elites—intersecting networks of liberal policy makers, journalists, scholars, and intellectuals . . . a world overwhelmingly dominated by white middle-class men" (p. 13). Brinkley plunges headlong into that world, examining the views of such Franklin D. Roosevelt administration insiders as Henry Wallace, Harold Ickes, Henry Morgenthau, and Harry Hopkins, but devoting even more attention to officials and advisers somewhat lower in the New Deal pecking order: Leon Henderson, Marriner Eccles, Lauchlin Currie, Mordecai Ezekiel, Alvin Hansen, Thurman Arnold, and Isidor Lubin.

Of necessity, Brinkley revisits much familiar territory, including the debate between Morgenthau and Hopkins over an antirecession program, the dispute between Wallace and Jesse Jones over the role of the Board of Economic Warfare, and the conflict between Donald Nelson and General Brehen B. Somervell over the War Production Board's procurement policy. But he always returns to the theme that World War II "muted liberal hostility to capitalism and the corporate world" (p. 7).

The End of Reform is grounded in impressive research in manuscript collections as well as in published sources; it offers a balanced assessment of its subject; and it is gracefully, indeed elegantly written. Brinkley is usually sensitive to developments that do not neatly fit his interpretive framework, such as the wartime inclusion of a greater commitment to civil rights for African Americans. He does not, however, mention the incarceration of Japanese Americans, much less examine what that policy implied about liberalism in wartime. So firmly is his vision fixed on economic issues that he terms the Office of Price Administration—rather than the War Relocation Authority—the wartime agency "which infringed on personal liberty more directly than any other" (p. 160).

Brinkley convincingly shows that by 1945 American liberals had "detached liberalism from its earlier emphasis on reform—its preoccupation with issues of class, its tendency to equate freedom and democracy with economic autonomy, its hostility to concentrated economic power." Equally suggestive, if less fully developed, is his view that this very disen-

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gagement "stripped postwar liberalism of its ability to deal with some enduring and inescapable problems" and, consequently, "is among the sources of American liberalism's present travail" (p. 271).

RICHARD POLENBERG
Cornell University

The British Tradition of Federalism *by Michael Burgess. London, Leicester University Press, 1995. 197 pp. $39.50.*

Britain is usually considered to be a unitary state, both in constitutional theory and to a large extent in practice. Although not entirely denying that characterization, Michael Burgess insists that elements of federalism are present in British history. He argues, furthermore, that in their search for solutions to seemingly intractable problems, politicians and academics have seriously neglected a homegrown tradition of federalistic thinking and advocacy. In this book he aims to set the record straight and demonstrate that interest in federalism has not been solely the preserve of foreigners.

To support this case, Burgess examines the federalists' response to crisis in three policy arenas: empire, Ireland, and Europe. He goes back to the forty years prior to World War I to unearth rudiments of a federalistic solution to emerging problems and growing restiveness in the British empire. It is revealing of the federalists of that time that the debate over the possibility of building elements of federalism into imperial relations focused almost exclusively on the self-governing white nations; their enthusiasm for genuine federalism (as opposed to the loose confederation that became the Commonwealth) faded when the nonwhite parts of the empire became dominant. Federalism as an alternative figured more prominently in the question of Ireland, but much of its appeal was diminished by the outcome of the home rule controversy. The quasi-federal arrangement that characterized the Northern Ireland-British relationship from 1921 to 1972 (the Stormont regime) was a high point in the institutionalizing of federalist ideas, but it was hardly a model for a democratic society and tended above all to reflect Britain's desire to keep the problem of Ireland at a distance. Burgess's third issue area, British relations with the emerging European Union, does not strengthen his case, as it really underlines the suspicion of dominant political groups of anything smacking of genuine federalism. About the best he can do is to show the link between British federalist ideas and the European union by citing Altiero Spinelli's acknowledged debt to the federalist tracts on the 1930s of Lord Lothian, Lionel Robbins, and Sir William Beveridge. Burgess is more to the point in acknowledging the "phobia of federalism" displayed by Britons in their views of the European Union.

He has done a useful service in resurrecting a nearly forgotten literature and in assessing its influence. But the book has some pronounced peculiarities. One is the almost total neglect (apart from the discussion of Ireland) of the issue of federalism within Britain itself. The Scots and the Welsh and their nationalistic demands play no role in his discussion, and the relationship between the concept of devolution and federalism is not really explicated. Another lacuna is the lack of recognition of the determinedly unitary, centralizing positions of the Thatcher and Major regimes, which have dampened prospects for anything approaching even quasi-federalism within the United Kingdom. After all, federalism depends on the existence and capacity of genuine local government, a condition that has been seriously undermined in Britain in the past fifteen years.

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Despite the success of the *Federalist Papers*, the problems of converting theories of and intellectual enthusiasms for federalism into workable practice cannot be underestimated. That seems to me to be the hidden message of this scholarly but flawed book. Burgess succeeds in pointing out that on occasion federalism in Britain has gained influential supporters; but at the end of the day it has failed to stir sufficient mass or elite enthusiasm. Still, if and when Britain comes to undertake serious constitutional reform, federalism might come onto the menu once more.

JAMES B. CHRISTOPH
Indiana University

Multilateral Negotiations: Lessons from Arms Control, Trade, and the Environment *by Fen Osler Hampson with Michael Hart. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995. 421 pp. $49.95.*

You would think it should be easy to understand why multilateral negotiations fail and why they succeed, given the lack of mystery about the fundamental bargaining problem. In bargaining, the parties have some potential common interest in concluding a deal that will make them all better off, but they also have competing interests in dividing up that new surplus, which tends to lead them to misrepresent their minimum requirements for a deal in order to gain more: in pursuing a bigger share of the benefits, negotiators can sink even beneficial deals.

As this study shows, things are never this simple, and consequently multilateral negotiations are not so easy to explain. Unlike traditional bilateral diplomacy and simple bargaining problems, they involve multiple parties, and often the problems they are meant to overcome are composed of multiple issues. Furthermore, while potential agreements may be better for nation-states as a whole, those new arrangements are nearly always worse for some domestic political or economic interests than the status quo. Providing nine detailed case studies of multilateral negotiations in arms control, trade (by Michael Hart), and the environment, Hampson seeks to explain how these obstacles can be overcome. One important feature of the case studies that should be noted and praised is the inclusion of negotiation failures as well as successes (for example, the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks as well as the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty), which allows us to evaluate the author's causal claims.

The author argues that success lies in the process of negotiation, rather than structural features. More specifically, the parties negotiate agreements successfully when the process allows them to break down the complexity of the task facing them in three ways: by facilitating the creation of coalitions of states with like interests and objectives; by leading states, national leaders, nonstate actors, or officials in international organizations to take on leadership roles and those of policy entrepreneur; and through issue decomposition and sequencing tactics.

The author's case studies and inductive approach substantiate these reasonable claims, but then the question becomes: how do these three conditions get met? The study suggests that there are a multitude of ways this can happen. Active smaller states can often advance negotiations by creating coalitions and offering integrative solutions, where the larger powers fail because of their tendency to declare negotiating positions and then bargain hard to defend them. The perception and understanding of crisis conditions in an issue area, supported by consensual scientific knowledge and evidence, often enable states to focus on a few crucial

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aspects of the negotiations. The author also shows how the felicitous appearance of creative and committed leaders at the subnational, national, and international levels has often played a crucial role in moving states out of negotiating impasses.

However, the author does not push enough to find systematic and general explanation for these conditions, although this careful and comprehensive study suggests some ideas worth pursuing. Do international organizations, or particular types, facilitate the leadership of smaller states? Perhaps the most promising avenue is opened by evidence in the case studies that complex variations in domestic political support and opposition account for both the success and form of multilateral agreements. This suggests that variation in the types of political economic systems of the key states in each issue area permits the pursuit of common benefits over insistence on the status quo.

CELESTE A. WALLANDER
Harvard University

David Brinkley: A Memoir *by David Brinkley. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1995. 273 pp. $25.00.*

Literate Americans who turn to television for an instant window on the latest developments in the political arena have found David Brinkley a reliable, dispassionate (if occasionally acerbic), guide to the world as seen through a Washington eyepiece. And he is still a major media player in his role as host and moderator of a Sunday morning public affairs discussion hour.

Off camera (and the obligation not to offend too large a segment of his audience), Brinkley might be expected to unburden himself of more candid views on the Washington scene and why and how major events occurred over the past half century. Be forewarned: little of that sort will be found in this memoir.

What you see on television is what you get in Brinkley's book—laconic, self-deprecating, often amusing anecdotes about growing up in a North Carolina town and making it to the top of the media world through dedication, hard work, and a lot of luck. It's heart-warming stuff, but even Disney would have trouble finding a handle on it for Hollywood.

What *do* we find out about David Brinkley in this somewhat episodic and selective review of his life? He was the son of a "warm-hearted and generous" father (who died when David was eight) and a rigid, demanding mother who commanded respect. For the most part, David and his brothers and sisters delivered it in their modest Wilmington, NC home. By today's standards, their home life could be regarded as only moderately "dysfunctional." But one brother loved the bottle too much, and another was notorious as a local Lothario. And a sister (to David's horror) accepted a job as executive secretary to Senator Joseph McCarthy in his days of infamy.

Meanwhile, young David had his eye on the media prize from high school on. He worked for a pittance for his hometown paper before moving on to other modest stipends as a reporter with United Press in southern cities. The UP introduced him to radio requirements, and before World War II was over he was on his way to fame and fortune with NBC in Washington.

The rest is largely public history. Brinkley has covered and/or commented on every president and every Congress since Franklin Roosevelt. The presidents fare better than the Congresses. Like most of the top-ranking journalists of modern times, Brinkley finds it easier

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to understand and empathize with the leaders of the free world than with their foot soldiers. Indeed, what emerges clearly from these pages is a portrait of respect and deference toward the White House by the journalists assigned to cover the president, until Watergate spattered Richard Nixon with mud and made his successors suspect.

Ever modest in the assessment of his own talents, Brinkley is equally shy in offering prescriptions for public policy. He has one proposal on presidential politics. The national party conventions are relics that even television has abandoned. The modern solution, says Brinkley, should be fifty state primaries arranged in a reasonable chronology to permit a fair shot for all candidates. Then a one-day meeting would be sufficient to crown the winner and let the candidate spell out a vision for the nation.

A second public policy prescription is somewhat more surprising. For years Brinkley has simmered and stewed over the complexities and outrageous inequities of the federal income tax. After citing some of the abuses, he comes out firmly in favor of a flat tax.

JOHN J. SMEE
Fordham University

Remote and Controlled: Media Politics in a Cynical Age *by Matthew Robert Kerbel. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1995. 170 pp. Cloth, $45.00; paper, $13.95.*

Sparked by a concern about the connection between press cynicism and the public's political cynicism, Matthew Kerbel has crafted an important, accessible, and engaging critique of the state of American media. Kerbel explores the intriguing paradox that in an age when citizens are deluged with information about politics, they feel distant from and contemptuous of governmental leaders. He contends that the nature of political news has undergone a dangerous transformation in recent years, which provides the public with an overwhelmingly negative view of the political world. The internal maneuvering within and between institutions that was once the privileged domain of insiders has now become a staple of public media fare. In addition, personal problems of political leaders routinely upstage policy debate in the news arena. As Kerbel states, ". . . when governance competes with scandal, scandal wins" (p. 114).

Kerbal employs a combination of historical documentation, empirical research, and poignant observation to support his case. He traces over 200 years of American media history to document the central role that the press has played in politics and governance. Kerbel's insight that technology has worked in conjunction with media strategies adopted by reporters and politicians to transform the media/politics environment is compelling. Emergent media technologies, such as radio and television, created the opportunity for political leaders to develop increased personal intimacy with their constituents. This has been a mixed blessing, and the negative consequences seem now to outweigh the positive. In earlier days, FDR used the personal connection fostered by radio to assuage the fears of a Depression-ravaged nation. Today, intimacy conveyed via television often means exposing the seamier side of politicians' private lives.

Another factor contributing to press-generated political cynicism is the inordinate focus on the president as the country's chief newsmaker. An intense struggle has developed between the president and the press for control of political messages. Kerbel employs the imagery of a "battle" to describe this relationship. Presidents use highly refined methods of media management to foster a positive public image. This deliberate strategizing generates resent-

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ment among members of the press corps. Reporters have reacted by employing aggressive techniques of investigative journalism. Journalists themselves have become visible actors in the political process, perpetuating a system of self-referential reporting that undermines the position of governmental leaders.

Further, the distinction between coverage of campaigning versus governing has become blurred. News organizations seem to have adopted permanently a fast-paced, short-term campaign style of coverage that requires a constant supply of new story lines. The result is that news reports tend to highlight conflict and undermine citizen's views of governmental effectiveness. Kerbel notes, "Because the electoral system requires elevated rhetoric, presidents commit to do what the mediated version of governance leads the public to believe they can do—and that is far more than they can realistically achieve" (p. 103).

Kerbel also examines how the media report the actions of other national governmental actors. Media coverage of Washington provides a misleading picture of how the policy process operates. Congress is portrayed as hopelessly gridlocked while its members posture for press attention. "Special" interests are invariably cast as "dastardly supporting players who complicate the system as they work it" (p. 120).

Given that bad news about government has become the norm, is there anything that citizens can do? Kerbel believes that citizens can make a difference by using computer networks and "new" media, such as talk radio and electronic town meetings, to their advantage. The public needs to become an integral and active part of the media system, rather than passive receptors of its messages.

This book is an excellent classroom text. It covers a lot of ground in a concise, yet comprehensive manner. It is carefully researched, clearly written, and provides a wealth of real-world examples to accompany the more theoretical material presented. In addition, discussion questions to accompany each chapter and a glossary of key terms appear at the end of the text. Students will be challenged by the argument, which is bound to spark lively discussion.

DIANA OWEN
Georgetown University

Barry Goldwater *by Robert Alan Goldberg. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1995. 338 pp. $27.50.*

Conservatives seem to be everywhere these days, and historians have begun to notice. Among the many new studies of the Right, this book deserves special attention. Thoroughly researched in primary sources, based on numerous interviews (which for some reason are not listed in the bibliography) and grounded firmly in the secondary literature, this is the definitive biography of Barry Goldwater to date. Although written with the cooperation of the senator and his family, it is far from a court biography. Goldberg has written a fair-minded and extremely useful study of one of the most important people involved in the evolution of modern conservatism.

Goldwater played a crucial role in the transition of conservatism from it's postwar manifestation to the emergence of the "New" Right of the 1980s. His 1964 presidential bid combined elements of both past and future movements. Although campaign issues such as anticommunism harkened back to the 1950s, others such as immorality and crime presaged the 1980s. The concentration on the evils of big government continued from old Right to new. Besides

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foreshadowing many of the problems conservatives would focus on in the next decades, Goldwater's campaign laid the foundation for Ronald Reagan's election by recruiting and training an army of political neophytes. Once involved, these people formed a valuable grassroots network that raised the funds and the votes necessary for the Reagan revolution.

Goldberg's main contribution, however, is his portrayal of the Arizonan. His Goldwater is a flesh and blood man replete with strengths and weaknesses. Although he was a fiscal conservative who chastised Dwight Eisenhower for deviating from right-wing economic policy, Goldwater himself never thought deeply about conservative ideology. Similarly, the Arizona senator emerges as a man who maintained no personal prejudices and so refused to see the consequences of others' racism. For example, he was appalled when the Phoenix Country Club discriminated against his good friend Harry Rosenzweig because he was Jewish. Goldwater threatened to "blackball every name you put in" unless the Club allowed Rosenzweig to join (p. 91). Once the board relented on his friend, however, Goldwater felt no compunction to push for the abolition of the antisemitic policy. This attitude combined with his dedication to the sacredness of property rights led to his vote against the 1964 Civil Rights Act. This Goldwater is also a dedicated partisan who supported Nixon even after he betrayed conservative principles. Finally, Goldwater, despite his image of remaining true to right-wing ideals, could be a pragmatic politician who changed positions to suit the current political climate.

In addition, Goldberg puts his subject into his historical and regional context, which is particularly important with Goldwater, because so much of his identity and image were connected to his southwestern background. Perhaps more important, as Goldberg recognizes, Goldwater's rise to prominence mirrored the emergence of the Sunbelt. The growth in population and economic resources of the southwestern United States following World War II was little acknowledged by those outside the area at the time. These demographic changes, however, resulted in a significant shift in the political power base in the country.

The one area where the book seems lacking is in providing the intraparty background for the conservative takeover. Goldberg glosses over the growing weaknesses of the liberal Republicans, which helped right-wingers to gain control. He similarly dismisses the problems the Kennedy administration created for both wings of the GOP. These are small complaints, however, in an otherwise readable and informative book.

MARY C. BRENNAN
Southwest Texas State University

Ethics in Congress: From Individual to Institutional Corruption *by Dennis F. Thompson. Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1995. 256 pp. Cloth, $34.95; paper, $14.95.*

This is an interesting and insightful analysis of congressional ethics. It contributes not only to understanding problems of political ethics in America, but also to understanding Congress. In dealing with material that often can cause more heat than light, Dennis Thompson's approach to congressional ethics is both analytical and temperate. He carefully and sensitively draws the line between ethical and unethical congressional conduct. In so doing, he distinguishes individual and institutional corruption, the former providing personal benefit by inappropriate means and the latter giving institutional sanction to political actions that prove to be corrupt.

To exemplify individual corruption, Thompson considers the case of former Minnesota Senator David Durenberger, who, in violation of Senate honoraria limits and other rules, accepted large stipends from organizations for speaking appearances, ostensibly to promote

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the sale of his books. To illustrate institutional corruption, Thompson analyzes the case of the so-called Keating Five—Senators Dennis DeConcini (AZ), Alan Cranston (CA), John Glenn (OH), Donald Riegle (MI), and John McCain (AZ). These five senators were implicated in a deal to extricate real estate financier Charles Keating, Jr. from regulatory enforcement affecting a savings and loan (S&L) corporation Keating owned. The senators were charged with accepting campaign contributions from Keating in return for special help with the S&L regulators. After an ethics committee investigation, four senators were rebuked by the Senate for their actions, and Senator Cranston was strongly reprimanded. To exemplify combined individual and institutional corruption, Thompson relates the case of Speaker Jim Wright, who accepted income from sales of his book to lobby groups in excess of the House limit on outside income and who was charged with using improper influence with the Federal Home Loan Bank Board.

In more general terms, Thompson sorts out ethical issues in regard to personal gain, constituent services, and the connections between personal gain and services rendered. For instance, Thompson argues that it is perfectly legitimate for a citizen to contribute money to a candidate's campaign because the citizen agrees with that candidate and wants to support his or her election or reelection. Such a connection animates the political process, he argues. In contrast, Keating made large campaign contributions to senators, especially Cranston, whose views were ideologically light years different from his own. Thompson argues that "a contribution given without regard to the political positions of the candidate only incidentally provides political support; its primary aim is to influence the candidate when in office," and "it short-circuits the democratic process" (p. 113).

Thompson believes that the ethical issues faced by Congress cannot be resolved properly by committees made up of members. Rather, he advocates the establishment of ethics tribunals composed of citizens who are not members of Congress. Under Thompson's plan, congressional consideration of ethics violations would be a two-stage process: investigation by a commission of distinguished citizens appointed by the majority and minority party leaders; and determination by the ethics committees composed of representatives and senators. This proposal would leave Congress the final arbiter of the ethical conduct of its members, but it would allow for independent, outside evaluation of ethics charges against members so that they could not be the sole judges of the validity of members' ethics violations.

This book is interesting to read because it is cogently argued and artfully written. It makes a valuable contribution to discussion about ethical issues in Congress, and it proposes a practical solution to the problem of congressional handling of such issues. Accordingly, it not only contributes to understanding Congress, but it also can be helpful in working out new, more effective congressional practices in dealing with ethics violations.

SAMUEL C. PATTERSON
Ohio State University

Conflict and Compromise: How Congress Makes the Law *by Ronald D. Elving. New York, Simon & Schuster, 1994. 320 pp. $25.00.*

If a student of Congress reads this book knowing nothing of the author, she or he might conclude that the author wrote the book using only Congressional Quarterly Service sources.

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But given the fact that the book's author has spent much of the last decade as one of CQ's outstanding journalists, that conclusion is more a comment on the distinctive style of Congressional Quarterly reporting than on this particular case study.

Ron Elving has produced an encyclopedic review of family and parental leave legislation from its inception in the California legislature in the early 1980s through passage into federal law in the 103rd Congress. All of the facts are there. All of the characters are introduced. All of the legislative rules and quirks are laid out for the reader to see.

A good case study must go beyond merely relating a story to presenting examples from which one can generalize. Elving seems to have written this book with that dictum in mind. As one follows the labyrinthine path of this legislation, Elving points the reader to the relevant road marks on the way to passage: understanding the differences between the House and the Senate, in terms of rules, norms, influence and the like; comprehending that bicameralism has implications for legislation beyond the textbook notation that bills must pass each house of Congress; appreciating the importance of well placed individuals as subcommittee and committee chairs, as friends of the sponsors; viewing the stakes of the legislative process from the position of lobbyists and understanding their roles as information providers and coalition builders; seeing divided government at work and the ways in which the president affects the legislative process; taking a long and a broad perspective on legislation over a period of time and in the context of other domestic and international concerns.

As one would expect from a CQ reporter, Elving describes all of the characters in intimate detail, recalling the smallest incident that the reader once might have known but surely has forgotten. He also takes the reader through the intricacies of process and strategy—through the options open to the Rules Committee, to "holds" in the Senate, to the tactics involved in determining the order in which amendments are proposed or in avoiding a recorded vote in the Senate. These details are the strengths of the book. Student readers will benefit from seeing why they are so important—because in the end they may well determine the final outcome.

But in a sense, the all-inclusive CQ style is also the weakness of the book. Elving's analysis of the case is very well done, but generalizations that the examples should permit do not follow. We know what every actor did and why, but not why results come out one way in one circumstance but differently in another. We see every variable, but we are not told which ones are important, when, and why. As the author states, family leave legislation was around long enough to see several important changes on Capitol Hill. But he does not reveal which of these changes had what kinds of results under what kinds of circumstances. The book also suffers from timing, because the legislation finally passed before the election of the Republican 104th Congress and a whole new political situation. *Conflict and Compromise* during the decade in which Elving followed this legislation may be all but irrelevant in this new environment—or it may not—and the book does not tell the reader what to look for in assessing bills' chances for passage in today's most intriguing Congress.

L. SANDY MAISEL
Colby College

Challengers, Competition, and Reelection: Comparing Senate and House Elections *by Jonathan S. Krasno. New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1995. 195 pp. $26.00.*

Senate elections tend to be more competitive than House elections. More specifically, a higher percentage of Senate incumbents than House incumbents are defeated. These facts

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are well known to students of congressional elections. The question addressed by Jonathan Krasno in his new book is why this disparity exists. Using data from the Center for Political Studies' 1988 Senate Election Study (and occasionally from the 1990 Study), Krasno tests three broad explanations for the greater competitiveness of Senate elections. One explanation focuses on differences in public perceptions of senators and representatives, a second emphasizes differences between Senate and House constituencies, and a third looks at differences between Senate and House challengers.

Krasno's principal findings are that neither differences in perceptions of Senate and House incumbents nor differences between Senate and House constituencies can explain the greater competitiveness of Senate elections. Rather, it is the higher quality of Senate challengers and the greater intensity of the campaigns waged by these challengers that explains the disparity between the reelection rates of Senate and House incumbents. After controlling for differences in challenger quality and campaign intensity, most of the difference in competition between Senate and House contests disappears.

Krasno's results largely confirm the findings of earlier studies regarding the greater visibility of Senate challengers and the greater intensity of Senate campaigns. By using the Senate Election Study data, however, Krasno is able to demonstrate more clearly than previous studies that campaigns really do matter. Specifically, he is able to show that Senate incumbents facing strong challengers were no less visible or popular two years earlier than their colleagues facing weak challengers.

The major weakness of Krasno's book, however, is its almost exclusive reliance on a single data set and a single election year. Because of the relatively small number of seats contested every two years, Senate elections can vary dramatically from one election year to the next. Both the 1988 and 1990 elections were characterized by unusually high rates of incumbent success in Senate races, and this fact may color some of Krasno's findings. For example, I believe that Krasno seriously underestimates the importance of differences between Senate and House constituencies. Many House incumbents represent districts that are dominated by one party. In the 1990s, however, very few states can be considered safe for one party. This difference can be shown by comparing the proportions of incumbent and challenger partisans in Senate and House constituencies. In 1986, for example, challenger partisans actually outnumbered incumbent partisans in states with Senate incumbents running for reelection.

Despite the problems caused by excessive reliance on one data set and one election year, *Challengers, Competition, and Reelection* makes a valuable contribution to our understanding of congressional elections by confirming the influence of challengers and their campaigns on voters in congressional elections. Krasno's findings underscore the need for data that would allow scholars to directly examine the effects of campaigns on voters in different types of Senate and House elections.

ALAN ABRAMOWITZ
Emory University

The Reincarnation of Russia: Struggling with the Legacy of Communism, 1990–1994 *by John Lowenhardt. Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 1995. 238 pp. Cloth, $42.50; paper, $15.95.*

With Russia four years into its post-Soviet stage, it is appropriate to look back at the last several years in order to understand where Russia is and begin to formulate an idea about

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where it is going. This is the purpose of Lowenhardt's work. Thankfully, this is not another book about the collapse of the Soviet Union. While considering the legacies of the Soviet period, it focuses, with the help of the existing literature on political transitions, on the problems facing Russia today.

The book has four distinct parts in addition to the short introduction and conclusion. First, Lowenhardt lays out the topics in the transitions literature that may be useful for understanding Russian politics (legitimacy, civil society and market capitalism, pacts, institutional choices, cleavages and political parties, and governability). Second, he discusses the Soviet legacy and the unique elements of the situation facing Russia at the beginning of its transition. Third, he provides details about Russian politics from 1990–1994, dividing the period into four stages (the chapters that make up this third section are also complemented by a detailed chronology in the form of an appendix). Fourth, he organizes the events of 1990–1994 in Russian by revisiting the important topics of political transitions discussed at the beginning of the book.

While there is some logic in the way that Lowenhardt divides the book into these different sections, the attempt at separating the discussion of the events of 1990–1994 from the interpretation of these events is problematic. As they must, the events reemerge during the analysis, and, as a result, these chapters are repetitive. Combining the descriptive chapters and the interpretation chapter would have allowed the book to flow more smoothly. Each "stage" of post-Soviet Russian politics could then have been its own chapter with analysis included. This also would have set the stage for a genuine conclusion. Instead, the conclusion is quite weak, covering Russian foreign policy and Western aid before briefly turning to Russia's future as a democracy.

While the book could have been organized more efficiently, the use of the transitions literature in the interpretation of Russian events is a real strength. Lowenhardt covers the uniqueness of the Soviet legacy, but he does not pretend that the Russian transition is so unique that those who study it could not be informed by other works on political transitions. A few of his arguments in the interpretation section are by now familiar ("Yeltsin's greatest failure has been his lack of resolve in building and leading a strong political movement or party," [p. 166], for example). Yet, his grasp of arguments in comparative politics allows a discussion of the Russian scene that is more informed and useful than descriptions of Russian politics by those who know extensive details about life in Russia and nothing more.

Had Lowenhardt also used the events in Russia to reexamine the transitions literature itself, rather than simply relying on this literature as a road map to make sense of the Russian situation since 1990, this would have been a truly important work in comparative politics. Even without this, Lowenhardt has produced a useful book for those unfamiliar with the occurrences of post-Soviet Russian politics or for those looking to organize the events of 1990–1994 in a meaningful way.

LOWELL W. BARRINGTON
Marquette University

Cultivating Congress: Constituents, Issues, and Interests in Agricultural Policymaking *by William P. Browne. Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 1995. 298 pp. Cloth, $29.95; paper, $14.95.*

Browne has produced a massively researched examination of agricultural policy making in the postreform Congress. Prior to the reforms of the 1970s, Congress was dominated by

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committee chairs, with adherence to the norms of division of labor, specialization, and reciprocity. The author argues, as have other scholars, that in the postreform era, power and influence were dispersed as more members gained subcommittee chairs and subcommittees gained increased autonomy; additionally, staff sizes grew, enhancing members' capacity to engage in policy entrepreneurship. At roughly the same time, partisanship in the electorate declined, leaving members with a greater sense of electoral vulnerability. As a result, members of Congress became more individualistic and less deferential to committee leaders and to the norms that had undergirded the chairs' power. In the agricultural policy domain, the author finds that this individualism has led to vastly increased member involvement in policy making, as even those with minor agricultural interests in their districts have intruded into the agriculture domain on behalf of their constituents. Such intrusion consists of member initiation at the committee level of narrow policy proposals for constituents, proposals designed to provoke as little conflict as possible with other agricultural interests. The committees, in their turn, accommodate such member requests to a much greater degree than in the past, as they seek to build floor majorities in a more individualistic Congress.

Like scholars in a number of policy areas, Browne argues that these transformations make the "iron triangle," an inappropriate characterization of agricultural policy making. Although the traditional network of congressional committees, interest groups, and executive branch agencies still plays a role in this policy domain, he argues that the influence of the latter two in particular has declined, while that of rank and file members of Congress has increased. These members, working in networks of home state delegations, respond less to national agricultural interest groups than to their own constituents. Browne's argument for the partial eclipse of national agricultural interest groups by more atomized district interests is particularly astute. He shows that this pattern could reasonably have been predicted as a consequence of interest group scholarship. That research, both theoretical and empirical, shows that many groups have memberships that are divided over key issues; others have few members in the first place; while still others have little reason to represent accurately the interests of the members they do have. Thus, it makes sense for reelection-seeking members of Congress to treat national interest groups' entreaties with skepticism and tailor their legislative initiatives to their constituents' requests.

While Browne does consider the continued importance of the agriculture committees in this process, more analysis of the committees' internal processes in response to members' demands would have been welcome. However, his judgment of the impact of member individualism on agricultural policy is compelling: given that the agriculture committees find it expedient to accommodate most members who come to them with narrowly-framed, locally-inspired policy proposals, the net results for agricultural policy making are an overall decline in expertise and specialization in the process and less comprehensive, uncoordinated public policy.

In the course of this research Browne consulted an enormous number of sources. Although his most systematic data collection is from a random sample of 113 congressional offices, he interviewed several hundred others in Congress, the executive branch, and interest groups. His analysis is remarkably comprehensive, particularly in its examination of the role of individual members and their staffs in the policy-making process; additionally, he considers the impact of this fragmented, parochial policy-making process on the major agricultural programs, particularly farm income support. This is an excellent book that will find a well deserved place in the literature of congressional policy making, interest groups, and agricultural policy.

DIANA EVANS
Trinity College

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Party Conflict and Community Development: Postwar Politics in Ann Arbor *by Samuel J. Eldersveld. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1995. 271 pp. Paper, $19.95.*

Here is an important deviant case: it enlightens us about America by showing how Ann Arbor is "un-American." It sharpens our thinking about political parties and democratic theory. The grand American tradition—The Federalist Papers/Alexis de Tocqueville/Gabriel Almond/Sidney Verba/ Robert Putnam—stresses civic associations, not parties. American parties are often portrayed as a European peasant residue—for instance, the Robert Merton/ Edward Banfield/James Q. Wilson tradition stressed how parties helped the poor advance through patronage jobs and favors.

Eldersveld paints another picture. Unlike past work on local parties (usually studied in places like Chicago, Detroit, or Gary), in Ann Arbor the parties are not the preserve of lower-status persons joined through patronage and favors. Instead, the image is a squeaky clean, highly activist, partisan government, where, yes, there is civic activism. But parties are the central participants. The city manager and staff are clearly subordinate to the parties. Unusual.

Parties are critical: we find careful documentation on how they help structure public issues, mobilize voters' link with civic and interest groups, and discipline elected officials. They recruit activists into politics in a manner more like the New England Town Meeting ideal or the League of Women Voters than the Chicago machine. When Abner Mikva was a law student at Chicago, he volunteered his services to the local party organization. They said "Who sent ya" Answer: "Nobody." Reply: "We don't want nobody nobody sent." Such closed particularism (heightened by Irish Catholicism) is transformed in Ann Arbor into a more open and universalistic pattern. Politics is driven far more by policies and issues than the nonideological parties of Chicago and Detroit. ("What types of differences divide people here?" "Political views" answered 79 percent of Ann Arbor leaders compared to 19 percent in twenty-five other cities. p. 178).

In the 1950s, business leaders and the Republican party led in the council, but then the Democrats organized, and there has since been an actively competitive two-party system, which dramatically differentiates Ann Arbor from most U.S. cities. Eldersveld shows how the parties imitated each other in efforts to expand their voting base, although the most dramatic shift was in the 1970s, when the Human Rights party mobilized students and former students to turn out in vast numbers and brought young activists to power. Ann Arbor's council members have been young (in the 1970s 75 percent were under 40), often women (32 percent in the 1980s), and highly educated (75 percent had graduate degrees in the 1970s, 51 percent in the 1980s).

Does all this partisan activity make a difference? The turnout rates are not much above the U.S. average, but trust is. This is important for current debates by Robert Putnam, Seymour Martin Lipset and others on the decline of confidence in all political institutions. Not only do Ann Arbor residents report "trust in local government to do what is right just about always or most of the time" (71 percent in Ann Arbor, 55 percent nationally). They also report "trust in the government in Washington to do what is right just about always or most of the time" (50 percent in Ann Arbor, 29 percent nationally). Some differences from the national average are due simply to demographic composition (Ann Arbor has a disproportionately highly educated, professional population). But some are probably also a spillover from the positive specifics of Ann Arbor partisan democracy. Eldersveld, unfortunately, does not seriously seek to disentangle these types of effects.

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Eldersveld and legions of students have studied Ann Arbor for decades. He draws on their multiple citizen surveys, civic and political leader surveys, voting records, newspaper coverage, and budgets from 1945 to near present. As an activist himself for decades and past mayor, Eldersveld writes with deep knowledge of specifics. I would have preferred him to give us a bit more explicit ethnography, more examples to illustrate the general points. But Eldersveld is True Blue Michigan in favoring his survey data. There is lots here; do read it.

TERRY NICHOLS CLARK
The University of Chicago

Rebuilding the Inner City: A History of Neighborhood Initiatives to Address Poverty in the United States *by Robert Halpern. New York, Columbia University Press, 1995. 257 pp. Cloth, $49.50; paper, $17.00.*

This book has a substantial agenda, and its partial success is a testament to careful historical research on the part of the author. Halpern, a professor at Loyola University's Erikson Institute for Advanced Study in Child Development, has two goals. In addition to surveying the variety of poverty-related initiatives that has been implemented in poor inner city neighborhoods since the end of the nineteenth century, he wishes to interpret and draw broad lessons from this history. The book is far more successful in accomplishing the former than the much more difficult latter goal.

The book opens with a substantive introduction that highlights the themes the author will return to in the following pages. Two maintained assumptions are also introduced here, and remain important throughout. The first is that "Americans have preferred to view poverty as an individually and locally rooted problem . . ." (p. 6). Second is that "predominant economic and social arrangements" (p. 7) (capitalism combined with racism) are the sources of inner city poverty in the United States. Halpern's assumptions form the interpretive lens through which he views the successes and failures of neighborhood initiative. They also contribute to the major themes highlighted in the introduction. Two of these are that "[m]embers of neglected and depleted communities have . . . had no choice but to rely on their own efforts to counter the effects of their exclusion—to make something good of marginality," and that "[t]he logic of neighborhood initiative . . . can become illogic under conditions of resource scarcity and social exclusion" (p. 12). The social and economic isolation that engenders ghetto poverty has left residents to go it alone with neighborhood initiatives, but they face a daunting and potentially illogical task.

The seven chapters that follow the introduction proceed roughly chronologically, beginning with an analysis of the settlement movement and the Progressive era and concluding with a look at current and emerging neighborhood initiatives. The book is most useful for its retelling of this history, which is based mainly on secondary sources, as Halpern draws out the commonality of approach that has characterized efforts in different eras. The strength of the book is in its careful reading and use of both primary and secondary sources, and occasional case studies that bring the history to life.

One lesson that emerges quite clearly is that, in contrast to the claim advanced in the introduction, neighborhood initiatives have rarely been undertaken by inner city residents alone. The mobilization of outside resources has played a crucial role in inner city revitaliza-

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tion efforts throughout the period surveyed. A more important message is that "the historic experience with neighborhood initiative suggests that it is at best an ameliorative, not a transforming, problem solving strategy" (p. 221). Of course, if Halpern's structural view of the sources of poverty is correct, then it is difficult to imagine neighborhood-based programs that will successfully "address poverty in the United States." A strategy for addressing (and eliminating) structural inner city poverty must attack divisive social and economic arrangements, which predominate nationwide. Neighborhood initiatives have been less successful than they might have been, in part because they have often tried to use these locally oriented programs as a means of broad social transformation. Their sporadic attempts to do so have in the long run alienated both their sponsors and their clients. Reducing poverty is the surest way to improve the quality of life for inner city residents, but programs that focus on improving the quality of the inner city environment are not (and cannot be) society's primary means for accomplishing that goal.

ANDREW F. HAUGHWOUT
Princeton University

The Making of a Conservative Environmentalist *by Gordon K. Durnil. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1995. 200 pp. $19.95.*

Gordon Durnil, a former Indiana Republican state chairman, is also a lawyer, diplomat, and conservative environmentalist. He wrote this book because he was ". . . concerned that one of the largest barriers to achieving environmental protection is the artificial labeling of those who seek a clean environment as liberals and the labeling of conservatives as anti-environmentalists" (p. x). Rather, he feels that the policy debates in this area should take place on *how* we solve environmental problems, not on whether they should be solved. The means, as opposed to the ends of environmental protection, is thus what this book is about.

Among the procedures that Durnil advocates are pollution prevention by industry and the public, education in the elementary schools about the necessity of environmental protection, consultation and dialogue among all stakeholders in environmental disputes, conclusive proof of environmental harms before remedies are adopted, market-based approaches to environmental protection where possible, citizen empowerment with respect to environmental protection, and good communication from our elected leaders to the mass public about the nature of environmental problems. These remedies are well founded, and when taken together they offer a straightforward and coherent approach to the environmental problematique. Durnil does not, on the other hand, advocate a stronger approach by the federal, state, or local governments; instead, he deliberately avoids a reliance on public (government-based) approaches to environmental protection and pollution abatement.

It is refreshing to see books being written by those who do not come from a traditional liberal, antimarket, and pro-government perspective. Most of the prescriptive literature on solutions to environmental problems (with the exception of the "cornucopians" like Herman Kahn and Julian Simon and the "free-marketeers" like John Baden and Richard Stroup or Terry Anderson and Donald Leal), places greater hope in more stringent government regulation, more public funds for environmental protection, and more governmental bureaucracy to deal with the environmental dilemma.

The only weakness of the book is that Durnil is given to a great deal of personal musings about his upbringing, his core values, and the recent upsurge in Republican party support

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in the U.S. Congress. In this sense, the book reads in places more like an historical memoir than a serious treatment of the environmental dilemma and solutions to remedy it. The book might have been more effective if Durnil had made a stronger case, chapter by chapter, on his various prescriptions rather than digressing into his personal history and conservative leanings. Nevertheless, the book makes a decent contribution to the level of environmental discourse and offers an interesting counterpoint to most of what is available for students of the environment.

JAMES P. LESTER
Colorado State University

Regulation in the Reagan-Bush Era: The Eruption of Presidential Influence *by Barry D. Friedman. Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995. 261 pp. $39.95.*

In February 1981, President Ronald Reagan issued an executive order intended to set off a revolution. Executive regulatory agencies would now be required to submit all proposed rules to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for a cost-benefit analysis and then possible approval. Presidents Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Jimmy Carter had made some attempts at central coordination of regulation, but their efforts were minor when compared to a Reagan agenda quite awesome in its scope. This book describes the results of this revolution in the Reagan and subsequent administrations.

Surprisingly to some, this audacious claim to power fomented no counter-revolution. The major reaction from Congress and the courts was acquiescence and accommodation. This response cries out for explanation. Friedman provides it in a clear and effective discussion that combines legal, historical, political, and methodological analysis with case studies. Three relevant elements of a useful explanation are ambiguity in law, a desire to avoid responsibility, and the fact that most of the proposed regulations were not overruled by OMB.

The book starts with a brief history of national government regulation, beginning with economic regulation followed by social regulation. Economic regulation was mainly administered through independent regulatory agencies, social regulation most often by units within the executive branch.

The discussion of presidential oversight of regulation reads initially like the doctoral dissertation that it originally was. Then it becomes more productive as we move from whether the president can be involved to the more interesting questions of how the president is involved and for what purposes. The initial legal discussion moves inevitably toward an inconclusive end. Toleration of the executive's new role by Congress and the courts is based ultimately on political acquiescence by institutions that see political and institutional advantages in doing so.

Friedman clearly exposes the political and policy foundations of the Reagan program. The Reagan administration simply wanted to reduce the role of government in regulation and to benefit some of its ardent supporters. Presumably the election results entitled the president to try. The author's astute observations penetrate the aura of science surrounding the use of cost-benefit analysis, which, he argues, rests on the assumptions of the analysts and on the values assigned both to costs and benefits. A seemingly precise, scientific tool for analysis is revealed as the rather subjective instrument that it is.

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Friedman's discussion of opposition to the Reagan efforts shows that some objections were based on policy differences disguised as arguments about process and law, while others were rooted in conflicts over management techniques and due process. He shows the impact of OMB prodding on regulatory policy but takes care to show some positive management results as well. His own conclusions are mixed and mainly dispassionate.

Ultimately, the author shows convincingly that a determined president operating in a legally and politically permissive climate can use his ability to appoint personnel and to allocate resources to executive units to gain substantial policy ends. The president is not simply a symbol with no instrumental teeth.

Friedman's discussion and analysis seem largely persuasive. However, when he tries to ground his insightful, sensitive analysis in exchange theory (sic) he falters. From this reviewer's perspective, the analysis would stand firmly even if exchange theory had never been mentioned. Discussion based on institutional or individual advantage will do nicely. Some arguments do not necessarily profit from methodological embellishment.

MORRIS S. OGUL
University of Pittsburgh

The Bill: How the Adventures of Clinton's National Service Bill Reveal What is Corrupt, Comic, Cynical—and Noble—About Washington *by Steven Waldman. New York, Viking, 1995. 301 pp. $22.95.*

Steven Waldman has written a remarkably detailed account of the National and Community Service Trust Act of 1993, otherwise known as Americorps or National Service. Using his access as a *Newsweek* reporter to maximum advantage, Waldman leaves virtually no detail left unmentioned, no twist left undocumented, and no participant left uninterviewed. Readers are literally overwhelmed with details on the intricacies of President Bill Clinton's National Service plan and its legislative progress. And therein lie both the weakness and the strength of this case study book.

Start with the weakness. Although the National Service legislation was a complicated idea and was eventually split into two separate bills, it is hardly the most complex legislation to pass in recent memory. However difficult it was to translate into legislative language and however unique the story, National Service is hardly in the league of Jimmy Carter's energy reforms, Ronald Reagan's 1981 budget and tax cuts, or Bill Clinton's own national health care bill.

Yet, this book renders the history of the National Service plan in such detail that the ordinary student will quickly become lost. Indeed, lacking a firm grasp of government-sponsored loan programs, even the best prepared reader must have a notepad handy to keep track of the details. In a sense, Waldman has lost the forest of a provocative, inherently interesting reform for the trees of the bill itself. Professors who imagine using this book in an introductory American government course should think twice. Even students who come through the National Service program to their classes will find the material much too thick to track.

The problem with *The Bill* seems painfully simple: the author knows too much. Unlike those who toil at a distance from reform, perhaps Waldman had too much access, too many interviews, too many names to track. And having collected all the detail, Waldman simply

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does not know when to ignore the details. At the same time, however, students will not emerge with a very good sense of the overall setting of reform. There is very little here about why Congress or the presidency work the way they do.

Although students are hardly the only audience for the book, this is very much an inside-the-beltway read. Those who are familiar with the players will easily nod with Waldman's razor-sharp descriptions of the players; he easily captures the personal quirks of Eli Segal and Bill Galston, two key White House advisers. But those who do not know Washington may end up frustrated with the facile nature of the description. Does it really matter, for example, that Galston has the tendency to insert the word "yo" into every other sentence? And if so, why?

The strength of the book is in the details, too. This is likely to be the definitive history of the National Service plan. Every key meeting, every key conversation, every slight change in the bill is chronicled. Waldman is clearly a gifted writer and has done a magnificent job organizing his material. Following a two-track process is no small achievement, and he does particularly well knitting together his details. His analysis of Eli Segal's operating style and overall commitment is stellar, for example, and renders Segal as close to a hero as this book ever gets. Alas, because Waldman is reluctant to write about the villains of reform, readers may end up wondering whey the bill really took so long. And despite its subtitle, this book has far too little about the adventures of Clinton's National Service bill, and far too much on the intricacies of how the White House came to closure on the details.

PAUL C. LIGHT
The Pew Charitable Trusts

Downsizing Defense *edited by Ethan Barnaby Kapstein. Washington, DC, Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1995. 236 pp. $24.95.*

This book has ten chapters. Ethan Kapstein provides a preface and a conclusion. Roger E. Brinner writes about the effect of defense reductions on the American economy; John E. Lynch and Billy R. Dickens, regional effects; Kenneth R. Mayer, Congress and the defense budget; Peter Trubowitz, regional politics. Yevgeny Kuznetsov describes the collapse of the Soviet military-industrial complex. Richard T. Minnich argues that some American defense firms may learn to serve commercial markets, but most defense plants won't and, if not kept open by the Pentagon, will be closed. Bernard Udis notes the absence of discussion of downsizing in Western Europe and of government conversion policy. Major European defense firms look to exports and collaboration with foreign partners to survive. Nevertheless, most have increased their commercial sales.

Europe can redeploy more of its existing defense capital to commercial purposes than America, because it is newer and less specialized. The American arms industry relies on some of the oldest manufacturing plant and equipment in the world, much of it configured for volume assembly and dating back to World War II. Moreover, the core competency of most American defense firms is their ability to satisfy the military procurement system; it is unlikely this will provide competitive advantage in commercial markets.

David Blair focuses on the defense industrial base. He says that we don't know which specific capabilities are needed to meet future military contingencies, that the existing system of military assessment cannot provide satisfactory answers to this question, and that even if we had answers, they couldn't be implemented through the existing procurement system,

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which is oriented to the acquisition of weapons not the maintenance of capital stock. He poses the issue as a choice between arms-length, quasi-competitive procurements (the American model) and reliance on close, long-term relationships with a few suppliers, nurtured and supported by the Pentagon. (Blair describes this as the French model, but it is how many firms organize relationships with component suppliers.) He concludes that the American model is inconsistent with rational pruning of the military industrial base, but doubts that the French is administratively or politically feasible.

Finally, Murray Weidenbaum repeats the argument that the Pentagon should rely on the commercial sector of the economy for more of the things it buys and greatly simplify its acquisitions process, substituting wherever possible commercial prices, specifications, and practices for the existing system of arms-length, quasi-competitive procurements.

It is possible that Weidenbaum's argument is finally ripe to be heard. The dysfunctions of the existing system loom large, in part because they are no longer masked by economies of scale. Moreover, technological changes have produced a convergence in military and commercial components and products, so that some defense markets can now mimic consumer durables markets where before they couldn't. These technological changes are, of course, the same ones that are driving the so-called new public management in other areas and countries—deregulating, privatizing, contracting out, emphasizing outputs, performance contracts, monetary targets and incentives, and freedom to manage.

Can Weidenbaum's argument be reconciled with Blair's? Perhaps. Both actually favor sound commercial practice. Investment in use-specific assets generally calls for integration between buyer and seller. However, the only use-specific investments that are vital to America's security involve the capability to design and manufacture systems that confer tactical or strategic advantage—high tech weapons, communications and information-processing equipment, and systems integration. Everything else, including most platforms, could be safely purchased off-the-shelf, either here or abroad. In the foreseeable future, wars will be fought from existing inventories, as was the case with Desert Storm.

FRED THOMPSON
Willamette University

Women and Public Policy: A Revolution in Progress *by M. Margaret Conway, David W. Ahern, and Gertrude Steuernagel. Washington, DC, Congressional Quarterly Press, 1995. 213 pp. Paper, $19.95.*

This volume seeks to describe the impact of cultural change on women's roles in American society and to assess changing patterns of public policy as they affect women and families. Culture as it is defined in the volume refers to the ways in which identity is formed—largely by interactions with people and institutions. According to the authors, the cultural approach emphasizes factors such as class, ethnicity, religion and race, and their relationship to the political significance of gender. The authors suggest that the connection between cultural change and public policy may be illustrated by the emergence of women as an electoral force and the increased number of women who hold public office. In this book, three models of the policy-making process are suggested for analysis. The first is policy as a result of the changes in elite composition and attitudes; the second, policy as the result of interaction between groups (although not named, this is really a pluralist model); and third, policy as

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the incremental result of past policies that have occurred over time. The volume is divided into three sections: changes in the way institutions treat women; changes in women's role in the family; changes in women's economic condition.

Women and Public Policy is especially timely in presenting up-to-date information about a number of important policies. Each chapter presents a different one, describes its origins and political development, and assesses its status as of 1993. The policies under review are taken through the state of formulation and adoption to the important stage of implementation and enforcement. This comprehensive approach to specific policies makes the book a valuable resource for students and scholars.

Among the policy areas discussed are education and health. In the interesting section on women and health, the authors point to the strong relationship between culture and policy. (This chapter is one of the most convincing with regard to these two dimensions of analysis.) While health care has been construed as gender neutral, in fact women live longer, have higher costs for care as a result, and comprise a higher percentage of the poor receiving health services. Women are primary recipients of health policy, but have little participation in decision making. Prenatal and reproductive issues present challenges to the gender neutral model; and as is now well known, studies of heart disease and illness, ignoring women, have subsumed both genders under a male model. The authors refer to this and other phenomena that ignore women, as "policy silences."

Additional chapters treat other important policies. The section on equal employment discusses the history of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and points to the fact that the legislation calls for enforcement by judicial action rather than administrative hearings. The authors document the shift from a more proactive strategy of affirmative action and investigations of patterns and practices to a decrease in effort under Ronald Reagan and George Bush. In the case of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, the chapter chronicles the strengthening of the law's scope by legislative amendments throughout the 1980s. Access to commercial and business credit was expanded and written explanations were required for rejected credit applicants. Among the demonstrable impacts has been the increase of women business owners from 5 percent in the 1970s to 30 percent in 1988, with a projected 50 percent in the year 2000. Nonetheless, the authors conclude that low priority was given to government enforcement of this policy and that gains made were due to market forces, once lenders became aware that their self-interest was served by increasing women's credit worthiness. Chapters dealing with women's economic role do an excellent job of documenting women's partial access to retirement pensions as a result of limited connections to the paid labor force and also raise questions regarding the practice of gender-based insurance ratings.

This volume is best regarded as an important resource, primarily for students but also for scholars. While the chapters present important information regarding the specific policies addressed, they are largely descriptive. At their best, they combine the impact of culture and issues related to implementation in a deft and interesting manner, as in the case of women and health. Elsewhere, the discussion is a bit more pedestrian, largely presenting a compendium of important facts. Several chapters have been written by other authors (Earlean McCarrick and Robert Jerry), and in this reader's view, there is an occasional lack of uniformity between the chapter styles as a result. There is also considerable repetition, for example, on pension inequity, and an occasional discrepancy, such as the disparate figures presented on male/female salary inequity in different chapters.

It is be to hoped that the important material gathered in "Women and Public Policy" (viewed by the authors as an introduction to the subject) will be further analyzed by other scholars. This volume concentrates solely on policy outputs: the three models of policy

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introduced at the outset are not really incorporated into the various subject chapters. What is the relationship between cultural change and public policy? Which precedes the other? What factors explain the relative success in some areas and relative failure in others (for example, education versus day care)? What of the role of women's groups in monitoring the policy process, particularly including the implementation stage? (The latter part of the policy process is particularly well covered in several of the chapters of this book.) How to relate the concept of "policy silence" discussed in the health chapter, for example, to housing and other policies addressed elsewhere in the volume? In the final analysis, does the information presented in *Women and Public Policy* provide convincing evidence of the volume's subtitle: *A Revolution in Progress?* The answer to this final question and the others that preceded it could provide the authors of this important volume with material for a second volume.

JOYCE GELB
Graduate Center,
City University of New York

Changing Differences: Women and the Shaping of American Foreign Policy, 1917–1924
by Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones. New Brunswick, NJ, Rutgers University Press, 1995. 275 pp. $24.95.

"Changing differences" refers to the shifting relationship of women to American foreign policy throughout the twentieth century. Yet, despite these differences in tactics and issues, the primary contention of this work is that: "Women have always been especially inclined to support peace" (p. 10). The principal goal is thus to amass historical evidence of women's peaceful activities. Readers who are generally in agreement with this perspective, based upon ideas of "nurturant motherhood," should find the argument persuasive, while those who are less sure may consider the results unsatisfying.

Twenty-five years ago, Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones began studying the impact upon American foreign policy of six social groups: organized labor, citizens of color, immigrants, university students, consumer organizations, and women. This book represents the first results of this inquiry, concentrating upon the influence of women. Since it is maintained that women have had little impact on foreign policy in early American history, the intent is to examine the real leverage women have had since they won the vote in 1920.

Jeffreys-Jones argues that women's impact has been most visible in the arena of public opinion. In this context, he develops two major foci: how women formed themselves into distinct pressure groups to have an impact on foreign policy; and famous women, who were not part of a uniform movement, but who also sought foreign policy influence. Chapters 1 through 4 reflect the author's real forte, a well documented historical account of how women worked in a variety of ways for a more peaceful world from the 1920s to 1940s. He examines the background and public opinion impact of women's interest groups, particularly the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF). Included in this discussion are women such as Jane Addams and Carrie Chapman Catt, as well as analyses of the tariff debates and the 1932 disarmament conference. Chapters 5 and 6 detail the activities of women outside the major interest groups, such as Dorothy Detzer (and her investigations of munitions manufacture) along with Harriet Elliott and Eleanor Roosevelt.

However, after the 1940s, the investigation shifts. Instead of continuing the discussion of interest groups, Chapters 7 and 8 are extended examinations of the careers of Margaret

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Chase Smith and Bella Abzug. Margaret Chase Smith's denial of being a feminist and her conservative, hawkish positions on defense would seem to argue against the author's central proposition. Yet, his rejoinder that Smith was in her own way a peace-seeking stateswoman presages the argument of Chapter 9 that the image of the Iron Lady is a myth. His digression here into examining the impact of women in executive positions throughout the world is justified by arguing both that foreign women leaders have had more influence on American foreign policy than have American women, and that U.S. female ambitions are being realized vicariously abroad. The examples of Margaret Thatcher, Golda Meir, Indira Gandhi, Sirimavo Bandaranaike, Khaleda Zia, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Vigdis Finnbogadottir, and Gro Harlem Brundtland are all presented as proof that women are more peaceful or less belligerent than their male equivalents. However, the evidence provided gives the impression of being selectively chosen to fit his hypothesis. The judgment, for instance, that Margaret Thatcher is one of the most peaceful premieres in British History is somewhat disquieting. In conclusion, Chapter 10 addresses the positions of women within the contemporary foreign policy process. Unfortunately, the last four chapters do not follow logically, and one wonders why the author did not continue the original investigation of interest groups.

In the past, most accounts of women in foreign policy have concentrated upon the unique-women approach, or were histories of the foreign policy establishments themselves. Thus, Jeffreys-Jones's focus on interest groups provides an interesting alternative. His conclusion is one with which few American feminists would disagree: the United States is held up as the leading democracy, but American women have been left behind. Since there has as yet been no female chief executive in the United States, American women are classified as among the "missing sisters of world politics."

MEREDITH REID SARKEES
Niagara University

Political Stability and Democracy in Mexico: The "Perfect Dictatorship?" *by Dan A. Cothran. Westport, CT, Praeger, 1994. 252 pp. $55.00.*

This book joins a long list of high-quality monographs on Mexico published by nonuniversity presses. Like most, it is empirically thorough and accurate but lacks analytical bite. Cothran argues that six factors made Mexican government "the perfect dictatorship": institutionalization, adaptability, economic effectiveness, elite unity, use of coercion, and location next to the United States. But conditions have changed, and while once assets, these characteristics of Mexican politics and economics are now liabilities. Exactly what kind of political instability the future holds—breakdown and chaos or relatively orderly transition to multiparty democracy—Cochran does not venture to say.

The student of theory in comparative politics is disappointed on two scores. First, Cothran raises but does not answer questions about the conditions making certain regime characteristics stabilizing or destabilizing. He provides an eclectic theory of static cross-regime comparison that adds little to current theoretical debates. On the question of change, he implicitly conveys a sense that history is the driving force of comparative politics and that generalization lies beyond reach. This contaminates our faith in his theoretical pretensions; the book is at its best detailing and summarizing twentieth-century Mexican politics.

For the Mexican specialist there are some interesting additions to standard accounts. For example, a detailed chapter on the Luis Echeverria Alvarez years discusses the president's

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anti-Zionist vote in the UN and the American Jewish boycott that forced him to recant. It also highlights the importance of black humor in Mexican politics and translates several jokes indicative of Echeverria's downfall. The chapter on Echeverria is possibly the most balanced account of his presidency available in English. The chapter on elite unity includes an excellent review of the 1988 elections. Similarly, the chapter on economic performance and political stability during the Mexican "miracle" years is ideal background reading for undergraduate audiences. Yet the chapter on Carlos Salinas de Gortari surprises with its neglect of economics, especially given the theoretical emphasis accorded economic performance earlier in the book. The chapter on political institutionalization rehashes existing work.

The book predicts political instability in Mexico in the coming years, which seems prescient in an era when Ponce de Léon Zedillo refers to himself as an opposition president and coup rumors have resurfaced for the first time in twenty years. But this is not a book about the current conjuncture in Mexican politics. It is a very readable account of Mexican politics in the twentieth century, well suited to upper-level seminars in Mexican or Latin American politics.

SYLVIA MAXFIELD
Yale University

Opposition in South Africa: The Leadership of Z. K. Matthews, Nelson Mandela and Stephen Biko *by Tim J. Juckes. Westport, CT, Praeger Publishers, 1995. 207pp. $49.95.*

Tim J. Juckes tackles a perennial political problem: what is the role of leaders in affecting overall political outcomes. The question is particularly interesting as applied to South Africa, because the country had at once a highly institutionalized political system that was seemingly impervious to individual calls for change and a history of black leaders who protested against apartheid.

The analysis is conducted through brief histories of three South African leaders: Z.K. Matthews, Nelson Mandela, and Stephen Biko. In well written narratives, the author traces the political development of each and tries to say something about the individuals' effect on society. Juckes takes the position that individuals can affect society but may not always do so and that society affects the individual characteristics of leaders. While this is probably the position most analysts would bring to a problem, the author implies that he is nearly alone in arguing against "individualism" or "social reductionism." Indeed, the major analytic flaw of the book is that the author does not go further with his own analysis. When can a leader make a particular impact is the obviously important question to ask, but the study spends too much time jousting with strawmen to go far in producing a nuanced analysis.

A particular flaw in the book is that it only considers Nelson Mandela's leadership in the 1960s. Nothing is said about his role in helping initiate and then negotiate the transition to nonracial rule, despite the fact that he has dominated South African politics since his release from prison in 1990. This omission may just be an unfortunate sign of a determination to finish a study irrespective of what is actually happening in the news.

Alternatively, the omission of Mandela's role in the 1990s may reflect the fact that so consequential was the current South African president's role in changing the country that he may be challenging the analytic framework of the book. It is actually hard to imagine the transition occurring in South Africa without Mandela. Another black leader or group of

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leaders may not have had his particular mix of vision, authority, and legitimacy that was necessary both to negotiate with the whites and sell the deal to his own constituency.

It is probably the case that the definitive study on leadership in South Africa remains to be done.

JEFFREY HERBST
Princeton University

Red Scare: Memories of the American Inquisition, An Oral History *by Griffin Fariello. New York, Norton, 1995. 575 pp. $29.95.*

If nothing else, the anticommunist political repression of the 1940s and 1950s produced good stories. Many of the best are in this collection of oral history interviews. As historical memory fades and the McCarthy era is no longer part of the lived experience of people under the age of fifty-five, the value of having such a lively readable introduction to that era becomes increasingly more important.

During the course of compiling this collection, San Francisco writer Griffin Fariello interviewed about 150 survivors of the cold war Red Scare, victims and victimizers alike. Among the seventy-one whose testimony appears here are the playwright Arthur Miller, folk-singer Pete Seeger, screenwriter Ring Lardner, Jr., former Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr., former Communist party leader Steve Nelson, as well as Alger Hiss and one of the Rosenbergs's sons.

These are not unfamiliar names, and in fact most of these people's stories have been told before. Over a third of Fariello's subjects have published memoirs or been interviewed, filmed, or written about elsewhere. Some of the most fascinating accounts come from the so-called hounds, the FBI agents and other professionals who operated the machinery of repression. There is, for example, a chilling interview with a near-fascist State Department security officer who talks about Joseph McCarthy and "those two kikes" (Roy Cohn and David Schine) and discusses the "sodomites" (p. 123) he got fired without a hearing. His only regrets are that some of them then committed suicide before a decent interval transpired.

It may be unfair to judge a book like this from a scholarly perspective, for it does a fine job of evoking the political and psychological stresses of the McCarthy years. But it also misrepresents much of what went on and perpetuates some of that era's most troubling myths. Much of the problem stems from the author's uncritical approach to his subjects. Most of them are, after all, extraordinarily interesting and sympathetic human beings who were unjustly victimized. But they were not "innocent" victims. Most were in or near the Communist party—something Fariello either does not know or does not want to reveal.

By failing to confront this issue, the author garbles the story. Because the party usually required its rank-and-file members to conceal their identity, it helped distort its own image by making it impossible for ordinary Communists to counter the demonized stereotypes that circulated during the early cold war. It also gave its enemies the potent weapon of exposure and transformed the mere fact of belonging to the party into an unnecessarily sensitive issue. Though understandable at the time, such concealment is now counterproductive. It continues to mystify the history of American communism and anticommunism and allows Fariello to repeat the traditionally misleading claim that "involvement in any organization concerned with social reform or the spread of ideas was automatically suspect" (p. 130). By conflating

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the impact of the Red Scare with its intent, such an assertion makes it appear more random and unpredictable than it really was.

Equally misleading is the author's skewed sampling of McCarthy era survivors. Because there are few trade union activists among them, this volume recapitulates the show-biz orientation of earlier literature and overlooks the cold war Red Scare's devastating impact on the left-wing of the American labor movement. The historical profession has corrected that error, but Fariello seems not to know. Most of the studies that he relies upon for his explanatory material are seriously out of date. This failure to utilize the standard scholarship on American communism and anticommunism is regrettable. It undermines an otherwise useful collection by perpetuating myths about McCarthyism that impede the historical understanding we need to avoid a recurrence.

ELLEN SCHRECKER
Yeshiva University

Shaping Europe's Military Order: The Origins and Consequences of the CFE Treaty *by Richard A. Falkenrath. Cambridge, MA, The MIT Press, 1995. 300 pp. Cloth, $39.95; paper, $17.95.*

The author has written an excellent study of the origins, negotiation, and consequences of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, the most ambitious exercise in arms control and disarmament ever undertaken. Remarkably, it was also one of the most rapidly negotiated, in spite of the disintegration of the treaty's political premises during the course of the negotiations in 1989 and 1990.

The author, who has made exhaustive use of the available English-language literature on the subject, including much in translation from the Russian as well as interviews with many of the principals, analyzes the CFE Treaty from several angles: in terms of its origins in both the long and fruitless history of conventional arms talks in the 1970s and 1980s as well as the new Soviet security agenda of Mikhail Gorbachev; the interaction of the CFE negotiations with the disintegration of the bipolar bloc structure in Europe and growing domestic reaction against the treaty in the USSR; problems in ratifying and implementing the treaty following the fragmentation of the USSR into fifteen states and the breakup of the Warsaw Pact; and the lessons that the CFE experience holds for other settings in which conventional arms control may be considered.

One of the most interesting insights is provided by the author's discussion of how, even though the treaty had become obsolete midway into the talks, given bilateral Soviet agreements with the states of East-Central Europe to withdraw its military forces from the region, all thought of renegotiating was repulsed. Western negotiators saw the growing domestic reaction against Gorbachev and wanted to lock in Soviet agreement to truly massive reductions while there was still time to do so. Moreover, they were deterred by the sheer magnitude of the task of renegotiating incredibly complex treaty terms that required unanimous consent among a score of states. The treaty appears to have had important residual value in providing a framework for reconfiguring Germany's armed forces during the negotiations on German unification, though one of the perverse results of the treaty's counting rules was that it enabled the United States and Germany to transfer large quantities of aging equipment to countries like Greece, Turkey, and Spain. These countries' conventional combat effectiveness was

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dramatically increased while the United States and Germany were able to maintain and even bolster their state-of-the art armored forces without violating the terms of the treaty.

While the author is surely right that the treaty's significance is now largely historical, and that most of its lessons are not applicable to other regions of the world, there is also, as the author notes, unfinished business to be attended to. The treaty dramatically limits Russia's ability to deploy forces along its northern and southern peripheries. While this made sense in the context of the cold war, it hardly corresponds to Russia's current security situation, which is dominated by instability along Russia's southern borders in the Caucuses and Central Asia. How this anomaly is addressed, whether by unilateral or negotiated means, will say much about the extent to which the experience accumulated during the CFE talks can be translated into diplomatic capital under very different international circumstances.

ALLEN LYNCH
University of Virginia

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Reference Books and Other Publications of Interest Received

The Access Guide to International Affairs Internships: Washington DC *edited by Bruce Seymore II and Matthew T. Higham. Washington, DC, Access, 1996. 157 pp. $19.95.*

Accessing U.S. Government Information, Revised and Expanded Edition: Subject Guide to Jurisdiction of the Executive and Legislative Branches *compiled by Jerrold Zwirn. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1996. 200 pp. $59.95.*

Basic Documents on International Law and the Environment *by Patricia W. Birnie and Alan Boyle. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996. 688 pp. $38.00.*

Candidates '96: Profiles of Presidential Contenders *edited by Ronald D. Elving. Washington, DC, Congressional Quarterly Press, 1996. 160 pp. $18.95.*

Charting Democracy in America: Landmarks from History and Political Thought *by Alfred Fernbach and Julian Bishko. Lanham, MD, American University Press, 1995. 425 pp. $34.00.*

Church and State in the Modern Age: A Documentary History *edited by J. F. Maclear. New York, Oxford University Press, 1995. 510 pp. $65.00.*

The Congressional Yearbook 1994, 103rd Congress, 2nd Session. *Washington, DC, Congressional Quarterly Press, 1995. 289 pp. Cloth, $33.95; paper, $23.95.*

Election Law Cases and Materials *by Daniel Hays Lowenstein. Durham, NC, Carolina Academic Press, 1995. 821 pp. $75.00.*

The Encyclopedia of Democracy, Volumes 1–4 *edited by Seymour Martin Lipset. Washington, DC, Congressional Quarterly Press, 1995. 1,950 pp. $395.00.*

Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War *edited by Stanley I. Kutler. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1996. 711 pp. $99.00.*

Guide to the 1996 Presidential Election *by Michael L. Goldstein. Washington, DC, Congressional Quarterly Press, 1995. 93 pp. $17.95.*

How to Access the Government's Electronic Bulletin Boards *by Bruce Maxwell. Washington, DC, Congressional Quarterly Press, 1996. 394 pp. $22.95.*

The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt and Brander Matthews *edited by Lawrence J. Oliver. Knoxville, University of Tennessee Press, 1996. 240 pp. $27.00.*

Members of Congress: A Bibliography *by Robert U. Goehlert, Fenton S. Martin, and John R. Sayre. Washington, DC, Congressional Quarterly Press, 1996. 507 pp. $175.00.*

Politics in the American States: A Comparative Analysis *by Virginia Gray and Herbert Jacob. Washington, DC, Congressional Quarterly Press, 1996. 560 pp. $34.95.*

Ralph J. Bunche: Selected Speeches & Writings *edited by Charles P. Henry. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1996. 330 pp. $37.50.*

SIPRI Yearbook 1995: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security *by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. New York, Oxford University Press, 1995. 920 pp. $95.00.*

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Slaughter Among Neighbors: The Political Origins of Communal Violence *by Human Rights Watch. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1995. 188 pp. Cloth, $30.00; paper, $15.00.*

The Speaker: Leadership in the U.S. House of Representatives *edited by Ronald M. Peters. Washington, DC, Congressional Quarterly Press, 1995. 288 pp. $23.95.*

The Supreme Court Justices: Illustrated Biographies, 1789–1995, 2nd ed. *edited by Clare Cushman. Washington, DC, Congressional Quarterly Press, 1995. 588 pp. $33.95.*

The United Nations and Somalia: 1992–1996, with an introduction by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Blue Book Series Volume VIII *by the United Nations. New York, United Nations Publications, 1996. 516 pp. $29.95.*

The U. S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships, Part IV: July 1965–January 1968 *by William Conrad Gibbons. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1995. 969 pp. Cloth, $79.50; paper, $24.95.*

U. S. Women's Interest Groups: Institutional Profiles *edited by Sarah Slavin. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1995. 688 pp. $99.50.*

Vital Statistics on American Politics, 5th ed. *by Harold W. Stanley and Richard G. Niemi. Washington, DC, Congressional Quarterly Press, 1995. 440 pp. $39.95.*

Vital Statistics on Congress, 1995–1996 *by Norman J. Ornstein, Thomas E. Mann, and Michael J. Malbin. Washington, DC, Congressional Quarterly Press, 1996. 291 pp. Cloth, $46.95; paper, $32.95.*

Vital Statistics on the Presidency: Washington to Clinton *by Lyn Ragsdale. Washington, DC, Congressional Quarterly Press, 1996. 455 pp. Cloth, $46.95; paper, $32.95.*

Western Political Thought: A Bibliographical Guide to Post-war Research *compiled by Robert Eccleshall and Michael Kenny. Manchester, England, Manchester University Press, 1995. 342 pp. $79.95.*

Who's Who in Washington Nonprofit Groups, 1995. *Washington, DC, Congressional Quarterly Press, 1995. 305 pp. $15.95.*

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

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

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
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

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